new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 91a9bd79cdbab8f8518c4a5e669b3f19680a2f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 14:31:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] gh-151558: Fix symlink escape via `tarfile`
+ hardlink-extraction fallback (GH-151559)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-11940
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/27dd970bf6b17ebca7c8ed486a40ab043ed7af8f]
+
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Robin <benjamin.robin@bootlin.com>
+---
+ Lib/tarfile.py | 3 +++
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
+index 59d3f6e5cce1..83226e907e4b 100755
+--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
+@@ -2650,6 +2650,9 @@ def makelink_with_filter(self, tarinfo, targetpath,
+ "makelink_with_filter: if filter_function is not None, "
+ + "extraction_root must also not be None")
+ try:
++ filter_function(
++ unfiltered.replace(name=tarinfo.name, deep=False),
++ extraction_root)
+ filtered = filter_function(unfiltered, extraction_root)
+ except _FILTER_ERRORS as cause:
+ raise LinkFallbackError(tarinfo, unfiltered.name) from cause
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index 759fa03ead70..29719d95b6c1 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -4080,6 +4080,30 @@ def test_sneaky_hardlink_fallback(self):
+ self.expect_file("boom", symlink_to='../../link_here')
+ self.expect_file("c", symlink_to='b')
+
++ @symlink_test
++ def test_sneaky_hardlink_fallback_deep(self):
++ # (CVE-2026-11940)
++ with ArchiveMaker() as arc:
++ arc.add("a/b/s", symlink_to=os.path.join("..", "escape"))
++ arc.add("s", hardlink_to=os.path.join("a", "b", "s"))
++
++ with self.check_context(arc.open(), 'data'):
++ e = self.expect_exception(
++ tarfile.LinkFallbackError,
++ "link 's' would be extracted as a copy of "
++ + "'a/b/s', which was rejected")
++ self.assertIsInstance(e.__cause__,
++ tarfile.LinkOutsideDestinationError)
++
++ for filter in 'tar', 'fully_trusted':
++ with self.subTest(filter), self.check_context(arc.open(), filter):
++ if not os_helper.can_symlink():
++ self.expect_file("a/")
++ self.expect_file("a/b/")
++ else:
++ self.expect_file("a/b/s", symlink_to=os.path.join('..', 'escape'))
++ self.expect_file("s", symlink_to=os.path.join('..', 'escape'))
++
+ @symlink_test
+ def test_exfiltration_via_symlink(self):
+ # (CVE-2025-4138)
+--
+2.54.0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-6019_p2.patch \
file://CVE-2025-13462.patch \
file://CVE-2026-4224.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-11940.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
tarfile.extractall() with the 'data' or 'tar' filter could be bypassed by a crafted archive where a hardlink references a symlink stored at a deeper name than the hardlink itself. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Robin (Schneider Electric) <benjamin.robin@bootlin.com> --- .../python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.12.13.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)