new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From e9697d98e7249b0f68a6be040a4f3dcc5bc101fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Sat, 20 Jun 2026 14:39:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix server-controlled unbounded MD5 loop in FTP OPIE
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* src/ftp-basic.c (ftp_login): Limit the skey sequence to 9999.
+
+Report:
+wget accepts an unbounded server-controlled integer as the iteration
+count for its OPIE/S-KEY MD5 key-derivation loop. No upper bound is
+enforced on the sequence number supplied by the server in the FTP
+challenge line. The value is passed directly to skey_response() as a
+loop counter, causing wget to perform up to ~2.1 billion full MD5
+computations before responding to the authentication challenge.
+
+Reported-by: Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-16599
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/e9697d98e7249b0f68a6be040a4f3dcc5bc101fa]
+
+Signed-off-by: Ghanshyam Banait <Ghanshyam.BanaitSanjay@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/ftp-basic.c | 15 +++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ftp-basic.c b/src/ftp-basic.c
+index 0f4bb821..af38a69a 100644
+--- a/src/ftp-basic.c
++++ b/src/ftp-basic.c
+@@ -204,12 +204,11 @@ ftp_login (int csock, const char *acc, const char *pass)
+ "331 s/key ",
+ "331 opiekey "
+ };
+- size_t i;
+ const char *seed = NULL;
+
+- for (i = 0; i < countof (skey_head); i++)
++ for (size_t i = 0; i < countof (skey_head); i++)
+ {
+- int l = strlen (skey_head[i]);
++ size_t l = strlen (skey_head[i]);
+ if (0 == c_strncasecmp (skey_head[i], respline, l))
+ {
+ seed = respline + l;
+@@ -222,7 +221,15 @@ ftp_login (int csock, const char *acc, const char *pass)
+
+ /* Extract the sequence from SEED. */
+ for (; c_isdigit (*seed); seed++)
+- skey_sequence = 10 * skey_sequence + *seed - '0';
++ {
++ skey_sequence = 10 * skey_sequence + *seed - '0';
++ if (skey_sequence > 9999)
++ {
++ xfree (respline);
++ return FTPLOGREFUSED;
++ }
++ }
++
+ if (*seed == ' ')
+ ++seed;
+ else
+--
+GitLab
+
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2026-58471.patch \
file://CVE-2026-58472.patch \
file://CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-16599.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "766e48423e79359ea31e41db9e5c289675947a7fcf2efdcedb726ac9d0da3784"
GNU wget is vulnerable to denial of service in its FTP OPIE/S-KEY authentication functionality. The server-supplied sequence number from the FTP challenge line is used as an iteration count for an MD5 key-derivation loop without any upper bound validation. A malicious FTP server or a network attacker positioned to intercept FTP traffic can send a crafted OPIE challenge with a sequence number near INT_MAX, causing wget to perform up to approximately 2.1 billion MD5 computations and suspend for some time. The --timeout option does not mitigate this because it applies only to network I/O, not CPU computation. This issue was fixed in commit e9697d98e7249b0f68a6be040a4f3dcc5bc101fa Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-16599 Backport the patch to fix CVE-2026-16599. https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/e9697d98e7249b0f68a6be040a4f3dcc5bc101fa Signed-off-by: Ghanshyam Banait <Ghanshyam.BanaitSanjay@windriver.com> --- .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-16599.patch | 68 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.25.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-16599.patch