new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+From 664701eb7576edb7c7c7d9f2d600815ec1f43459 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 08:20:43 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0272: [security]: 'tabpanel' can be set in a
+ modeline
+
+Problem: 'tabpanel' can be set in a modeline
+Solution: Set the P_MLE flag for the 'tabpanel' option, disable
+ autocmd_add()/autocomd_delete() functions in restricted/secure
+ mode.
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-2gmj-rpqf-pxvh
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-34714
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/664701eb7576edb7c7c7d9f2d600815ec1f43459]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/autocmd.c | 3 +++
+ src/optiondefs.h | 2 +-
+ src/testdir/test_autocmd.vim | 5 +++++
+ src/testdir/test_tabpanel.vim | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ src/version.c | 2 ++
+ 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/autocmd.c b/src/autocmd.c
+index 94f9c1fba4..8a6b363aad 100644
+--- a/src/autocmd.c
++++ b/src/autocmd.c
+@@ -3069,6 +3069,9 @@ autocmd_add_or_delete(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv, int delete)
+ rettv->v_type = VAR_BOOL;
+ rettv->vval.v_number = VVAL_FALSE;
+
++ if (check_restricted() || check_secure())
++ return;
++
+ if (check_for_list_arg(argvars, 0) == FAIL)
+ return;
+
+diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h
+index 62d142e637..bd02d04f47 100644
+--- a/src/optiondefs.h
++++ b/src/optiondefs.h
+@@ -2570,7 +2570,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
+ (char_u *)&p_tpm, PV_NONE, NULL, NULL,
+ {(char_u *)10L, (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT},
+ #if defined(FEAT_TABPANEL)
+- {"tabpanel", "tpl", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_RALL,
++ {"tabpanel", "tpl", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_RALL|P_MLE,
+ (char_u *)&p_tpl, PV_NONE, NULL, NULL,
+ {(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT},
+ {"tabpanelopt","tplo", P_STRING|P_ALLOCED|P_VI_DEF|P_ONECOMMA|P_COLON
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_autocmd.vim b/src/testdir/test_autocmd.vim
+index 43605f7e11..1fea13b00a 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_autocmd.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_autocmd.vim
+@@ -5501,4 +5501,9 @@ func Test_VimResized_and_window_width_not_equalized()
+ call StopVimInTerminal(buf)
+ endfunc
+
++func Test_autocmd_add_secure()
++ call assert_fails('sandbox call autocmd_add([{"event": "BufRead", "cmd": "let x = 1"}])', 'E48:')
++ call assert_fails('sandbox call autocmd_delete([{"event": "BufRead"}])', 'E48:')
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_tabpanel.vim b/src/testdir/test_tabpanel.vim
+index ecc12b59be..b0d4202dc4 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_tabpanel.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_tabpanel.vim
+@@ -770,4 +770,20 @@ function Test_tabpanel_with_cmdline_pum()
+
+ call StopVimInTerminal(buf)
+ endfunc
++
++func Test_tabpanel_no_modeline()
++ let _tpl = &tabpanel
++ let _mls = &modelineexpr
++
++ set nomodelineexpr
++ setlocal modeline
++ new
++ call writefile(['/* vim: set tabpanel=test: */'], 'Xtabpanel.txt', 'D')
++ call assert_fails(':e Xtabpanel.txt', 'E992:')
++
++ let &tabpanel = _tpl
++ let &modelineexpr = _mls
++ bw!
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c
+index 4f47ec2688..309ddf7f7c 100644
+--- a/src/version.c
++++ b/src/version.c
+@@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ static char *(features[]) =
+
+ static int included_patches[] =
+ { /* Add new patch number below this line */
++/**/
++ 1687,
+ /**/
+ 1686,
+ /**/
+--
+2.50.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From 75661a66a1db1e1f3f1245c615f13a7de44c0587 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 18:29:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0276: [security]: modeline security bypass
+
+Problem: [security]: modeline security bypass
+Solution: disallow mapset() from secure mode, set the P_MLE flag for the
+ 'complete', 'guitabtooltip' and 'printheader' options.
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-8h6p-m6gr-mpw9
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-34982
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/75661a66a1db1e1f3f1245c615f13a7de44c0587]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/map.c | 3 +++
+ src/optiondefs.h | 6 +++---
+ src/testdir/test_modeline.vim | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/map.c b/src/map.c
+index fbecf4aced..7677243625 100644
+--- a/src/map.c
++++ b/src/map.c
+@@ -2746,6 +2746,9 @@ f_mapset(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv UNUSED)
+ int dict_only;
+ mapblock_T *mp_result[2] = {NULL, NULL};
+
++ if (check_secure())
++ return;
++
+ // If first arg is a dict, then that's the only arg permitted.
+ dict_only = argvars[0].v_type == VAR_DICT;
+ if (in_vim9script()
+diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h
+index 77155a63e8..62d142e637 100644
+--- a/src/optiondefs.h
++++ b/src/optiondefs.h
+@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
+ {"compatible", "cp", P_BOOL|P_RALL,
+ (char_u *)&p_cp, PV_NONE, did_set_compatible, NULL,
+ {(char_u *)TRUE, (char_u *)FALSE} SCTX_INIT},
+- {"complete", "cpt", P_STRING|P_ALLOCED|P_VI_DEF|P_ONECOMMA|P_NODUP,
++ {"complete", "cpt", P_STRING|P_ALLOCED|P_VI_DEF|P_ONECOMMA|P_NODUP|P_MLE,
+ (char_u *)&p_cpt, PV_CPT, did_set_complete, expand_set_complete,
+ {(char_u *)".,w,b,u,t,i", (char_u *)0L}
+ SCTX_INIT},
+@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
+ {(char_u *)NULL, (char_u *)0L}
+ #endif
+ SCTX_INIT},
+- {"guitabtooltip", "gtt", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_RWIN,
++ {"guitabtooltip", "gtt", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_RWIN|P_MLE,
+ #if defined(FEAT_GUI_TABLINE)
+ (char_u *)&p_gtt, PV_NONE, NULL, NULL,
+ {(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L}
+@@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] =
+ {(char_u *)NULL, (char_u *)0L}
+ #endif
+ SCTX_INIT},
+- {"printheader", "pheader", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_GETTEXT,
++ {"printheader", "pheader", P_STRING|P_VI_DEF|P_GETTEXT|P_MLE,
+ #ifdef FEAT_PRINTER
+ (char_u *)&p_header, PV_NONE, NULL, NULL,
+ // untranslated to avoid problems when 'encoding'
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
+index 1f8686328a..c00032ba72 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim
+@@ -361,4 +361,29 @@ func Test_modeline_disable()
+ call assert_equal(2, &sw)
+ endfunc
+
++func Test_modeline_forbidden()
++ let tempfile = tempname()
++ let lines =<< trim END
++ some test text for completion
++ vim: set complete=F{->system('touch_should_not_run')} :
++ END
++ call writefile(lines, tempfile, 'D')
++ call assert_fails($'new {tempfile}', 'E992:')
++ bw!
++ let lines =<< trim END
++ some text
++ vim: set guitabtooltip=%{%mapset()%}:
++ END
++ call writefile(lines, tempfile)
++ call assert_fails($'new {tempfile}', 'E992:')
++ bw!
++ let lines =<< trim END
++ some text
++ vim: set printheader=%{mapset('n',0,{})%)%}:
++ END
++ call writefile(lines, tempfile, 'D')
++ call assert_fails($'new {tempfile}', 'E992:')
++ bw!
++endfunc
++
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+--
+2.35.7
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 7088926316d8d4a7572a242d0765e99adfc8b083 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2026 16:23:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0280: [security]: path traversal issue in zip.vim
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Problem: [security]: path traversal issue in zip.vim
+ (Michał Majchrowicz)
+Solution: Detect more such attacks and warn the user.
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-jc86-w7vm-8p24
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-35177
+Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7088926316d8d4a7572a242d0765e99adfc8b083
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ runtime/autoload/zip.vim | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/runtime/autoload/zip.vim b/runtime/autoload/zip.vim
+index c46ec44708..e57fbcfde0 100644
+--- a/runtime/autoload/zip.vim
++++ b/runtime/autoload/zip.vim
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ " 2024 Aug 21 by Vim Project: simplify condition to detect MS-Windows
+ " 2025 Mar 11 by Vim Project: handle filenames with leading '-' correctly
+ " 2025 Jul 12 by Vim Project: drop ../ on write to prevent path traversal attacks
++" 2026 Apr 01 by Vim Project: Detect more path traversal attacks
+ " License: Vim License (see vim's :help license)
+ " Copyright: Copyright (C) 2005-2019 Charles E. Campbell {{{1
+ " Permission is hereby granted to use and distribute this code,
+@@ -246,6 +247,11 @@ fun! zip#Write(fname)
+ return
+ endif
+
++ if simplify(a:fname) =~ '\.\.[/\\]'
++ call s:Mess('Error', "***error*** (zip#Write) Path Traversal Attack detected, not writing!")
++ return
++ endif
++
+ let curdir= getcwd()
+ let tmpdir= tempname()
+ if tmpdir =~ '\.'
+@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@ fun! zip#Extract()
+ if fname =~ '/$'
+ call s:Mess('Error', "***error*** (zip#Extract) Please specify a file, not a directory")
+ return
+- elseif fname =~ '^[.]\?[.]/'
++ elseif fname =~ '^[.]\?[.]/' || simplify(fname) =~ '\.\.[/\\]'
+ call s:Mess('Error', "***error*** (zip#Browse) Path Traversal Attack detected, not extracting!")
+ return
+ endif
+--
+2.35.7
+
@@ -16,12 +16,15 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://disable_acl_header_check.patch \
file://0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch \
file://no-path-adjust.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-34982.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-33412.patch \
file://CVE-2026-25749.patch \
file://CVE-2026-26269.patch \
- file://CVE-2026-33412.patch \
file://CVE-2026-28418.patch \
file://CVE-2026-28419.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-34714.patch \
file://CVE-2026-39881.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-35177.patch \
"
PV .= ".1683"
Pick patch from [1], [2] & [3] also mentioned at NVD report in [4,5 & 6] [1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/75661a66a1db1e1f3f1245c615f13a7de44c0587 [2] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/664701eb7576edb7c7c7d9f2d600815ec1f43459 [3] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7088926316d8d4a7572a242d0765e99adfc8b083 [4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34982 [5] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34714 [6] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35177 More info : CVE-2026-34982 - vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass. CVE-2026-34714 - vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted file. CVE-2026-35177 - vim zip.vim plugin: Arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal bypass. Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> --- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-34714.patch | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-34982.patch | 105 +++++++++++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-35177.patch | 58 ++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 5 +- 4 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-34714.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-34982.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-35177.patch