new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 06:03:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Further restrict the characters allowed in a
+ command-line
+
+supplied user name, disallowing '$' and '\'. Reported by SecBuddyF KeenLab
+Tencent (CodeBuddy Security).
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13671c178f492af63b5c1296f284818c7809ed9a
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-106583
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Applied the username validation change to ssh.c:valid_ruser(), where
+ the equivalent validator resides in OpenSSH 9.6p1. Upstream changes
+ readconf.c:ssh_valid_ruser().
+- Omitted the upstream readconf.c OpenBSD RCS revision-only hunk.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0c4c9a7b320bd7ff61c4a2dc345cb2e27e9663b2)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ ssh.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 2d2837d..91f7109 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -631,14 +631,11 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ return 0;
+- if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++ if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}$\\", s[i]) != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+ if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+ return 0;
+- /* Disallow \ in last position */
+- if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+- return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
file://CVE-2026-106586_p3.patch \
file://CVE-2026-106585.patch \
file://CVE-2026-106584.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-106583.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \