new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+From 6881a4fc8596307ab9ff2e85e605afa2e413ab71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 00:19:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Fix (harmless) use of uninitialized memory
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/561/commits
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-25236
+
+Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 902895d5..c768f856 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -718,8 +718,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) {
+
+ XML_Parser XMLCALL
+ XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) {
+- XML_Char tmp[2];
+- *tmp = nsSep;
++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0};
+ return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp);
+ }
+
+@@ -1344,8 +1343,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context,
+ would be otherwise.
+ */
+ if (parser->m_ns) {
+- XML_Char tmp[2];
+- *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0};
+ parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd);
+ } else {
+ parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd);
+From a2fe525e660badd64b6c557c2b1ec26ddc07f6e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 01:09:29 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Protect against malicious namespace declarations
+ (CVE-2022-25236)
+
+---
+ expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index c768f856..a3aef88c 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -3754,6 +3754,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
+ if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
+ && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
+ isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
++
++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986,
++ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of
++ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into
++ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused
++ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters
++ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to
++ // be expected.
++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) {
++ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
++ }
+ }
+ isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
+ isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
+From 2de077423fb22750ebea599677d523b53cb93b1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 00:51:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] tests: Cover CVE-2022-25236
+
+---
+ expat/tests/runtests.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
+index d07203f2..bc5344b1 100644
+--- a/tests/runtests.c
++++ b/tests/runtests.c
+@@ -7220,6 +7220,35 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+
++START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) {
++ struct test_case {
++ enum XML_Status expectedStatus;
++ const char *doc;
++ };
++ struct test_case cases[] = {
++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"},
++ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"},
++ };
++
++ size_t i = 0;
++ size_t failCount = 0;
++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n');
++ XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element);
++ if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc),
++ /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)
++ != cases[i].expectedStatus) {
++ failCount++;
++ }
++ XML_ParserFree(parser);
++ }
++
++ if (failCount) {
++ fail("Namespace separator handling is broken");
++ }
++}
++END_TEST
++
+ /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully
+ * allocate */
+ #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1)
+@@ -11905,6 +11934,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
+ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype);
+ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype);
+ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype);
++ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri);
+
+ suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc);
+ tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libexpat/libexpat.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
file://CVE-2022-23852.patch \
file://CVE-2022-23990.patch \
file://CVE-2022-25235.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-25236.patch \
file://libtool-tag.patch \
"
xmlparse.c in Expat (aka libexpat) before 2.4.5 allows attackers to insert namespace-separator characters into namespace URIs. Backport patches from: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/561/commits CVE: CVE-2022-25236 Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> --- .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236.patch | 129 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236.patch