new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From 8f8a4747a0223b8897deda9a40a8a099c61fa80f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 09:44:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This commit addresses an integer overflow (wraparound) vulnerability
+in the check_memb_join_sanity function.
+
+Previously, the 32-bit unsigned network values proc_list_entries and
+failed_list_entries were added together before being promoted to
+size_t. This allowed the addition to wrap around in 32-bit arithmetic
+(e.g., 0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0), resulting in a required_len
+calculation that was incorrectly small.
+
+The solution is to cast the list entries to size_t and verify that
+neither exceeds the maximum allowed value before the addition occurs.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2026-35092
+
+Reported-by: Sebastián Alba Vives (@Sebasteuo / 0xS4bb1) <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
+Also-proposed-by: nicholasyang <nicholas.yang@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Christine Caulfield <ccaulfie@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-35092
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/corosync/corosync/commit/4082294f5094a7591e4e00658c5a605f05d644f1]
+Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com>
+---
+ exec/totemsrp.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/exec/totemsrp.c b/exec/totemsrp.c
+index 94d6c21..6845cec 100644
+--- a/exec/totemsrp.c
++++ b/exec/totemsrp.c
+@@ -3786,7 +3786,17 @@ static int check_memb_join_sanity(
+ failed_list_entries = swab32(failed_list_entries);
+ }
+
+- required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) + ((proc_list_entries + failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
++ if (proc_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX ||
++ failed_list_entries > PROCESSOR_COUNT_MAX) {
++ log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
++ "Received memb_join message list_entries exceeds the maximum "
++ "allowed value... ignoring.");
++
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ required_len = sizeof(struct memb_join) +
++ (((size_t)proc_list_entries + (size_t)failed_list_entries) * sizeof(struct srp_addr));
+ if (msg_len < required_len) {
+ log_printf (instance->totemsrp_log_level_security,
+ "Received memb_join message is too short... ignoring.");
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ inherit autotools pkgconfig systemd github-releases
SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://corosync.conf \
file://CVE-2026-35091.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-35092.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "be361c827f99b215b3bd3fa2fb071c03dac6831c2a351963d938caef62604bc8"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "v(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35092 Pick the patch that mentions the CVE ID explicitly (the same commit was identified by Debian also[1]) [1]: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35092 Signed-off-by: Gyorgy Sarvari <skandigraun@gmail.com> --- .../corosync/corosync/CVE-2026-35092.patch | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ .../corosync/corosync_3.1.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-extended/corosync/corosync/CVE-2026-35092.patch