diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8739212da2 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28421.patch @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +From 65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt +Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 21:42:39 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0077: [security]: Crash when recovering a corrupted + swap file + +Problem: memline: a crafted swap files with bogus pe_page_count/pe_bnum + values could cause a multi-GB allocation via mf_get(), and + invalid pe_old_lnum/pe_line_count values could cause a SEGV + when passed to readfile() (ehdgks0627, un3xploitable) +Solution: Add bounds checks on pe_page_count and pe_bnum against + mf_blocknr_max before descending into the block tree, and + validate pe_old_lnum >= 1 and pe_line_count > 0 before calling + readfile(). + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-r2gw-2x48-jj5p + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt + +CVE: CVE-2026-28421 +Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/65c1a143c331c886dc28888dd632708f953b4eb3] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + src/memline.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + src/po/vim.pot | 5 ++++- + src/testdir/test_recover.vim | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/memline.c b/src/memline.c +index b93eb0a..15ac203 100644 +--- a/src/memline.c ++++ b/src/memline.c +@@ -1597,8 +1597,12 @@ ml_recover(int checkext) + if (!cannot_open) + { + line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count; +- if (readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum, +- pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum - 1, ++ linenr_T pe_old_lnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_old_lnum; ++ // Validate pe_line_count and pe_old_lnum from the ++ // untrusted swap file before passing to readfile(). ++ if (line_count <= 0 || pe_old_lnum < 1 || ++ readfile(curbuf->b_ffname, NULL, lnum, ++ pe_old_lnum - 1, + line_count, NULL, 0) != OK) + cannot_open = TRUE; + else +@@ -1629,6 +1633,27 @@ ml_recover(int checkext) + bnum = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_bnum; + line_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_line_count; + page_count = pp->pb_pointer[idx].pe_page_count; ++ // Validate pe_bnum and pe_page_count from the untrusted ++ // swap file before passing to mf_get(), which uses ++ // page_count to calculate allocation size. A bogus value ++ // (e.g. 0x40000000) would cause a multi-GB allocation. ++ // pe_page_count must be >= 1 and bnum + page_count must ++ // not exceed the number of pages in the swap file. ++ if (page_count < 1 ++ || bnum + page_count > mfp->mf_blocknr_max + 1) ++ { ++ ++error; ++ ml_append(lnum++, ++ (char_u *)_("???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER"), ++ (colnr_T)0, TRUE); ++ // Skip this entry and pop back up the stack to keep ++ // recovering whatever else we can. ++ idx = ip->ip_index + 1; ++ bnum = ip->ip_bnum; ++ page_count = 1; ++ --buf->b_ml.ml_stack_top; ++ continue; ++ } + idx = 0; + continue; + } +diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot +index 9608271..be79cf0 100644 +--- a/src/po/vim.pot ++++ b/src/po/vim.pot +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" + msgstr "" + "Project-Id-Version: Vim\n" + "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: vim-dev@vim.org\n" +-"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-04-30 12:40+0200\n" ++"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-02-27 21:04+0000\n" + "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" + "Last-Translator: FULL NAME \n" + "Language-Team: LANGUAGE \n" +@@ -1960,6 +1960,9 @@ msgstr "" + msgid "???LINES MISSING" + msgstr "" + ++msgid "???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER" ++msgstr "" ++ + msgid "???BLOCK MISSING" + msgstr "" + +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim +index db59223..93425f1 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_recover.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_recover.vim +@@ -471,4 +471,41 @@ func Test_noname_buffer() + call assert_equal(['one', 'two'], getline(1, '$')) + endfunc + ++" Test for recovering a corrupted swap file, those caused a crash ++func Test_recover_corrupted_swap_file1() ++ CheckUnix ++ " only works correctly on 64bit Unix systems: ++ if v:sizeoflong != 8 || !has('unix') ++ throw 'Skipped: Corrupt Swap file sample requires a 64bit Unix build' ++ endif ++ " Test 1: Heap buffer-overflow ++ new ++ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash1.swp' ++ let target = 'Xpoc1.swp' ++ call filecopy(sample, target) ++ try ++ sil recover! Xpoc1 ++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/ ++ endtry ++ let content = getline(1, '$')->join() ++ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content) ++ call delete(target) ++ bw! ++" ++" " Test 2: Segfault ++ new ++ let sample = 'samples/recover-crash2.swp' ++ let target = 'Xpoc2.swp' ++ call filecopy(sample, target) ++ try ++ sil recover! Xpoc2 ++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1364:/ ++ endtry ++ let content = getline(1, '$')->join() ++ call assert_match('???ILLEGAL BLOCK NUMBER', content) ++ call assert_match('???LINES MISSING', content) ++ call delete(target) ++ bw! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85139dc1f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt +Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:17:17 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0357: [security]: command injection via backticks + in tag files + +Problem: [security]: command injection via backticks in tag files + (Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu, Andy Ngo) +Solution: Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames. + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cwgx-gcj7-6qh8 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt + +CVE: CVE-2026-41411 +Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + src/tag.c | 4 +++- + src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/tag.c b/src/tag.c +index d3a7399..0e203f0 100644 +--- a/src/tag.c ++++ b/src/tag.c +@@ -4126,8 +4126,10 @@ expand_tag_fname(char_u *fname, char_u *tag_fname, int expand) + + /* + * Expand file name (for environment variables) when needed. ++ * Disallow backticks, they could execute arbitrary shell ++ * commands. This is not needed for tag filenames. + */ +- if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname)) ++ if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname) && vim_strchr(fname, '`') == NULL) + { + ExpandInit(&xpc); + xpc.xp_context = EXPAND_FILES; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim +index 47618d0..a95b8b5 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim +@@ -1670,4 +1670,26 @@ func Test_tag_excmd_with_number_vim9script() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++" Test that backtick expressions in tag filenames are not expanded. ++" This prevents command injection via malicious tags files. ++func Test_tag_backtick_filename_not_expanded() ++ let pwned_file = 'Xtags_pwnd' ++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file)) ++ ++ let tagline = "main\t`touch " .. pwned_file .. "`\t/^int main/;\"\tf" ++ call writefile([tagline], 'Xbt_tags', 'D') ++ call writefile(['int main(int argc, char **argv) {', '}'], 'Xbt_main.c', 'D') ++ ++ set tags=Xbt_tags ++ sp Xbt_main.c ++ ++ " The :tag command should fail to find the file, but must NOT execute ++ " the backtick shell command. ++ call assert_fails('tag main', 'E429:') ++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file)) ++ ++ set tags& ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..57278c08da --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +From 190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt +Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 16:10:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0435: [security]: backticks in 'path' may cause + shell execution on completion + +Problem: [security]: Backticks enclosed shell commands in the 'path' + option value are executed during completion (q1uf3ng). +Solution: Skip path entries containing backticks, add P_SECURE to 'path' + option, so that it cannot be set from a modeline (for symmetry with + the 'cdpath' option) + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-hwg5-3cxw-wvvg + +Supported by AI. + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt + +CVE: CVE-2026-44656 +Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + runtime/doc/options.txt | 5 ++++- + src/findfile.c | 4 ++++ + src/optiondefs.h | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + src/testdir/test_modeline.vim | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/doc/options.txt b/runtime/doc/options.txt +index 8dba6f4..d06411f 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/options.txt ++++ b/runtime/doc/options.txt +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-*options.txt* For Vim version 9.1. Last change: 2025 Aug 23 ++*options.txt* For Vim version 9.2. Last change: 2026 May 03 + + + VIM REFERENCE MANUAL by Bram Moolenaar +@@ -6615,6 +6615,9 @@ A jump table for the options with a short description can be found at |Q_op|. + < Replace the ';' with a ':' or whatever separator is used. Note that + this doesn't work when $INCL contains a comma or white space. + ++ This option cannot be set from a |modeline| or in the |sandbox|, for ++ security reasons. ++ + *'perldll'* + 'perldll' string (default depends on the build) + global +diff --git a/src/findfile.c b/src/findfile.c +index 008338c..f73a66b 100644 +--- a/src/findfile.c ++++ b/src/findfile.c +@@ -2412,6 +2412,10 @@ expand_path_option( + { + buflen = copy_option_part(&path_option, buf, MAXPATHL, " ,"); + ++ // do not expand backticks, could have been set via a modeline ++ if (vim_strchr(buf, '`') != NULL) ++ continue; ++ + if (buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == NUL || vim_ispathsep(buf[1]))) + { + size_t plen; +diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h +index bd02d04..72d3f36 100644 +--- a/src/optiondefs.h ++++ b/src/optiondefs.h +@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] = + (char_u *)&p_pm, PV_NONE, + did_set_backupext_or_patchmode, NULL, + {(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT}, +- {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_COMMA|P_NODUP, ++ {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_SECURE|P_COMMA|P_NODUP, + (char_u *)&p_path, PV_PATH, NULL, NULL, + { + #if defined(AMIGA) || defined(MSWIN) +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim +index 079fb78..8b8b71c 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim +@@ -161,4 +161,21 @@ func Test_find_complete() + set path& + endfunc + ++" Verify that backticks in 'path' are not executed ++func Test_find_completion_backtick_in_path() ++ CheckUnix ++ CheckExecutable id ++ ++ new Xpoc.c ++ setl path+=`id>Xrce_marker` ++ " Triggering completion must not execute the backtick command. ++ call getcompletion('', 'file_in_path') ++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker')) ++ call feedkeys(":find \t\n", "xt") ++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker')) ++ ++ bwipe! ++ call delete('Xrce_marker') ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim +index c00032b..fc11cc6 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim +@@ -386,4 +386,18 @@ func Test_modeline_forbidden() + bw! + endfunc + ++" Verify that backticks in 'path' set from a modeline are not executed ++func Test_path_modeline() ++ let lines =<< trim END ++ // vim: set path+=foobar : ++ END ++ call writefile(lines, 'Xpoc.c', 'D') ++ ++ set nomodelinestrict modeline ++ call assert_fails('split Xpoc.c', 'E520:') ++ ++ bwipe! ++ set modelinestrict& modeline& ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc index 0b7a831eed..3a988fbe7d 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-34714.patch \ file://CVE-2026-39881.patch \ file://CVE-2026-35177.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-44656.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-41411.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-28421.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"