new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 336f1a0c18c04b63cab024b9f030af2b6c6b248c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Padilla?= <jpadilla@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 14:11:10 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Bundle security fixes and hardening into 2.13.0
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Security:
+- `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` rejects JWK JSON documents passed as raw
+ HMAC secrets to close an algorithm-confusion gap not covered by the
+ existing PEM/SSH guard. Reported by @aradona91 in GHSA-xgmm-8j9v-c9wx.
+- Bind the JWT header `alg` to `PyJWK.algorithm_name` during verification
+ so the caller's `algorithms` allow-list cannot be bypassed when decoding
+ with a `PyJWK` / `PyJWKClient` key. Reported by @sushi-gif in
+ GHSA-jq35-7prp-9v3f.
+- Skip the unconditional base64 decode of the compact-form payload
+ segment when `b64=false` is set, and require that segment to be empty
+ (RFC 7515 Appendix F detached form). Closes an unauthenticated DoS
+ amplifier. Reported by @thesmartshadow in GHSA-w7vc-732c-9m39.
+- `PyJWKClient` rejects any URI whose scheme is not `http` or `https` so
+ attacker-influenced URIs cannot read local files or reach unintended
+ schemes via urllib's default `file://` / `ftp://` / `data:` handlers.
+ Reported by @KEIJOT in GHSA-993g-76c3-p5m4.
+- Preserve the cached JWK Set on fetch errors in `PyJWKClient.fetch_data`.
+ The previous `finally`-block `put(None)` pattern cleared the cache on
+ any transient outage. Reported by @eddieran in GHSA-fhv5-28vv-h8m8.
+
+Fixes:
+- Reject empty HMAC keys outright in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` with
+ `InvalidKeyError` instead of accepting them with only a warning.
+ Hardening prompted by reports from @SnailSploit and @spartan8806.
+- Forward per-call `options` (including `enforce_minimum_key_length`)
+ from `PyJWT.decode` through to `PyJWS._verify_signature`. Thanks to
+ @WLUB.
+- RFC 7797 ยง3 compliance for `b64=false`: encoder auto-adds `"b64"` to
+ `crit`; decoder rejects tokens that set `b64=false` without listing
+ it in `crit`. Thanks to @MachineLearning-Nerd.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-48526
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Split out the raw JWK-as-HMAC-secret rejection because the upstream
+ commit bundles multiple CVEs.
+- Omitted CHANGELOG.rst because it conflicted and is release documentation.
+- Carried `test_hmac_prepare_key_rejects_jwk_json` and
+ `test_hmac_prepare_key_accepts_json_without_kty` regression tests covering
+ the same JWK-classification security boundary.
+- Omitted other tests/test_algorithms.py hunks for separate empty-key and
+ per-call key-length hardening.
+- Omitted the 2.13.0 version bump and other bundled fixes; applicable CVE
+ fixes are carried in separate patches.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 95791b1759b8aa4f2203575d344d5c78564cdc81)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ jwt/algorithms.py | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/test_algorithms.py | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/jwt/algorithms.py b/jwt/algorithms.py
+index 615dcf3..cf6da45 100644
+--- a/jwt/algorithms.py
++++ b/jwt/algorithms.py
+@@ -331,6 +331,26 @@ class HMACAlgorithm(Algorithm):
+ " should not be used as an HMAC secret."
+ )
+
++ # Defense against algorithm-confusion attacks: an attacker with
++ # control over the token header can force this code path by setting
++ # alg=HS*, and HMACAlgorithm is the only algorithm that accepts
++ # arbitrary bytes as a valid secret. Other algorithms reject
++ # non-key-shaped input naturally. Even a symmetric (kty=oct) JWK
++ # should be loaded via PyJWK / from_jwk rather than fed as raw JSON
++ # bytes (whose contents are not the secret material).
++ stripped = key_bytes.lstrip()
++ if stripped.startswith(b"{"):
++ try:
++ jwk_obj = json.loads(key_bytes)
++ except ValueError:
++ jwk_obj = None
++ if isinstance(jwk_obj, dict) and "kty" in jwk_obj:
++ raise InvalidKeyError(
++ "The specified key looks like a JWK and should not be "
++ "used directly as an HMAC secret. Load it via "
++ "PyJWK / HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk first."
++ )
++
+ return key_bytes
+
+ @overload
+diff --git a/tests/test_algorithms.py b/tests/test_algorithms.py
+index 5449f3c..82659cf 100644
+--- a/tests/test_algorithms.py
++++ b/tests/test_algorithms.py
+@@ -122,6 +122,29 @@ class TestAlgorithms:
+ with pytest.raises(InvalidKeyError):
+ algo.from_jwk(keyfile.read())
+
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++ "jwk_file",
++ [
++ "jwk_rsa_pub.json",
++ "jwk_ec_pub_P-256.json",
++ "jwk_okp_pub_Ed25519.json",
++ "jwk_hmac.json",
++ ],
++ )
++ def test_hmac_prepare_key_rejects_jwk_json(self, jwk_file: str) -> None:
++ algo = HMACAlgorithm(HMACAlgorithm.SHA256)
++
++ with open(key_path(jwk_file)) as keyfile:
++ with pytest.raises(InvalidKeyError, match="looks like a JWK"):
++ algo.prepare_key(keyfile.read())
++
++ def test_hmac_prepare_key_accepts_json_without_kty(self) -> None:
++ # JSON that doesn't look like a JWK (no "kty") should not be misclassified.
++ algo = HMACAlgorithm(HMACAlgorithm.SHA256)
++
++ key = algo.prepare_key('{"this": "is just a json-shaped secret"}')
++ assert key == b'{"this": "is just a json-shaped secret"}'
++
+ @crypto_required
+ def test_rsa_should_parse_pem_public_key(self) -> None:
+ algo = RSAAlgorithm(RSAAlgorithm.SHA256)
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-48522.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48523.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48524.patch \
file://CVE-2026-48525.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-48526.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c74a7a2adf861c04d002db713dd85f84beb242228e671280bf709d765b03672b"