| Message ID | 20220107074831.3065-1-thakur.virendra1810@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [meta-networking,dunfell,v2] strongswan: Fix for CVE-2021-41990 and CVE-2021-41991 | expand |
Hi Virendra, You need to send this patch to "openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org". Thanks, Best Regards, Ranjitsinh Rathod Technical Leader | | KPIT Technologies Ltd. Cellphone: +91-84606 92403
On Mon, Jan 17, 2022 at 10:56 PM Ranjitsinh Rathod via lists.openembedded.org <ranjitsinh.rathod=kpit.com@lists.openembedded.org> wrote: > Hi Virendra, > > You need to send this patch to "openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org > ". > And also, since this is not a patch to oe-core, the subject should be [oe][meta-networking] Thanks for CVE fixes! Steve > > Thanks, > > Best Regards, > > *Ranjitsinh Rathod* > Technical Leader | | KPIT Technologies Ltd. > Cellphone: +91-84606 92403 > > *__________________________________________ *KPIT <http://www.kpit.com/> | > Follow us on LinkedIn <http://www.kpit.com/linkedin> > > <https://www.kpit.com/TheNewBrand> > ------------------------------ > *From:* openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org < > openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org> on behalf of virendra thakur > via lists.openembedded.org <thakur.virendra1810= > gmail.com@lists.openembedded.org> > *Sent:* Friday, January 7, 2022 1:18 PM > *To:* openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org < > openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>; raj.khem@gmail.com < > raj.khem@gmail.com> > *Cc:* akuster808@gmail.com <akuster808@gmail.com>; Virendra Kumar Thakur < > Virendra.Thakur@kpit.com>; Virendra Kumar Thakur <Virendra.Thakur@kpit.com > > > *Subject:* [OE-core] [meta-networking][dunfell][PATCH v2] strongswan: Fix > for CVE-2021-41990 and CVE-2021-41991 > > Caution: This email originated from outside of the KPIT. Do not click > links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the > content is safe. > > From: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com> > > Add patch to fix CVE-2021-41990 and CVE-2021-41991 > > Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> > Signed-off-by: virendra thakur <thakur.virendra1810@gmail.com> > --- > .../strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ > .../strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch | 41 ++++++++++++ > .../strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb | 2 + > 3 files changed, 105 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch > create mode 100644 > meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch > > diff --git > a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000..b7118ba1f > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ > +From 423a5d56274a1d343e0d2107dfc4fbf0df2dcca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> > +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 17:52:08 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH] Reject RSASSA-PSS params with negative salt length > + > +The `salt_len` member in the struct is of type `ssize_t` because we use > +negative values for special automatic salt lengths when generating > +signatures. > + > +Not checking this could lead to an integer overflow. The value is > assigned > +to the `len` field of a chunk (`size_t`), which is further used in > +calculations to check the padding structure and (if that is passed by a > +matching crafted signature value) eventually a memcpy() that will result > +in a segmentation fault. > + > +Fixes: a22316520b91 ("signature-params: Add functions to parse/build > ASN.1 RSASSA-PSS params") > +Fixes: 7d6b81648b2d ("gmp: Add support for RSASSA-PSS signature > verification") > +Fixes: CVE-2021-41990 > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdownload.strongswan.org%2Fsecurity%2FCVE-2021-41990&data=04%7C01%7Cranjitsinh.rathod%40kpit.com%7C5abb6260dcf54af2885508d9d1b22a32%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637771385470682075%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=%2BWim%2Bl1Eip2jX8UPUD8QjiTYpau1BJo6SmfH5sqxSAc%3D&reserved=0 > ] > +CVE: CVE-2021-41990 > + > +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> > + > +--- > + src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c | 6 +++++- > + src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c | 2 +- > + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c > b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c > +index d89bd2c96bb5..837de8443d43 100644 > +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c > ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c > +@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ bool rsa_pss_params_parse(chunk_t asn1, int level0, > rsa_pss_params_t *params) > + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_SALT_LEN: > + if (object.len) > + { > +- params->salt_len = > (size_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); > ++ params->salt_len = > (ssize_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); > ++ if (params->salt_len < 0) > ++ { > ++ goto end; > ++ } > + } > + break; > + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_TRAILER: > +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c > b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c > +index f9bd1d314dec..3a775090883e 100644 > +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c > ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c > +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static bool > verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, > + int i; > + bool success = FALSE; > + > +- if (!params) > ++ if (!params || params->salt_len < 0) > + { > + return FALSE; > + } > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git > a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000..2d898fa5c > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ > +From b667237b3a84f601ef5a707ce8eb861c3a5002d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> > +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:38:22 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH] cert-cache: Prevent crash due to integer overflow/sign > change > + > +random() allocates values in the range [0, RAND_MAX], with RAND_MAX > usually > +equaling INT_MAX = 2^31-1. Previously, values between 0 and 31 were added > +directly to that offset before applying`% CACHE_SIZE` to get an index into > +the cache array. If the random value was very high, this resulted in an > +integer overflow and a negative index value and, therefore, an > out-of-bounds > +access of the array and in turn dereferencing invalid pointers when trying > +to acquire the read lock. This most likely results in a segmentation > fault. > + > +Fixes: 764e8b2211ce ("reimplemented certificate cache") > +Fixes: CVE-2021-41991 > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdownload.strongswan.org%2Fsecurity%2FCVE-2021-41991&data=04%7C01%7Cranjitsinh.rathod%40kpit.com%7C5abb6260dcf54af2885508d9d1b22a32%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637771385470682075%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=lodJFhXpIZ8FOw5TzFWwbAUJSbP9SoI9sgVheFPhNa4%3D&reserved=0 > ] > +CVE: CVE-2021-41991 > + > +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> > + > +--- > + src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c | 2 +- > + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c > b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c > +index f1579c60a9bc..ceebb3843725 100644 > +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c > ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c > +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void cache(private_cert_cache_t *this, > + for (try = 0; try < REPLACE_TRIES; try++) > + { > + /* replace a random relation */ > +- offset = random(); > ++ offset = random() % CACHE_SIZE; > + for (i = 0; i < CACHE_SIZE; i++) > + { > + rel = &this->relations[(i + offset) % CACHE_SIZE]; > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/ > strongswan_5.8.4.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/ > strongswan_5.8.4.bb > index 8a8809243..b45b8074c 100644 > --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb > @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI = " > https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.strongswan.org%2Fstrongswan-%24&data=04%7C01%7Cranjitsinh.rathod%40kpit.com%7C5abb6260dcf54af2885508d9d1b22a32%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637771385470682075%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=0g32wtulMlLljp9EdbG8BCz8hIG3mr95oWRYlOcoxMk%3D&reserved=0{PV}.tar.bz2 > <https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload.strongswan.org%2Fstrongswan-%24&data=04%7C01%7Cranjitsinh.rathod%40kpit.com%7C5abb6260dcf54af2885508d9d1b22a32%7C3539451eb46e4a26a242ff61502855c7%7C0%7C0%7C637771385470682075%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=0g32wtulMlLljp9EdbG8BCz8hIG3mr95oWRYlOcoxMk%3D&reserved=0%7BPV%7D.tar.bz2> > \ > file://fix-funtion-parameter.patch \ > file://0001-memory.h-Include-stdint.h-for-uintptr_t.patch \ > > file://0001-Remove-obsolete-setting-regarding-the-Standard-Outpu.patch \ > + file://CVE-2021-41990.patch \ > + file://CVE-2021-41991.patch \ > " > > SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0634e7f40591bd3f6770e583c3f27d29" > -- > 2.17.1 > > This message contains information that may be privileged or confidential > and is the property of the KPIT Technologies Ltd. It is intended only for > the person to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, > you are not authorized to read, print, retain copy, disseminate, > distribute, or use this message or any part thereof. If you receive this > message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete all > copies of this message. KPIT Technologies Ltd. does not accept any > liability for virus infected mails. > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#160669): > https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/160669 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/88257047/3620601 > Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [ > steve@sakoman.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > >
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b7118ba1f --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 423a5d56274a1d343e0d2107dfc4fbf0df2dcca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 17:52:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Reject RSASSA-PSS params with negative salt length + +The `salt_len` member in the struct is of type `ssize_t` because we use +negative values for special automatic salt lengths when generating +signatures. + +Not checking this could lead to an integer overflow. The value is assigned +to the `len` field of a chunk (`size_t`), which is further used in +calculations to check the padding structure and (if that is passed by a +matching crafted signature value) eventually a memcpy() that will result +in a segmentation fault. + +Fixes: a22316520b91 ("signature-params: Add functions to parse/build ASN.1 RSASSA-PSS params") +Fixes: 7d6b81648b2d ("gmp: Add support for RSASSA-PSS signature verification") +Fixes: CVE-2021-41990 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41990] +CVE: CVE-2021-41990 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c | 6 +++++- + src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +index d89bd2c96bb5..837de8443d43 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ bool rsa_pss_params_parse(chunk_t asn1, int level0, rsa_pss_params_t *params) + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_SALT_LEN: + if (object.len) + { +- params->salt_len = (size_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ params->salt_len = (ssize_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ if (params->salt_len < 0) ++ { ++ goto end; ++ } + } + break; + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_TRAILER: +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +index f9bd1d314dec..3a775090883e 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, + int i; + bool success = FALSE; + +- if (!params) ++ if (!params || params->salt_len < 0) + { + return FALSE; + } +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2d898fa5c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From b667237b3a84f601ef5a707ce8eb861c3a5002d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:38:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cert-cache: Prevent crash due to integer overflow/sign change + +random() allocates values in the range [0, RAND_MAX], with RAND_MAX usually +equaling INT_MAX = 2^31-1. Previously, values between 0 and 31 were added +directly to that offset before applying`% CACHE_SIZE` to get an index into +the cache array. If the random value was very high, this resulted in an +integer overflow and a negative index value and, therefore, an out-of-bounds +access of the array and in turn dereferencing invalid pointers when trying +to acquire the read lock. This most likely results in a segmentation fault. + +Fixes: 764e8b2211ce ("reimplemented certificate cache") +Fixes: CVE-2021-41991 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41991] +CVE: CVE-2021-41991 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c +index f1579c60a9bc..ceebb3843725 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void cache(private_cert_cache_t *this, + for (try = 0; try < REPLACE_TRIES; try++) + { + /* replace a random relation */ +- offset = random(); ++ offset = random() % CACHE_SIZE; + for (i = 0; i < CACHE_SIZE; i++) + { + rel = &this->relations[(i + offset) % CACHE_SIZE]; +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb index 8a8809243..b45b8074c 100644 --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://fix-funtion-parameter.patch \ file://0001-memory.h-Include-stdint.h-for-uintptr_t.patch \ file://0001-Remove-obsolete-setting-regarding-the-Standard-Outpu.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-41990.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-41991.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0634e7f40591bd3f6770e583c3f27d29"