new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From b34cd8399981324b361ae4f2b8e0eb77444ae0e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kim Davies <kim@cynosure.com.au>
+Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 08:47:22 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Merge commit from fork
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-45409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/kjd/idna/commit/c0dda4501df5d91c3181ce6f962dc5de74e82cc1]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omit the HISTORY.rst hunk because it documents the upstream 3.14
+ release and is not applicable to the Scarthgap 3.7 source.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c0dda4501df5d91c3181ce6f962dc5de74e82cc1)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ idna/core.py | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ tests/test_idna.py | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/idna/core.py b/idna/core.py
+index 0dae61a..a549326 100644
+--- a/idna/core.py
++++ b/idna/core.py
+@@ -340,6 +340,15 @@ def encode(s: Union[str, bytes, bytearray], strict: bool = False, uts46: bool =
+ raise IDNAError('should pass a unicode string to the function rather than a byte string.')
+ if uts46:
+ s = uts46_remap(s, std3_rules, transitional)
++
++ # Reject inputs that exceed the maximum DNS domain length up-front.
++ # Each codepoint in a U-label contributes at least one octet to its
++ # A-label form, so any input longer than the domain limit cannot
++ # produce a valid A-domain. Short-circuiting here prevents per-label
++ # validation from being driven into quadratic time
++ if len(s) > 254:
++ raise IDNAError("Domain too long")
++
+ trailing_dot = False
+ result = []
+ if strict:
+@@ -373,6 +382,11 @@ def decode(s: Union[str, bytes, bytearray], strict: bool = False, uts46: bool =
+ raise IDNAError('Invalid ASCII in A-label')
+ if uts46:
+ s = uts46_remap(s, std3_rules, False)
++ # See encode() for rationale; the same bound applies because every
++ # legal A-domain is at most 254 octets and every codepoint of a
++ # legal U-domain contributes at least one octet to its A-form.
++ if len(s) > 254:
++ raise IDNAError("Domain too long")
+ trailing_dot = False
+ result = []
+ if not strict:
+diff --git a/tests/test_idna.py b/tests/test_idna.py
+index 81afb32..5001b48 100755
+--- a/tests/test_idna.py
++++ b/tests/test_idna.py
+@@ -78,6 +78,19 @@ class IDNATests(unittest.TestCase):
+ self.assertFalse(idna.valid_label_length('a' * 64))
+ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.encode, 'a' * 64)
+
++ def test_oversized_input_rejected_promptly(self):
++ # GHSA-65pc-fj4g-8rjx: encode/decode must reject inputs that
++ # exceed the maximum DNS domain length before per-codepoint
++ # validation runs, so labels dominated by CONTEXTO codepoints
++ # cannot drive validation into quadratic time.
++ import time
++
++ for payload in ("٠" * 8000, "・" * 8000 + "漢"):
++ start = time.perf_counter()
++ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.encode, payload)
++ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.decode, payload)
++ self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
++
+ def test_check_bidi(self):
+
+ l = '\u0061'
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From fabb538f1885a135e48a60de2e3c656d965e861d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kim Davies <kim@cynosure.com.au>
+Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 12:44:47 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Use valid_string_length() for early oversized-input check
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-45409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/kjd/idna/commit/628fef84d3eda59321c21127e73dcd873db23ead]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 628fef84d3eda59321c21127e73dcd873db23ead)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ idna/core.py | 16 ++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/idna/core.py b/idna/core.py
+index a549326..4a9fc75 100644
+--- a/idna/core.py
++++ b/idna/core.py
+@@ -341,12 +341,9 @@ def encode(s: Union[str, bytes, bytearray], strict: bool = False, uts46: bool =
+ if uts46:
+ s = uts46_remap(s, std3_rules, transitional)
+
+- # Reject inputs that exceed the maximum DNS domain length up-front.
+- # Each codepoint in a U-label contributes at least one octet to its
+- # A-label form, so any input longer than the domain limit cannot
+- # produce a valid A-domain. Short-circuiting here prevents per-label
+- # validation from being driven into quadratic time
+- if len(s) > 254:
++ # Reject inputs that exceed the maximum DNS domain length up-front
++ # to avoid expensive computation on long inputs.
++ if not valid_string_length(s, trailing_dot=True):
+ raise IDNAError("Domain too long")
+
+ trailing_dot = False
+@@ -382,10 +379,9 @@ def decode(s: Union[str, bytes, bytearray], strict: bool = False, uts46: bool =
+ raise IDNAError('Invalid ASCII in A-label')
+ if uts46:
+ s = uts46_remap(s, std3_rules, False)
+- # See encode() for rationale; the same bound applies because every
+- # legal A-domain is at most 254 octets and every codepoint of a
+- # legal U-domain contributes at least one octet to its A-form.
+- if len(s) > 254:
++ # Reject inputs that exceed the maximum DNS domain length up-front
++ # to avoid expensive computation on long inputs.
++ if not valid_string_length(s, trailing_dot=True):
+ raise IDNAError("Domain too long")
+ trailing_dot = False
+ result = []
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 22acbaae97c3698005e69555eb4ebccc168b2fff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: metsw24-max <metsw24@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 20:59:30 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Enforce early length limits in check_label
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-45409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/kjd/idna/commit/e1cb465b6376f33306a26f467d197edbcd01c4b9]
+
+(cherry picked from commit e1cb465b6376f33306a26f467d197edbcd01c4b9)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <hthakar@cisco.com>
+---
+ idna/core.py | 11 +++++++++++
+ tests/test_idna.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/idna/core.py b/idna/core.py
+index 4a9fc75..26bb9fa 100644
+--- a/idna/core.py
++++ b/idna/core.py
+@@ -230,6 +230,17 @@ def check_label(label: Union[str, bytes, bytearray]) -> None:
+ label = label.decode('utf-8')
+ if len(label) == 0:
+ raise IDNAError('Empty Label')
++ # Reject oversized labels before per-codepoint validation runs.
++ # CONTEXTJ/CONTEXTO checks scan the whole label per codepoint, so an
++ # uncapped label drives validation into quadratic time
++ # (GHSA-65pc-fj4g-8rjx / CVE-2024-3651). encode()/decode() cap the
++ # whole-domain length; this cap protects direct callers of
++ # alabel/ulabel/check_label and the idna2008 incremental codec.
++ # Use the whole-domain bound rather than the per-label DNS bound so
++ # that UTS #46 lenient decoding of labels longer than 63 chars is
++ # preserved.
++ if not valid_string_length(label, trailing_dot=True):
++ raise IDNAError("Label too long")
+
+ check_nfc(label)
+ check_hyphen_ok(label)
+diff --git a/tests/test_idna.py b/tests/test_idna.py
+index 5001b48..2dc0892 100755
+--- a/tests/test_idna.py
++++ b/tests/test_idna.py
+@@ -91,6 +91,30 @@ class IDNATests(unittest.TestCase):
+ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.decode, payload)
+ self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
+
++ def test_oversized_label_rejected_promptly(self):
++ # The whole-domain cap in encode()/decode() does not cover direct
++ # callers of alabel/ulabel/check_label, nor the idna2008
++ # incremental codec which calls alabel/ulabel per label. Without a
++ # per-label cap, a single oversized CONTEXTO-heavy label still
++ # drives validation into quadratic time.
++ import codecs
++ import time
++
++ import idna.codec # noqa: F401 (register the idna2008 codec)
++
++ payload = "・" * 8000 + "漢"
++ start = time.perf_counter()
++ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.check_label, payload)
++ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.alabel, payload)
++ self.assertRaises(idna.IDNAError, idna.ulabel, payload)
++ self.assertRaises(
++ idna.IDNAError,
++ codecs.getincrementalencoder("idna2008")().encode,
++ payload,
++ True,
++ )
++ self.assertLess(time.perf_counter() - start, 1.0)
++
+ def test_check_bidi(self):
+
+ l = '\u0061'
@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://github.com/kjd/idna"
LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & Python-2.0 & Unicode-TOU"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.md;md5=204c0612e40a4dd46012a78d02c80fb1"
+SRC_URI += " \
+ file://CVE-2026-45409_p1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-45409_p2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-45409_p3.patch \
+"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "028ff3aadf0609c1fd278d8ea3089299412a7a8b9bd005dd08b9f8285bcb5cfc"
inherit pypi python_flit_core