new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,1305 @@
+From f7a2e90e80fd8b4c43042f8099e821b4118234d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:24:40 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ssl: compile against OSSL 3.0
+
+Compile against OpenSSL. This moves functions non-deprecated things if
+possible and ignores deprecation warnings when not. Padding manipulation
+routines seem to have been marked deprecated in OSSL 3.0, so we need to
+figure out a porting strategy here.
+
+Fixes: #686
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
+
+---
+ src/lib/backend_esysdb.c | 5 +-
+ src/lib/backend_fapi.c | 5 +-
+ src/lib/encrypt.c | 2 +-
+ src/lib/mech.c | 72 +---
+ src/lib/object.c | 3 +-
+ src/lib/sign.c | 2 +-
+ src/lib/ssl_util.c | 531 ++++++++++++++++--------
+ src/lib/ssl_util.h | 31 +-
+ src/lib/tpm.c | 6 +-
+ src/lib/utils.c | 35 +-
+ src/lib/utils.h | 13 -
+ test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c | 94 ++---
+ 12 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 358 deletions(-)
+
+Index: git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
++++ git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ #include "config.h"
+ #include "backend_esysdb.h"
+ #include "db.h"
++#include "ssl_util.h"
+ #include "tpm.h"
+
+ CK_RV backend_esysdb_init(void) {
+@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_unseal_wrappi
+ }
+
+ twist sealsalt = user ? sealobj->userauthsalt : sealobj->soauthsalt;
+- twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
++ twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
+ if (!sealobjauth) {
+ rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto error;
+@@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_changeauth(to
+ */
+ twist oldsalt = !user ? tok->esysdb.sealobject.soauthsalt : tok->esysdb.sealobject.userauthsalt;
+
+- twist oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt);
++ twist oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt);
+ if (!oldauth) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
++++ git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include "backend_fapi.h"
+ #include "emitter.h"
+ #include "parser.h"
++#include "ssl_util.h"
+ #include "utils.h"
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_FAPI
+@@ -793,7 +794,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_unseal_wrapping
+ }
+
+ twist sealsalt = user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt;
+- twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
++ twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt);
+ if (!sealobjauth) {
+ rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ goto error;
+@@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_changeauth(toke
+ }
+ rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+
+- oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt);
++ oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt);
+ if (!oldauth) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/encrypt.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/encrypt.c
++++ git/src/lib/encrypt.c
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void encrypt_op_data_free(encrypt_op_dat
+ CK_RV sw_encrypt_data_init(mdetail *mdtl, CK_MECHANISM *mechanism, tobject *tobj, sw_encrypt_data **enc_data) {
+
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+- CK_RV rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/mech.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/mech.c
++++ git/src/lib/mech.c
+@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ CK_RV ecc_keygen_validator(mdetail *m, C
+ }
+
+ int nid = 0;
+- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+@@ -857,11 +857,11 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl
+ }
+
+ /* Apply the PKCS1.5 padding */
+- int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, padded_len,
+- inbuf, inlen);
+- if (!rc) {
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(inbuf, inlen,
++ outbuf, padded_len);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ return rv;
+ }
+
+ *outlen = padded_len;
+@@ -893,22 +893,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_unsynthesizer(mdetail *md
+ size_t key_bytes = *keybits / 8;
+
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+- int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(buf, sizeof(buf),
+- inbuf, inlen,
+- key_bytes);
+- if (rc < 0) {
++ CK_ULONG buflen = sizeof(buf);
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(inbuf, inlen, key_bytes,
++ buf, &buflen);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ LOGE("Could not recover CKM_RSA_PKCS Padding");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ return rv;
+ }
+
+- /* cannot be < 0 because of check above */
+- if (!outbuf || (unsigned)rc > *outlen) {
+- *outlen = rc;
++ if (!outbuf || buflen > *outlen) {
++ *outlen = buflen;
+ return outbuf ? CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL : CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+- *outlen = rc;
+- memcpy(outbuf, buf, rc);
++ *outlen = buflen;
++ memcpy(outbuf, buf, buflen);
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+@@ -944,50 +943,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pss_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl,
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp_attr = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+- if (!exp_attr) {
+- LOGE("Signing key has no CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+ if (modulus_attr->ulValueLen > *outlen) {
+ LOGE("Output buffer is too small, got: %lu, required at least %lu",
+ *outlen, modulus_attr->ulValueLen);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(exp_attr->pValue, exp_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+- if (!e) {
+- LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+- BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(modulus_attr->pValue, modulus_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
+- if (!n) {
+- LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum");
+- BN_free(e);
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+- RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+- if (!rsa) {
+- LOGE("oom");
+- return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+- }
+-
+- int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
+- if (!rc) {
+- LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key");
+- BN_free(n);
+- BN_free(e);
+- RSA_free(rsa);
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attrs, &pkey);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ return rv;
+ }
+
+- rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf,
+- inbuf, md, -1);
+- RSA_free(rsa);
+- if (!rc) {
++ rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(pkey, inbuf, md, outbuf);
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed");
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/object.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/object.c
++++ git/src/lib/object.c
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include "object.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+ #include "session_ctx.h"
++#include "ssl_util.h"
+ #include "token.h"
+ #include "utils.h"
+
+@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ CK_RV tobject_get_min_buf_size(tobject *
+ }
+
+ int nid = 0;
+- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/sign.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/sign.c
++++ git/src/lib/sign.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static sign_opdata *sign_opdata_new(mdet
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+- rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
++ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.c
++++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/sha.h>
+
++#include "attrs.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+ #include "ssl_util.h"
+@@ -19,194 +20,228 @@
+ #include <openssl/evperr.h>
+ #endif
+
+-#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
++#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#endif
+
+ /*
+- * Pre openssl 1.1 doesn't have EC_POINT_point2buf, so use EC_POINT_point2oct to
+- * create an API compatible version of it.
++ * TODO Port these routines
++ * Deprecated function block to port
++ *
++ * There are no padding routine replacements in OSSL 3.0.
++ * - per Matt Caswell (maintainer) on mailing list.
++ * Signature verification can likely be done with EVP Verify interface.
+ */
+-size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+- point_conversion_form_t form,
+- unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) {
+-
+- /* Get the required buffer length */
+- size_t len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, 0, NULL);
+- if (!len) {
+- return 0;
+- }
++#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
++#pragma GCC diagnostic push
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
++#endif
+
+- /* allocate it */
+- unsigned char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+- if (!buf) {
+- return 0;
+- }
++CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
++ const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf) {
+
+- /* convert it */
+- len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx);
+- if (!len) {
+- OPENSSL_free(buf);
+- return 0;
++ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
++ if (!rsa) {
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- *pbuf = buf;
+- return len;
+-}
++ int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf,
++ inbuf, md, -1);
+
+-size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
++ return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++}
+
+- if (!obj) {
+- return 0;
+- }
++CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen) {
+
+- return obj->length;
++ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, outbuflen,
++ inbuf, inlen) == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+-const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) {
++CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen) {
+
+- if (!obj) {
+- return NULL;
++ int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(outbuf, *outbuflen,
++ inbuf, inlen, rsa_len);
++ if (rc < 0) {
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- return obj->data;
++ /* cannot be negative due to check above */
++ *outbuflen = rc;
++ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+-const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x) {
+- return ASN1_STRING_data((ASN1_STRING *)x);
+-}
++#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
++#endif
+
+-int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
++#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300)
+
+- if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
+- return 0;
+- }
++static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
++
++ OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
++ OSSL_PARAM_BN("n", n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen),
++ OSSL_PARAM_BN("e", e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen),
++ OSSL_PARAM_END
++ };
+
+- if (n != NULL) {
+- BN_free(r->n);
+- r->n = n;
++ /* convert params to EVP key */
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL);
++ if (!evp_ctx) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id");
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (e != NULL) {
+- BN_free(r->e);
+- r->e = e;
++ int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx);
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init");
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (d != NULL) {
+- BN_free(r->d);
+- r->d = d;
++ rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params);
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata");
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- return 1;
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++
++ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+-int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) {
++static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
++
++ /*
++ * The simplest way I have found to deal with this is to convert the ASN1 object in
++ * the ecparams attribute (was done previously with d2i_ECParameters) is to a nid and
++ * then take the int nid and convert it to a friendly name like prime256v1.
++ * EVP_PKEY_fromdata can handle group by name.
++ *
++ * Per the spec this is "DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value".
++ */
++ int curve_id = 0;
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(ecparams, &curve_id);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ LOGE("Could not get nid from params");
++ return rv;
++ }
+
+- if (!r || !s) {
+- return 0;
++ /* Per the spec CKA_EC_POINT attribute is the "DER-encoding of ANSI X9.62 ECPoint value Q */
++ const unsigned char *x = ecpoint->pValue;
++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen);
++ if (!os) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: %s");
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- BN_free(sig->r);
+- BN_free(sig->s);
++ OSSL_PARAM params[] = {
++ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(curve_id), 0),
++ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, os->data, os->length),
++ OSSL_PARAM_END
++ };
+
+- sig->r = r;
+- sig->s = s;
++ /* convert params to EVP key */
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
++ if (!evp_ctx) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id");
++ OPENSSL_free(os);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
+
+- return 1;
+-}
++ int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx);
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init: %s");
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++ OPENSSL_free(os);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
+
+-EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+- return NULL;
++ rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params);
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata");
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++ OPENSSL_free(os);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- return pkey->pkey.ec;
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
++ OPENSSL_free(os);
++
++ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+-#endif
+
+-static CK_RV convert_pubkey_RSA(RSA **outkey, attr_list *attrs) {
++#else
+
+- RSA *rsa = NULL;
+- BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
++static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
+
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
+- if (!exp) {
+- LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
++ BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++ if (!e) {
++ LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum");
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS);
+- if (!mod) {
+- LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS");
++ BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++ if (!n) {
++ LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum");
++ BN_free(e);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- rsa = RSA_new();
++ RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (!rsa) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to allocate OpenSSL RSA structure");
+- goto error;
++ LOGE("oom");
++ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+- e = BN_bin2bn(exp->pValue, exp->ulValueLen, NULL);
+- if (!e) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert exponent to SSL internal format");
+- goto error;
++ int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL);
++ if (!rc) {
++ LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key");
++ BN_free(n);
++ BN_free(e);
++ RSA_free(rsa);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- n = BN_bin2bn(mod->pValue, mod->ulValueLen, NULL);
+- if (!n) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert modulus to SSL internal format");
+- goto error;
++ /* assigned to RSA key */
++ n = e = NULL;
++
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (!pkey) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new");
++ RSA_free(rsa);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL)) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to set RSA modulus and exponent components");
++ rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
++ if (rc != 1) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+- BN_free(e);
+- BN_free(n);
+- goto error;
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- *outkey = rsa;
++ *out_pkey = pkey;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+-
+-error:
+- RSA_free(rsa);
+- if (e) {
+- BN_free(e);
+- }
+- if (n) {
+- BN_free(n);
+- }
+-
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+-static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY **outkey, attr_list *attrs) {
++static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) {
+
+- EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new();
+- if (!key) {
++ EC_KEY *ecc = EC_KEY_new();
++ if (!ecc) {
+ LOGE("oom");
+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
+- if (!ecparams) {
+- LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT);
+- if (!ecpoint) {
+- LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+ /* set params */
+ const unsigned char *x = ecparams->pValue;
+- EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&key, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen);
++ EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&ecc, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen);
+ if (!k) {
+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Parameters");
+- EC_KEY_free(key);
++ EC_KEY_free(ecc);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+@@ -215,22 +250,38 @@ static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY *
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen);
+ if (os) {
+ x = os->data;
+- k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&key, &x, os->length);
++ k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecc, &x, os->length);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(os);
+ if (!k) {
+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Points");
+- EC_KEY_free(key);
++ EC_KEY_free(ecc);
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+- *outkey = key;
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
++ if (!pkey) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new");
++ EC_KEY_free(ecc);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ecc);
++ if (!rc) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key");
++ EC_KEY_free(ecc);
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ *out_pkey = pkey;
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
++#endif
+
+-CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj) {
++CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey) {
+
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(obj->attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ if (!a) {
+ LOGE("Expected object to have attribute CKA_KEY_TYPE");
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+@@ -253,44 +304,52 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY *
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+- EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+- if (!pkey) {
+- LOGE("oom");
+- return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+- }
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ if (key_type == CKK_EC) {
+- EC_KEY *e = NULL;
+- rv = convert_pubkey_ECC(&e, obj->attrs);
+- if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+- return rv;
++
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS);
++ if (!ecparams) {
++ LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS");
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+- int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, e);
+- if (!rc) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key");
+- EC_KEY_free(e);
+- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT);
++ if (!ecpoint) {
++ LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT");
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+- } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) {
+- RSA *r = NULL;
+- rv = convert_pubkey_RSA(&r, obj->attrs);
++
++ rv = get_EC_evp_pubkey(ecparams, ecpoint, &pkey);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+- int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, r);
+- if (!rc) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with rsa key");
+- RSA_free(r);
+- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
++ } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) {
++
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
++ if (!exp) {
++ LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT");
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
++
++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS);
++ if (!mod) {
++ LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS");
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ rv = get_RSA_evp_pubkey(exp, mod, &pkey);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ return rv;
++ }
++
+ } else {
+ LOGE("Invalid CKA_KEY_TYPE, got: %lu", key_type);
+- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+
++ assert(pkey);
+ *outpkey = pkey;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+@@ -406,10 +465,12 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK
+ }
+ }
+
+- rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md);
+- if (!rc) {
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed");
+- goto error;
++ if (md) {
++ rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md);
++ if (!rc) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed");
++ goto error;
++ }
+ }
+
+ *outpkey_ctx = pkey_ctx;
+@@ -421,21 +482,12 @@ error:
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+-static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+- int padding, const EVP_MD *md,
+- CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
+- CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
++static CK_RV sig_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
++ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
++ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) {
+
+ CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+-
+- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+- rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md,
+- EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
+- if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+- return rv;
+- }
+-
+- int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len);
++ int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_verify failed");
+ } else if (rc == 1) {
+@@ -444,11 +496,11 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY
+ rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+-static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen, ECDSA_SIG **outsig) {
++static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen,
++ unsigned char **outbuf, size_t *outlen) {
+
+ if (siglen & 1) {
+ LOGE("Expected ECDSA signature length to be even, got : %lu",
+@@ -487,21 +539,48 @@ static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PT
+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+- *outsig = ossl_sig;
++ int sig_len =i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, NULL);
++ if (sig_len <= 0) {
++ if (rc < 0) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
++ } else {
++ LOGE("Expected length to be greater than 0");
++ }
++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, sig_len);
++ if (!buf) {
++ LOGE("oom");
++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
++ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
++ }
++
++ unsigned char *p = buf;
++ int sig_len2 = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, &p);
++ if (sig_len2 < 0) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
++ free(buf);
++ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ }
++
++ assert(sig_len == sig_len2);
++
++ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
++
++ *outbuf = buf;
++ *outlen = sig_len;
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+
+ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
++ const EVP_MD *md,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
+
+- EC_KEY *eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+- if (!eckey) {
+- LOGE("Expected EC Key");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+- }
+-
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL expects ASN1 framed signatures, PKCS11 does flat
+ * R + S signatures, so convert it to ASN1 framing.
+@@ -509,21 +588,47 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY *
+ * https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-pkcs11/issues/277
+ * For details.
+ */
+- ECDSA_SIG *ossl_sig = NULL;
+- CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &ossl_sig);
++ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++ size_t buflen = 0;
++ CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &buf, &buflen);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+- int rc = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ossl_sig, eckey);
+- if (rc < 0) {
+- ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed");
+- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
++ rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, 0, md,
++ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ free(buf);
++ return rv;
+ }
+- ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig);
+
+- return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++ rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, buf, buflen, digest, digest_len);
++
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
++ free(buf);
++
++ return rv;
++}
++
++static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
++ int padding, const EVP_MD *md,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) {
++
++ CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
++
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
++ rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md,
++ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx);
++ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
++ return rv;
++ }
++
++ rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len);
++
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
++ return rv;
+ }
+
+ CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+@@ -538,7 +643,7 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey
+ digest, digest_len,
+ signature, signature_len);
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+- return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, digest, digest_len,
++ return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, md, digest, digest_len,
+ signature, signature_len);
+ default:
+ LOGE("Unknown PKEY type, got: %d", type);
+@@ -577,3 +682,65 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY *
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ return rv;
+ }
++
++twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) {
++
++
++ twist out = NULL;
++ unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
++
++ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
++ if (!ctx) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_MD_CTX_new");
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ int rc = EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha256());
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestInit");
++ goto error;
++ }
++
++ rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pin, twist_len(pin));
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate");
++ goto error;
++ }
++
++ rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, twist_len(salt));
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate");
++ goto error;
++ }
++
++ unsigned int len = sizeof(md);
++ rc = EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &len);
++ if (rc != 1) {
++ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestFinal");
++ goto error;
++ }
++
++ /* truncate the password to 32 characters */
++ out = twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2);
++
++error:
++ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++ return out;
++}
++
++CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) {
++
++ const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue;
++
++ ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen);
++ if (!a) {
++ LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value");
++ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
++ }
++
++ *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a);
++ ASN1_OBJECT_free(a);
++
++ return CKR_OK;
++}
+Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.h
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.h
++++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.h
+@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
+
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+
++#include "attrs.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+-#include "object.h"
+ #include "twist.h"
+
+ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
+@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
+ #define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST111 0x1010100f
+ #endif
+
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 */
++#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300 0x1010100f
++#endif
++
+ /* OpenSSL Backwards Compat APIs */
+ #if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -58,7 +62,7 @@ static inline void *OPENSSL_memdup(const
+
+ #define SSL_UTIL_LOGE(m) LOGE("%s: %s", m, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+-CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj);
++CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey);
+
+ CK_RV ssl_util_encrypt(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ int padding, twist label, const EVP_MD *md,
+@@ -82,4 +86,27 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK
+ fn_EVP_PKEY_init init_fn,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX **outpkey_ctx);
+
++CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
++ const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf);
++
++CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen);
++
++CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len,
++ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen);
++
++twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt);
++
++/**
++ * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value.
++ * @param ecparams
++ * The DER X9.62 parameters value
++ * @param nid
++ * The nid to set
++ * @return
++ * CKR_OK on success.
++ */
++CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid);
++
+ #endif /* SRC_LIB_SSL_UTIL_H_ */
+Index: git/src/lib/tpm.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/tpm.c
++++ git/src/lib/tpm.c
+@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@ static CK_RV handle_ecparams(CK_ATTRIBUT
+ tpm_key_data *keydat = (tpm_key_data *)udata;
+
+ int nid = 0;
+- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(attr, &nid);
++ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(attr, &nid);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+@@ -3451,7 +3451,7 @@ static EC_POINT *tpm_pub_to_ossl_pub(EC_
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group,
++ int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group,
+ pub_key_point_tmp,
+ bn_x,
+ bn_y,
+@@ -4579,7 +4579,7 @@ CK_RV tpm_get_pss_sig_state(tpm_ctx *tct
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj);
++ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey);
+ if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+Index: git/src/lib/utils.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/utils.c
++++ git/src/lib/utils.c
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+ #include "log.h"
++#include "ssl_util.h"
+ #include "token.h"
+ #include "utils.h"
+
+@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ CK_RV utils_setup_new_object_auth(twist
+ pin_to_use = newpin;
+ }
+
+- *newauthhex = utils_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use);
++ *newauthhex = ssl_util_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use);
+ if (!*newauthhex) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+@@ -330,22 +331,6 @@ out:
+
+ }
+
+-twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) {
+-
+-
+- unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+-
+- SHA256_CTX sha256;
+- SHA256_Init(&sha256);
+-
+- SHA256_Update(&sha256, pin, twist_len(pin));
+- SHA256_Update(&sha256, salt, twist_len(salt));
+- SHA256_Final(md, &sha256);
+-
+- /* truncate the password to 32 characters */
+- return twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2);
+-}
+-
+ size_t utils_get_halg_size(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mttype) {
+
+ switch(mttype) {
+@@ -448,22 +433,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrapp
+
+ return CKR_OK;
+ }
+-
+-CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) {
+-
+- const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue;
+-
+- ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen);
+- if (!a) {
+- LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value");
+- return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+- }
+-
+- *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a);
+- ASN1_OBJECT_free(a);
+-
+- return CKR_OK;
+-}
+
+ CK_RV apply_pkcs7_pad(const CK_BYTE_PTR in, CK_ULONG inlen,
+ CK_BYTE_PTR out, CK_ULONG_PTR outlen) {
+Index: git/src/lib/utils.h
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/lib/utils.h
++++ git/src/lib/utils.h
+@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline void _str_padded_copy(CK_U
+ memcpy(dst, src, src_len);
+ }
+
+-twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt);
+-
+ twist aes256_gcm_decrypt(const twist key, const twist objauth);
+
+ twist aes256_gcm_encrypt(twist keybin, twist plaintextbin);
+@@ -77,17 +75,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_unwrap_objauth(twist wra
+ CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrappingkey, twist objauth, twist *wrapped_auth);
+
+ /**
+- * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value.
+- * @param ecparams
+- * The DER X9.62 parameters value
+- * @param nid
+- * The nid to set
+- * @return
+- * CKR_OK on success.
+- */
+-CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid);
+-
+-/**
+ * Removes a PKCS7 padding on a 16 byte block.
+ * @param in
+ * The PKCS5 padded input.
+Index: git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
++++ git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c
+@@ -1061,70 +1061,13 @@ static void test_double_sign_final_call_
+ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
+ }
+
+-static CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR get_attr(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) {
+-
+- CK_ULONG i;
+- for (i=0; i < attr_len; i++) {
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = &attrs[i];
+- if (a->type == type) {
+- return a;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- return NULL;
+-}
+-
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
+-#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11
+-#endif
+-
+-RSA *template_to_rsa_pub_key(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) {
+-
+- RSA *ssl_rsa_key = NULL;
+- BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL;
+-
+- /* get the exponent */
+- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = get_attr(CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, attrs, attr_len);
+- assert_non_null(a);
+-
+- e = BN_bin2bn((void*)a->pValue, a->ulValueLen, NULL);
+- assert_non_null(e);
+-
+- /* get the modulus */
+- a = get_attr(CKA_MODULUS, attrs, attr_len);
+- assert_non_null(a);
+-
+- n = BN_bin2bn(a->pValue, a->ulValueLen,
+- NULL);
+- assert_non_null(n);
+-
+- ssl_rsa_key = RSA_new();
+- assert_non_null(ssl_rsa_key);
+-
+-#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
+- ssl_rsa_key->e = e;
+- ssl_rsa_key->n = n;
+-#else
+- int rc = RSA_set0_key(ssl_rsa_key, n, e, NULL);
+- assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
+-#endif
+-
+- return ssl_rsa_key;
+-}
+-
+-static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) {
+-
+- EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+- assert_non_null(pkey);
+-
+- int rc = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, pub);
+- assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
++static void verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) {
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ const EVP_MD* md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
+ assert_non_null(md);
+
+- rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
++ int rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL);
+ assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
+
+ rc = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey);
+@@ -1136,7 +1079,6 @@ static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR
+ rc = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sig, sig_len);
+ assert_int_equal(rc, 1);
+
+- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ }
+
+@@ -1170,20 +1112,38 @@ static void test_sign_verify_public(void
+ assert_int_equal(siglen, 256);
+
+ /* build an OSSL RSA key from parts */
+- CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[2][1024];
++ CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[3][1024];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[] = {
+- { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] },
+- { .type = CKA_MODULUS, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] },
++ { .type = CKA_KEY_TYPE, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] },
++ { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] },
++ { .type = CKA_MODULUS, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[2] },
+ };
+
+ rv = C_GetAttributeValue(session, pub_handle, attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs));
+ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
+
+- RSA *r = template_to_rsa_pub_key(attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs));
+- assert_non_null(r);
++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKA_KEY_TYPE_BAD;
++ rv = attr_CK_KEY_TYPE(&attrs[0], &key_type);
++ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
++
++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++ attr_list *l = attr_list_new();
++
++ bool res = attr_list_add_int(l, CKA_KEY_TYPE, key_type);
++ assert_true(res);
+
+- verify(r, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen);
+- RSA_free(r);
++ res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[1].type, attrs[1].pValue, attrs[1].ulValueLen);
++ assert_true(res);
++
++ res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[2].type, attrs[2].pValue, attrs[2].ulValueLen);
++ assert_true(res);
++
++ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(l, &pkey);
++ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK);
++ attr_list_free(l);
++
++ verify(pkey, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen);
++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ static void test_sign_verify_context_specific_good(void **state) {
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From d33e5ef0b11125fe4683d7bfa17023e24997f587 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:30:50 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ossl: require version 1.1.0 or greater
+
+THIS DROPS SUPPORT FOR OSSL 1.0.2.
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
+---
+ configure.ac | 2 +-
+ src/lib/ssl_util.h | 43 +++++--------------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index a7aeaf5..94fb5d4 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ PKG_CHECK_EXISTS([tss2-esys >= 3.0],
+ # require sqlite3 and libcrypto
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([SQLITE3], [sqlite3])
+ PKG_CHECK_MODULES([YAML], [yaml-0.1])
+-PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CRYPTO], [libcrypto >= 1.0.2g])
++PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CRYPTO], [libcrypto >= 1.1.0])
+
+ # check for pthread
+ AX_PTHREAD([],[AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find pthread])])
+diff --git a/src/lib/ssl_util.h b/src/lib/ssl_util.h
+index 9909fd6..2591728 100644
+--- a/src/lib/ssl_util.h
++++ b/src/lib/ssl_util.h
+@@ -15,51 +15,18 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "twist.h"
+
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */
+-#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11
+-/* LibreSSL does not appear to have evperr.h, so their is no need to define this otherwise */
+-#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010100fL) /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 */
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010100fL) /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 */
+ #define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST111 0x1010100f
+ #endif
+
+-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 */
+-#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300 0x1010100f
++#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST111)
++#include <openssl/evperr.h>
+ #endif
+
+-/* OpenSSL Backwards Compat APIs */
+-#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11)
+-#include <string.h>
+-size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
+- point_conversion_form_t form,
+- unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx);
+-
+-const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x);
+-
+-int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+-
+-int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+-
+-EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+-
+-static inline void *OPENSSL_memdup(const void *dup, size_t l) {
+-
+- void *p = OPENSSL_malloc(l);
+- if (!p) {
+- return NULL;
+- }
+-
+- memcpy(p, dup, l);
+- return p;
+-}
+-
+-#endif
+-
+-#ifndef RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
+-#define RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST -1
++#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 */
++#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300 0x1010100f
+ #endif
+
+-/* Utility APIs */
+-
+ #define SSL_UTIL_LOGE(m) LOGE("%s: %s", m, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+
+ CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey);
+--
+2.25.1
+
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ DEPENDS = "autoconf-archive pkgconfig dstat sqlite3 openssl libtss2-dev tpm2-too
SRC_URI = "git://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-pkcs11.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://bootstrap_fixup.patch \
file://0001-remove-local-binary-checkes.patch \
+ file://0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch \
+ file://0002-ossl-require-version-1.1.0-or-greater.patch \
"
-SRCREV = "862bdb845910342cd7b6e6da7495f6ee7d090a37"
+SRCREV = "11fd2532ce10e97834a57dfb25bff6c613a5a851"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
bump to tip of current sources. Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> --- .../0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch | 1305 +++++++++++++++++ ...ssl-require-version-1.1.0-or-greater.patch | 93 ++ .../tpm2-pkcs11/tpm2-pkcs11_1.7.0.bb | 4 +- 3 files changed, 1401 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch create mode 100644 meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0002-ossl-require-version-1.1.0-or-greater.patch