new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 3c55fdefa576c7a06feab86a9e4341be414de49b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Denis Ovsienko <denis@ovsienko.info>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 13:33:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-0799: Access M[] safely in the BPF interpreter.
+
+Include Security identified and reported this problem as a potential
+vulnerability in 2018 (case reference "I7"). Their work was sponsored
+by Mozilla under the Secure Open Source program. The vulnerability has
+been independently confirmed only recently.
+
+The current revision of pcapint_filter_with_aux_data() can, but does not
+check whether a scratch memory register index is valid in the "ld M[k]",
+"ldx M[k]", "st M[k]" and "stx M[k]" BPF instructions, and assumes this
+is always the case. This holds for programs that have been generated or
+validated by libpcap.
+
+However, this does not necessarily hold for programs that come via
+pcap_offline_filter() or [deprecated] bpf_filter() from an external
+source and have not been explicitly validated. If the interpreter
+executes such a program with an invalid index, it will read/write the
+process memory at arbitrary locations starting at the current stack
+frame. Depending on the address, the memory layout and the OS, this can
+result in stack buffer overflow, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS or other effects. To
+fix this, in the interpreter reject the packet if the index is invalid.
+
+(backported from commit 569f8fd3524192acbabf93c9cd704471bb38f84a)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7)
+
+Notes on backporting to 1.10.6:
+ - The upstream CHANGES/changelog hunk is not backported.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7]
+CVE: CVE-2026-0799
+Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech>
+---
+diff --git a/bpf_filter.c b/bpf_filter.c
+index 9b899bbb..510dbd9c 100644
+--- a/bpf_filter.c
++++ b/bpf_filter.c
+@@ -217,18 +217,26 @@ DIAG_ON_DEFAULT_ONLY_SWITCH
+ continue;
+
+ case BPF_LD|BPF_MEM:
++ if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++ return 0;
+ A = mem[pc->k];
+ continue;
+
+ case BPF_LDX|BPF_MEM:
++ if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++ return 0;
+ X = mem[pc->k];
+ continue;
+
+ case BPF_ST:
++ if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++ return 0;
+ mem[pc->k] = A;
+ continue;
+
+ case BPF_STX:
++ if (pc->k >= BPF_MEMWORDS)
++ return 0;
+ mem[pc->k] = X;
+ continue;
+
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native"
SRC_URI = "https://www.tcpdump.org/release/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://0001-Fix-error-messages-about-32-bit-integer-overflow.patch \
+ file://01-CVE-2026-0799.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ec97d1206bdd19cb6bdd043eaa9f0037aa732262ec68e070fd7c7b5f834d5dfc"
NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0799 Upstream-commit: https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/48e8960a7108e9e828f9d7bdc7e97bdab841aec7 Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <jaipaul.cheernam@est.tech> --- .../libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch | 67 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libpcap/libpcap_1.10.6.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/01-CVE-2026-0799.patch