new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+From d9237e3d607f946fe74540efa42a2eacca2a6fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <itchyny@cybozu.co.jp>
+Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 07:45:00 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix signed integer overflow in jvp_array_write and
+ jvp_object_rehash
+
+This commit fixes signed integer overflow and SEGV issues on growing
+arrays and objects. The size of arrays and objects is now limited to
+`536870912` (`0x20000000`). This fixes CVE-2024-23337 and fixes #3262.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq.git/commit/de21386681c0df0104a99d9d09db23a9b2a78b1e]
+CVE: CVE-2024-23337
+
+(cherry picked from commit de21386681c0df0104a99d9d09db23a9b2a78b1e)
+Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <roland.kovacs@est.tech>
+---
+ src/jv.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ src/jv_aux.c | 9 ++++----
+ tests/jq.test | 4 ++++
+ 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv.c b/src/jv.c
+index 34573b8..15990f1 100644
+--- a/src/jv.c
++++ b/src/jv.c
+@@ -1001,6 +1001,11 @@ jv jv_array_set(jv j, int idx, jv val) {
+ jv_free(val);
+ return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Out of bounds negative array index"));
+ }
++ if (idx > (INT_MAX >> 2) - jvp_array_offset(j)) {
++ jv_free(j);
++ jv_free(val);
++ return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Array index too large"));
++ }
+ // copy/free of val,j coalesced
+ jv* slot = jvp_array_write(&j, idx);
+ jv_free(*slot);
+@@ -1020,6 +1025,7 @@ jv jv_array_concat(jv a, jv b) {
+ // FIXME: could be faster
+ jv_array_foreach(b, i, elem) {
+ a = jv_array_append(a, elem);
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
+ }
+ jv_free(b);
+ return a;
+@@ -1283,15 +1289,22 @@ jv jv_string_indexes(jv j, jv k) {
+ assert(JVP_HAS_KIND(k, JV_KIND_STRING));
+ const char *jstr = jv_string_value(j);
+ const char *idxstr = jv_string_value(k);
+- const char *p;
++ const char *p, *lp;
+ int jlen = jv_string_length_bytes(jv_copy(j));
+ int idxlen = jv_string_length_bytes(jv_copy(k));
+ jv a = jv_array();
+
+ if (idxlen != 0) {
+- p = jstr;
++ int n = 0;
++ p = lp = jstr;
+ while ((p = _jq_memmem(p, (jstr + jlen) - p, idxstr, idxlen)) != NULL) {
+- a = jv_array_append(a, jv_number(p - jstr));
++ while (lp < p) {
++ lp += jvp_utf8_decode_length(*lp);
++ n++;
++ }
++
++ a = jv_array_append(a, jv_number(n));
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+@@ -1314,14 +1327,17 @@ jv jv_string_split(jv j, jv sep) {
+
+ if (seplen == 0) {
+ int c;
+- while ((jstr = jvp_utf8_next(jstr, jend, &c)))
++ while ((jstr = jvp_utf8_next(jstr, jend, &c))) {
+ a = jv_array_append(a, jv_string_append_codepoint(jv_string(""), c));
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
++ }
+ } else {
+ for (p = jstr; p < jend; p = s + seplen) {
+ s = _jq_memmem(p, jend - p, sepstr, seplen);
+ if (s == NULL)
+ s = jend;
+ a = jv_array_append(a, jv_string_sized(p, s - p));
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
+ // Add an empty string to denote that j ends on a sep
+ if (s + seplen == jend && seplen != 0)
+ a = jv_array_append(a, jv_string(""));
+@@ -1339,8 +1355,10 @@ jv jv_string_explode(jv j) {
+ const char* end = i + len;
+ jv a = jv_array_sized(len);
+ int c;
+- while ((i = jvp_utf8_next(i, end, &c)))
++ while ((i = jvp_utf8_next(i, end, &c))) {
+ a = jv_array_append(a, jv_number(c));
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
++ }
+ jv_free(j);
+ return a;
+ }
+@@ -1614,10 +1632,13 @@ static void jvp_object_free(jv o) {
+ }
+ }
+
+-static jv jvp_object_rehash(jv object) {
++static int jvp_object_rehash(jv *objectp) {
++ jv object = *objectp;
+ assert(JVP_HAS_KIND(object, JV_KIND_OBJECT));
+ assert(jvp_refcnt_unshared(object.u.ptr));
+ int size = jvp_object_size(object);
++ if (size > INT_MAX >> 2)
++ return 0;
+ jv new_object = jvp_object_new(size * 2);
+ for (int i=0; i<size; i++) {
+ struct object_slot* slot = jvp_object_get_slot(object, i);
+@@ -1630,7 +1651,8 @@ static jv jvp_object_rehash(jv object) {
+ }
+ // references are transported, just drop the old table
+ jv_mem_free(jvp_object_ptr(object));
+- return new_object;
++ *objectp = new_object;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+ static jv jvp_object_unshare(jv object) {
+@@ -1659,27 +1681,32 @@ static jv jvp_object_unshare(jv object) {
+ return new_object;
+ }
+
+-static jv* jvp_object_write(jv* object, jv key) {
++static int jvp_object_write(jv* object, jv key, jv **valpp) {
+ *object = jvp_object_unshare(*object);
+ int* bucket = jvp_object_find_bucket(*object, key);
+ struct object_slot* slot = jvp_object_find_slot(*object, key, bucket);
+ if (slot) {
+ // already has the key
+ jvp_string_free(key);
+- return &slot->value;
++ *valpp = &slot->value;
++ return 1;
+ }
+ slot = jvp_object_add_slot(*object, key, bucket);
+ if (slot) {
+ slot->value = jv_invalid();
+ } else {
+- *object = jvp_object_rehash(*object);
++ if (!jvp_object_rehash(object)) {
++ *valpp = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+ bucket = jvp_object_find_bucket(*object, key);
+ assert(!jvp_object_find_slot(*object, key, bucket));
+ slot = jvp_object_add_slot(*object, key, bucket);
+ assert(slot);
+ slot->value = jv_invalid();
+ }
+- return &slot->value;
++ *valpp = &slot->value;
++ return 1;
+ }
+
+ static int jvp_object_delete(jv* object, jv key) {
+@@ -1779,7 +1806,11 @@ jv jv_object_set(jv object, jv key, jv value) {
+ assert(JVP_HAS_KIND(object, JV_KIND_OBJECT));
+ assert(JVP_HAS_KIND(key, JV_KIND_STRING));
+ // copy/free of object, key, value coalesced
+- jv* slot = jvp_object_write(&object, key);
++ jv* slot;
++ if (!jvp_object_write(&object, key, &slot)) {
++ jv_free(object);
++ return jv_invalid_with_msg(jv_string("Object too big"));
++ }
+ jv_free(*slot);
+ *slot = value;
+ return object;
+@@ -1804,6 +1835,7 @@ jv jv_object_merge(jv a, jv b) {
+ assert(JVP_HAS_KIND(a, JV_KIND_OBJECT));
+ jv_object_foreach(b, k, v) {
+ a = jv_object_set(a, k, v);
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
+ }
+ jv_free(b);
+ return a;
+@@ -1823,6 +1855,7 @@ jv jv_object_merge_recursive(jv a, jv b) {
+ jv_free(elem);
+ a = jv_object_set(a, k, v);
+ }
++ if (!jv_is_valid(a)) break;
+ }
+ jv_free(b);
+ return a;
+diff --git a/src/jv_aux.c b/src/jv_aux.c
+index 6004799..bbe1c0d 100644
+--- a/src/jv_aux.c
++++ b/src/jv_aux.c
+@@ -193,18 +193,19 @@ jv jv_set(jv t, jv k, jv v) {
+ if (slice_len < insert_len) {
+ // array is growing
+ int shift = insert_len - slice_len;
+- for (int i = array_len - 1; i >= end; i--) {
++ for (int i = array_len - 1; i >= end && jv_is_valid(t); i--) {
+ t = jv_array_set(t, i + shift, jv_array_get(jv_copy(t), i));
+ }
+ } else if (slice_len > insert_len) {
+ // array is shrinking
+ int shift = slice_len - insert_len;
+- for (int i = end; i < array_len; i++) {
++ for (int i = end; i < array_len && jv_is_valid(t); i++) {
+ t = jv_array_set(t, i - shift, jv_array_get(jv_copy(t), i));
+ }
+- t = jv_array_slice(t, 0, array_len - shift);
++ if (jv_is_valid(t))
++ t = jv_array_slice(t, 0, array_len - shift);
+ }
+- for (int i=0; i < insert_len; i++) {
++ for (int i = 0; i < insert_len && jv_is_valid(t); i++) {
+ t = jv_array_set(t, start + i, jv_array_get(jv_copy(v), i));
+ }
+ jv_free(v);
+diff --git a/tests/jq.test b/tests/jq.test
+index d052b22..22bfd3a 100644
+--- a/tests/jq.test
++++ b/tests/jq.test
+@@ -198,6 +198,10 @@ null
+ [0,1,2]
+ [0,5,2]
+
++try (.[999999999] = 0) catch .
++null
++"Array index too large"
++
+ #
+ # Multiple outputs, iteration
+ #
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From fa6131eb6e9d43e88e35982fa5f6049da2a77a87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <itchyny@cybozu.co.jp>
+Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 07:43:54 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject NaN with payload while parsing JSON
+
+This commit drops support for parsing NaN with payload in JSON like
+`NaN123` and fixes CVE-2024-53427. Other JSON extensions like `NaN` and
+`Infinity` are still supported. Fixes #3023, fixes #3196, fixes #3246.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq.git/commit/a09a4dfd55e6c24d04b35062ccfe4509748b1dd3]
+CVE: CVE-2024-53427
+
+(cherry picked from commit a09a4dfd55e6c24d04b35062ccfe4509748b1dd3)
+Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <roland.kovacs@est.tech>
+---
+ src/jv.c | 9 +++++++++
+ tests/jq.test | 14 ++++++++++----
+ tests/shtest | 5 -----
+ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv.c b/src/jv.c
+index e23d8ec..34573b8 100644
+--- a/src/jv.c
++++ b/src/jv.c
+@@ -589,6 +589,15 @@ static jv jvp_literal_number_new(const char * literal) {
+ jv_mem_free(n);
+ return JV_INVALID;
+ }
++ if (decNumberIsNaN(&n->num_decimal)) {
++ // Reject NaN with payload.
++ if (n->num_decimal.digits > 1 || *n->num_decimal.lsu != 0) {
++ jv_mem_free(n);
++ return JV_INVALID;
++ }
++ jv_mem_free(n);
++ return jv_number(NAN);
++ }
+
+ jv r = {JVP_FLAGS_NUMBER_LITERAL, 0, 0, JV_NUMBER_SIZE_INIT, {&n->refcnt}};
+ return r;
+diff --git a/tests/jq.test b/tests/jq.test
+index 7036df2..d052b22 100644
+--- a/tests/jq.test
++++ b/tests/jq.test
+@@ -1938,11 +1938,17 @@ tojson | fromjson
+ {"a":nan}
+ {"a":null}
+
+-# also "nan with payload" #2985
+-fromjson | isnan
+-"nan1234"
++# NaN with payload is not parsed
++.[] | try (fromjson | isnan) catch .
++["NaN","-NaN","NaN1","NaN10","NaN100","NaN1000","NaN10000","NaN100000"]
+ true
+-
++true
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 4 (while parsing 'NaN1')"
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 5 (while parsing 'NaN10')"
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 6 (while parsing 'NaN100')"
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 7 (while parsing 'NaN1000')"
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 8 (while parsing 'NaN10000')"
++"Invalid numeric literal at EOF at line 1, column 9 (while parsing 'NaN100000')"
+
+ # calling input/0, or debug/0 in a test doesn't crash jq
+
+diff --git a/tests/shtest b/tests/shtest
+index 14aafbf..a471889 100755
+--- a/tests/shtest
++++ b/tests/shtest
+@@ -594,11 +594,6 @@ if ! x=$($JQ -n "1 # foo$cr + 2") || [ "$x" != 1 ]; then
+ exit 1
+ fi
+
+-# CVE-2023-50268: No stack overflow comparing a nan with a large payload
+-$VALGRIND $Q $JQ '1 != .' <<\EOF >/dev/null
+-Nan4000
+-EOF
+-
+ # Allow passing the inline jq script before -- #2919
+ if ! r=$($JQ --args -rn -- '$ARGS.positional[0]' bar) || [ "$r" != bar ]; then
+ echo "passing the inline script after -- didn't work"
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 35c08446e4bcd89e0e87e7750c68306d6c0e9ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: itchyny <itchyny@cybozu.co.jp>
+Date: Sat, 31 May 2025 11:46:40 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix heap buffer overflow when formatting an empty string
+
+The `jv_string_empty` did not properly null-terminate the string data,
+which could lead to a heap buffer overflow. The test case of
+GHSA-p7rr-28xf-3m5w (`0[""*0]`) was fixed by the commit dc849e9bb74a,
+but another case (`0[[]|implode]`) was still vulnerable. This commit
+ensures string data is properly null-terminated, and fixes CVE-2025-48060.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jqlang/jq.git/commit/c6e041699d8cd31b97375a2596217aff2cfca85b]
+CVE: CVE-2025-48060
+
+(cherry picked from commit c6e041699d8cd31b97375a2596217aff2cfca85b)
+Signed-off-by: Roland Kovacs <roland.kovacs@est.tech>
+---
+ src/jv.c | 1 +
+ tests/jq.test | 4 ++++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/jv.c b/src/jv.c
+index 15990f1..18dbb54 100644
+--- a/src/jv.c
++++ b/src/jv.c
+@@ -1125,6 +1125,7 @@ static jv jvp_string_empty_new(uint32_t length) {
+ jvp_string* s = jvp_string_alloc(length);
+ s->length_hashed = 0;
+ memset(s->data, 0, length);
++ s->data[length] = 0;
+ jv r = {JVP_FLAGS_STRING, 0, 0, 0, {&s->refcnt}};
+ return r;
+ }
+diff --git a/tests/jq.test b/tests/jq.test
+index 22bfd3a..ecb9116 100644
+--- a/tests/jq.test
++++ b/tests/jq.test
+@@ -2030,6 +2030,10 @@ map(try implode catch .)
+ [123,["a"],[nan]]
+ ["implode input must be an array","string (\"a\") can't be imploded, unicode codepoint needs to be numeric","number (null) can't be imploded, unicode codepoint needs to be numeric"]
+
++try 0[implode] catch .
++[]
++"Cannot index number with string \"\""
++
+ # walk
+ walk(.)
+ {"x":0}
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=488f4e0b04c0456337fb70d1ac1758ba"
GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/jqlang/${BPN}/releases/"
SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${BPN}-${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://run-ptest \
+ file://CVE-2024-23337.patch \
+ file://CVE-2024-53427.patch \
+ file://CVE-2025-48060.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "478c9ca129fd2e3443fe27314b455e211e0d8c60bc8ff7df703873deeee580c2"