Message ID | 20230210043508.6793-1-hprajapati@mvista.com |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | [meta-webserver,kirkstone] httpd: CVE-2022-37436 mod_proxy: HTTP response splitting | expand |
On 2/9/23 11:35 PM, Hitendra Prajapati wrote: > Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 > > Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> > --- > .../apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch | 138 ++++++++++++++++++ > .../recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb | 1 + Thanks for the patch but I am going with the update to 2.4.55 which includes this fix. -armin > 2 files changed, 139 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch > > diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..62a6a3844e > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ > +From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org> > +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000 > +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-37436 > + > +SECURITY: CVE-2022-37436 (cve.mitre.org) > + > +Prior to Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55, a malicious backend can > +cause the response headers to be truncated early, resulting in > +some headers being incorporated into the response body. If the > +later headers have any security purpose, they will not be > +interpreted by the client. > + > +git-svn-id: git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7] > +CVE: CVE-2022-37436 > +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> > +--- > + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- > + server/protocol.c | 2 ++ > + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c > +index d74ae05..04dd221 100644 > +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c > ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c > +@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c, > + * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing > + * what was read by ap_getline() upon return. > + */ > +-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > ++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > + char *buffer, int size, > + conn_rec *c, int *pread_len) > + { > +@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > + rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr, > + AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len); > + > +- if (len <= 0) > +- break; > + > +- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { > +- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn. > +- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead? > +- */ > +- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; > +- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) > +- "header size is over the limit allowed by " > +- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " > +- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", > +- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); > ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) { > ++ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { > ++ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; > ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) > ++ "header size is over the limit allowed by " > ++ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " > ++ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", > ++ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); > ++ } > ++ else { > ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) > ++ "Error reading headers from backend"); > ++ } > ++ r->headers_out = NULL; > ++ return rc; > ++ } > ++ > ++ if (len <= 0) { > ++ break; > + } > + else { > + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer); > +@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > + if (psc->badopt == bad_error) { > + /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */ > + r->headers_out = NULL; > +- return; > ++ return APR_EINVAL; > + } > + else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) { > + /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then > +@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > + "in headers returned by %s (%s)", > + r->uri, r->method); > + *pread_len = len; > +- return; > ++ return APR_SUCCESS; > + } > + else { > + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099) > + "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)", > + r->uri, r->method); > +- return; > ++ return APR_SUCCESS; > + } > + } > + } > +@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, > + process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value); > + saw_headers = 1; > + } > ++ return APR_SUCCESS; > + } > + > + > +@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req) > + "Set-Cookie", NULL); > + > + /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */ > +- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, > +- origin, &pread_len); > ++ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, > ++ origin, &pread_len); > + > +- if (r->headers_out == NULL) { > ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) { > + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106) > + "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)", > + major, minor, r->uri, r->method); > +diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c > +index 7adc7f7..6f9540a 100644 > +--- a/server/protocol.c > ++++ b/server/protocol.c > +@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ cleanup: > + /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */ > + bytes_handled = strlen(*s); > + if (bytes_handled < *read) { > ++ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf, > ++ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0); > + *read = bytes_handled; > + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { > + rv = APR_EINVAL; > +-- > +2.25.1 > + > diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb > index 37d498f52e..429b1e5dd0 100644 > --- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb > +++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ > file://0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch \ > file://0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch \ > file://0001-make_exports.awk-not-expose-the-path.patch \ > + file://CVE-2022-37436.patch \ > " > > SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \ > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- > Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. > View/Reply Online (#101015): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/101015 > Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/96870415/3616698 > Group Owner: openembedded-devel+owner@lists.openembedded.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/unsub [akuster808@gmail.com] > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- >
Hi Armin, Does any one update apache2 package to 2.4.55 which includes this fix ? Gentle reminder . Regards, Hitendra
Hi Armin/Team, Please ignore this mail. I have just seen that somebody update the package. Thank you
diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62a6a3844e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org> +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-37436 + +SECURITY: CVE-2022-37436 (cve.mitre.org) + +Prior to Apache HTTP Server 2.4.55, a malicious backend can +cause the response headers to be truncated early, resulting in +some headers being incorporated into the response body. If the +later headers have any security purpose, they will not be +interpreted by the client. + +git-svn-id: git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7] +CVE: CVE-2022-37436 +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> +--- + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + server/protocol.c | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +index d74ae05..04dd221 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c, + * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing + * what was read by ap_getline() upon return. + */ +-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, ++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + char *buffer, int size, + conn_rec *c, int *pread_len) + { +@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr, + AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len); + +- if (len <= 0) +- break; + +- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { +- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn. +- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead? +- */ +- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; +- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) +- "header size is over the limit allowed by " +- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " +- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", +- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) { ++ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { ++ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) ++ "header size is over the limit allowed by " ++ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " ++ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", ++ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ } ++ else { ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) ++ "Error reading headers from backend"); ++ } ++ r->headers_out = NULL; ++ return rc; ++ } ++ ++ if (len <= 0) { ++ break; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer); +@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + if (psc->badopt == bad_error) { + /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */ + r->headers_out = NULL; +- return; ++ return APR_EINVAL; + } + else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) { + /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then +@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + "in headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); + *pread_len = len; +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099) + "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + } + } +@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value); + saw_headers = 1; + } ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + +@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req) + "Set-Cookie", NULL); + + /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */ +- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, +- origin, &pread_len); ++ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, ++ origin, &pread_len); + +- if (r->headers_out == NULL) { ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106) + "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)", + major, minor, r->uri, r->method); +diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c +index 7adc7f7..6f9540a 100644 +--- a/server/protocol.c ++++ b/server/protocol.c +@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ cleanup: + /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */ + bytes_handled = strlen(*s); + if (bytes_handled < *read) { ++ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf, ++ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0); + *read = bytes_handled; + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + rv = APR_EINVAL; +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb index 37d498f52e..429b1e5dd0 100644 --- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb +++ b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch \ file://0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch \ file://0001-make_exports.awk-not-expose-the-path.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-37436.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \
Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> --- .../apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch | 138 ++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.54.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 139 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/CVE-2022-37436.patch