new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+From 2de0d3fd114e9d3d6a56bd7298aff8c637063509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergey Kandaurov <pluknet@nginx.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:55:44 +0400
+Subject: [PATCH] SNI: added restriction for TLSv1.3 cross-SNI session
+ resumption.
+
+In OpenSSL, session resumption always happens in the default SSL context,
+prior to invoking the SNI callback. Further, unlike in TLSv1.2 and older
+protocols, SSL_get_servername() returns values received in the resumption
+handshake, which may be different from the value in the initial handshake.
+Notably, this makes the restriction added in b720f650b insufficient for
+sessions resumed with different SNI server name.
+
+Considering the example from b720f650b, previously, a client was able to
+request example.org by presenting a certificate for example.org, then to
+resume and request example.com.
+
+The fix is to reject handshakes resumed with a different server name, if
+verification of client certificates is enabled in a corresponding server
+configuration.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-23419
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/13935cf9fdc3c8d8278c70716417d3b71c36140e]
+Signed-off-by: Colin Pinnell McAllister <colin.mcallister@garmin.com>
+---
+ src/http/ngx_http_request.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
+index 3cca57cf5..9593b7fb5 100644
+--- a/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
++++ b/src/http/ngx_http_request.c
+@@ -932,6 +932,31 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++ sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(cscf->ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
++
++#if (defined TLS1_3_VERSION \
++ && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
++
++ /*
++ * SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() is only available in OpenSSL 1.1.1+,
++ * but servername being negotiated in every TLSv1.3 handshake
++ * is only returned in OpenSSL 1.1.1+ as well
++ */
++
++ if (sscf->verify) {
++ const char *hostname;
++
++ hostname = SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(SSL_get0_session(ssl_conn));
++
++ if (hostname != NULL && ngx_strcmp(hostname, servername) != 0) {
++ c->ssl->handshake_rejected = 1;
++ *ad = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
++ }
++ }
++
++#endif
++
+ hc->ssl_servername = ngx_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(ngx_str_t));
+ if (hc->ssl_servername == NULL) {
+ goto error;
+@@ -945,8 +970,6 @@ ngx_http_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
+
+ ngx_set_connection_log(c, clcf->error_log);
+
+- sscf = ngx_http_get_module_srv_conf(hc->conf_ctx, ngx_http_ssl_module);
+-
+ c->ssl->buffer_size = sscf->buffer_size;
+
+ if (sscf->ssl.ctx) {
+diff --git a/src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c b/src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c
+index ba444776a..6dee106de 100644
+--- a/src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c
++++ b/src/stream/ngx_stream_ssl_module.c
+@@ -521,12 +521,35 @@ ngx_stream_ssl_servername(ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn, int *ad, void *arg)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++ sscf = ngx_stream_get_module_srv_conf(cscf->ctx, ngx_stream_ssl_module);
++
++#if (defined TLS1_3_VERSION \
++ && !defined LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER && !defined OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
++
++ /*
++ * SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname() is only available in OpenSSL 1.1.1+,
++ * but servername being negotiated in every TLSv1.3 handshake
++ * is only returned in OpenSSL 1.1.1+ as well
++ */
++
++ if (sscf->verify) {
++ const char *hostname;
++
++ hostname = SSL_SESSION_get0_hostname(SSL_get0_session(ssl_conn));
++
++ if (hostname != NULL && ngx_strcmp(hostname, servername) != 0) {
++ c->ssl->handshake_rejected = 1;
++ *ad = SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
++ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
++ }
++ }
++
++#endif
++
+ s->srv_conf = cscf->ctx->srv_conf;
+
+ ngx_set_connection_log(c, cscf->error_log);
+
+- sscf = ngx_stream_get_module_srv_conf(s, ngx_stream_ssl_module);
+-
+ if (sscf->ssl.ctx) {
+ if (SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl_conn, sscf->ssl.ctx) == NULL) {
+ goto error;
+--
+2.52.0
+
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
file://CVE-2024-7347-1.patch \
file://CVE-2024-7347-2.patch \
file://CVE-2025-53859.patch \
+ file://CVE-2025-23419.patch \
"
inherit siteinfo update-rc.d useradd systemd
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ require nginx.inc
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=175abb631c799f54573dc481454c8632"
-SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch \
- file://CVE-2025-23419.patch"
+SRC_URI:append = " file://CVE-2023-44487.patch"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "77a2541637b92a621e3ee76776c8b7b40cf6d707e69ba53a940283e30ff2f55d"
Updates nginx.inc to apply CVE-2025-23419.patch to both 1.24.0 and 1.25.5. However, a unique patch is provided for 1.25.5 since the upstream patch for CVE-2025-23419 can be cleanly applied to 1.25.5. Signed-off-by: Colin Pinnell McAllister <colin.mcallister@garmin.com> --- I'm not 100% sure if this is the best way to handle overriding the patch for 1.25.5. I figured this was better than having two patch files both in the files directory with nearly identical names. Please let me know if there is a better way to do this. .../nginx/nginx-1.25.5/CVE-2025-23419.patch | 119 ++++++++++++++++++ meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx.inc | 1 + .../recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.24.0.bb | 3 +- 3 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx-1.25.5/CVE-2025-23419.patch