new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+From 65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 21:42:39 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0077: [security]: Crash when recovering a corrupted
+ swap file
+
+Problem: memline: a crafted swap files with bogus pe_page_count/pe_bnum
+ values could cause a multi-GB allocation via mf_get(), and
+ invalid pe_old_lnum/pe_line_count values could cause a SEGV
+ when passed to readfile() (ehdgks0627, un3xploitable)
+Solution: Add bounds checks on pe_page_count and pe_bnum against
+ mf_blocknr_max before descending into the block tree, and
+ validate pe_old_lnum >= 1 and pe_line_count > 0 before calling
+ readfile().
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-r2gw-2x48-jj5p
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-28421
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/memline.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/po/vim.pot | 5 ++++-
+ src/testdir/test_recover.vim | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/memline.c b/src/memline.c
+index b93eb0a..15ac203 100644
+--- a/src/memline.c
++++ b/src/memline.c
+@@ -1597,8 +1597,12 @@ ml_recover(int checkext)
+ if (!cannot_open)
+ {
+ line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count;
+- if (readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum,
+- pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum - 1,
++ linenr_T pe_old_lnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum;
++ // Validate pe_line_count and pe_old_lnum from the
++ // untrusted swap file before passing to readfile().
++ if (line_count <= 0 || pe_old_lnum < 1 ||
++ readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum,
++ pe_old_lnum - 1,
+ line_count, NULL, 0) != OK)
+ cannot_open = TRUE;
+ else
+@@ -1629,6 +1633,27 @@ ml_recover(int checkext)
+ bnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_bnum;
+ line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count;
+ page_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_page_count;
++ // Validate pe_bnum and pe_page_count from the untrusted
++ // swap file before passing to mf_get(), which uses
++ // page_count to calculate allocation size. A bogus value
++ // (e.g. 0x40000000) would cause a multi-GB allocation.
++ // pe_page_count must be >= 1 and bnum + page_count must
++ // not exceed the number of pages in the swap file.
++ if (page_count < 1
++ || bnum + page_count > mfp->mf_blocknr_max + 1)
++ {
++ ++error;
++ ml_append(lnum++,
++ (char_u *)_("???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER"),
++ (colnr_T)0, TRUE);
++ // Skip this entry and pop back up the stack to keep
++ // recovering whatever else we can.
++ idx = ip->ip_index + 1;
++ bnum = ip->ip_bnum;
++ page_count = 1;
++ --buf->b_ml.ml_stack_top;
++ continue;
++ }
+ idx = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot
+index 9608271..be79cf0 100644
+--- a/src/po/vim.pot
++++ b/src/po/vim.pot
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid ""
+ msgstr ""
+ "Project-Id-Version: Vim\n"
+ "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: vim-dev@vim.org\n"
+-"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-04-30 12:40+0200\n"
++"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-02-27 21:04+0000\n"
+ "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+ "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+ "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
+@@ -1960,6 +1960,9 @@ msgstr ""
+ msgid "???LINES MISSING"
+ msgstr ""
+
++msgid "???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER"
++msgstr ""
++
+ msgid "???BLOCK MISSING"
+ msgstr ""
+
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
+index db59223..93425f1 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim
+@@ -471,4 +471,41 @@ func Test_noname_buffer()
+ call assert_equal(['one', 'two'], getline(1, '$'))
+ endfunc
+
++" Test for recovering a corrupted swap file, those caused a crash
++func Test_recover_corrupted_swap_file1()
++ CheckUnix
++ " only works correctly on 64bit Unix systems:
++ if v:sizeoflong != 8 || !has('unix')
++ throw 'Skipped: Corrupt Swap file sample requires a 64bit Unix build'
++ endif
++ " Test 1: Heap buffer-overflow
++ new
++ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash1.swp'
++ let target = 'Xpoc1.swp'
++ call filecopy(sample, target)
++ try
++ sil recover! Xpoc1
++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/
++ endtry
++ let content = getline(1, '$')->join()
++ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content)
++ call delete(target)
++ bw!
++"
++" " Test 2: Segfault
++ new
++ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash2.swp'
++ let target = 'Xpoc2.swp'
++ call filecopy(sample, target)
++ try
++ sil recover! Xpoc2
++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/
++ endtry
++ let content = getline(1, '$')->join()
++ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content)
++ call assert_match('???LINES MISSING', content)
++ call delete(target)
++ bw!
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+--
+2.34.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:17:17 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0357: [security]: command injection via backticks
+ in tag files
+
+Problem: [security]: command injection via backticks in tag files
+ (Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu, Andy Ngo)
+Solution: Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames.
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cwgx-gcj7-6qh8
+
+Supported by AI
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-41411
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/tag.c | 4 +++-
+ src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/tag.c b/src/tag.c
+index d3a7399..0e203f0 100644
+--- a/src/tag.c
++++ b/src/tag.c
+@@ -4126,8 +4126,10 @@ expand_tag_fname(char_u *fname, char_u *tag_fname, int expand)
+
+ /*
+ * Expand file name (for environment variables) when needed.
++ * Disallow backticks, they could execute arbitrary shell
++ * commands. This is not needed for tag filenames.
+ */
+- if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname))
++ if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname) && vim_strchr(fname, '`') == NULL)
+ {
+ ExpandInit(&xpc);
+ xpc.xp_context = EXPAND_FILES;
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
+index 47618d0..a95b8b5 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim
+@@ -1670,4 +1670,26 @@ func Test_tag_excmd_with_number_vim9script()
+ bwipe!
+ endfunc
+
++" Test that backtick expressions in tag filenames are not expanded.
++" This prevents command injection via malicious tags files.
++func Test_tag_backtick_filename_not_expanded()
++ let pwned_file = 'Xtags_pwnd'
++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file))
++
++ let tagline = "main\t`touch " .. pwned_file .. "`\t/^int main/;\"\tf"
++ call writefile([tagline], 'Xbt_tags', 'D')
++ call writefile(['int main(int argc, char **argv) {', '}'], 'Xbt_main.c', 'D')
++
++ set tags=Xbt_tags
++ sp Xbt_main.c
++
++ " The :tag command should fail to find the file, but must NOT execute
++ " the backtick shell command.
++ call assert_fails('tag main', 'E429:')
++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file))
++
++ set tags&
++ bwipe!
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+--
+2.34.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 16:10:03 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0435: [security]: backticks in 'path' may cause
+ shell execution on completion
+
+Problem: [security]: Backticks enclosed shell commands in the 'path'
+ option value are executed during completion (q1uf3ng).
+Solution: Skip path entries containing backticks, add P_SECURE to 'path'
+ option, so that it cannot be set from a modeline (for symmetry with
+ the 'cdpath' option)
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-hwg5-3cxw-wvvg
+
+Supported by AI.
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-44656
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ runtime/doc/options.txt | 5 ++++-
+ src/findfile.c | 4 ++++
+ src/optiondefs.h | 2 +-
+ src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ src/testdir/test_modeline.vim | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/runtime/doc/options.txt b/runtime/doc/options.txt
+index 8dba6f4..d06411f 100644
+--- a/runtime/doc/options.txt
++++ b/runtime/doc/options.txt
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-*options.txt* For Vim version 9.1. Last change: 2025 Aug 23
++*options.txt* For Vim version 9.2. Last change: 2026 May 03
+
+
+ VIM REFERENCE MANUAL by Bram Moolenaar
+@@ -6615,6 +6615,9 @@ A jump table for the options with a short description can be found at |Q_op|.
+ < Replace the ';' with a ':' or whatever separator is used. Note that
+ this doesn't work when $INCL contains a comma or white space.
+
++ This option cannot be set from a |modeline| or in the |sandbox|, for
++ security reasons.
++
+ *'perldll'*
+ 'perldll' string (default depends on the build)
+ global
+diff --git a/src/findfile.c b/src/findfile.c
+index 008338c..f73a66b 100644
+--- a/src/findfile.c
++++ b/src/findfile.c
+@@ -2412,6 +2412,10 @@ expand_path_option(
+ {
+ buflen = copy_option_part(&path_option, buf, MAXPATHL, " ,");
+
++ // do not expand backticks, could have been set via a modeline
++ if (vim_strchr(buf, '`') != NULL)
++ continue;
++
+ if (buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == NUL || vim_ispathsep(buf[1])))
+ {
+ size_t plen;
+diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h
+index bd02d04..72d3f36 100644
+--- a/src/optiondefs.h
++++ b/src/optiondefs.h
+@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
+ (char_u *)&p_pm, PV_NONE,
+ did_set_backupext_or_patchmode, NULL,
+ {(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT},
+- {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_COMMA|P_NODUP,
++ {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_SECURE|P_COMMA|P_NODUP,
+ (char_u *)&p_path, PV_PATH, NULL, NULL,
+ {
+ #if defined(AMIGA) || defined(MSWIN)
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
+index 079fb78..8b8b71c 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim
+@@ -161,4 +161,21 @@ func Test_find_complete()
+ set path&
+ endfunc
+
++" Verify that backticks in 'path' are not executed
++func Test_find_completion_backtick_in_path()
++ CheckUnix
++ CheckExecutable id
++
++ new Xpoc.c
++ setl path+=`id>Xrce_marker`
++ " Triggering completion must not execute the backtick command.
++ call getcompletion('', 'file_in_path')
++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker'))
++ call feedkeys(":find \t\n", "xt")
++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker'))
++
++ bwipe!
++ call delete('Xrce_marker')
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
+index c00032b..fc11cc6 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
+@@ -386,4 +386,18 @@ func Test_modeline_forbidden()
+ bw!
+ endfunc
+
++" Verify that backticks in 'path' set from a modeline are not executed
++func Test_path_modeline()
++ let lines =<< trim END
++ // vim: set path+=foobar :
++ END
++ call writefile(lines, 'Xpoc.c', 'D')
++
++ set nomodelinestrict modeline
++ call assert_fails('split Xpoc.c', 'E520:')
++
++ bwipe!
++ set modelinestrict& modeline&
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+--
+2.34.1
+
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://CVE-2026-34714.patch \
file://CVE-2026-39881.patch \
file://CVE-2026-35177.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-44656.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-41411.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-28421.patch \
"
PV .= ".1683"
Pick patch from [1], [2] & [3] also mentioned at NVD report in [4,5 & 6] [1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3 [2] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb [3] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 [4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28421 [5] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41411 [6] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44656 More info : CVE-2026-28421 - Validate block tree indices and readfile() line bounds. CVE-2026-41411 - Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames. CVE-2026-44656 - Prevent shell execution from 'path' backticks via modelines. Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> --- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch | 148 ++++++++++++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch | 75 +++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch | 130 +++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 3 + 4 files changed, 356 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch