new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From f19ab94ba9c891d801231654267556dc7f32b5e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 16:23:23 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] miext/sync: Fix use-after-free in miSyncTriggerFence()
+
+As reported by valgrind:
+
+ == Invalid read of size 8
+ == at 0x568C14: miSyncTriggerFence (misync.c:140)
+ == by 0x540688: ProcSyncTriggerFence (sync.c:1957)
+ == by 0x540CCC: ProcSyncDispatch (sync.c:2152)
+ == by 0x4A28C5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
+ == by 0x4B0B24: dix_main (main.c:274)
+ == by 0x42915E: main (stubmain.c:34)
+ == Address 0x17e35488 is 8 bytes inside a block of size 16 free'd
+ == at 0x4843E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:990)
+ == by 0x53D683: SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject (sync.c:169)
+ == by 0x53F14D: FreeAwait (sync.c:1208)
+ == by 0x4DFB06: doFreeResource (resource.c:888)
+ == by 0x4DFC59: FreeResource (resource.c:918)
+ == by 0x53E349: SyncAwaitTriggerFired (sync.c:701)
+ == by 0x568C52: miSyncTriggerFence (misync.c:142)
+ == by 0x540688: ProcSyncTriggerFence (sync.c:1957)
+ == by 0x540CCC: ProcSyncDispatch (sync.c:2152)
+ == by 0x4A28C5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
+ == by 0x4B0B24: dix_main (main.c:274)
+ == by 0x42915E: main (stubmain.c:34)
+ == Block was alloc'd at
+ == at 0x4840B26: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:447)
+ == by 0x5E50E1: XNFalloc (utils.c:1129)
+ == by 0x53D772: SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject (sync.c:206)
+ == by 0x53DCA8: SyncInitTrigger (sync.c:414)
+ == by 0x5409C7: ProcSyncAwaitFence (sync.c:2089)
+ == by 0x540D04: ProcSyncDispatch (sync.c:2160)
+ == by 0x4A28C5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
+ == by 0x4B0B24: dix_main (main.c:274)
+ == by 0x42915E: main (stubmain.c:34)
+
+When walking the list of fences to trigger, miSyncTriggerFence() may
+call TriggerFence() for the current trigger, which end up calling the
+function SyncAwaitTriggerFired().
+
+SyncAwaitTriggerFired() frees the entire await resource, which removes
+all triggers from that await - including pNext which may be another
+trigger from the same await attached to the same fence.
+
+On the next iteration, ptl = pNext points to freed memory...
+
+To avoid the issue, we need to restart the iteration from the beginning
+of the list each time a trigger fires, since the callback can modify the
+list.
+
+CVE-2026-34001, ZDI-CAN-28706
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2176>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/f19ab94ba9c891d801231654267556dc7f32b5e0]
+CVE: CVE-2026-34001
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ miext/sync/misync.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/miext/sync/misync.c b/miext/sync/misync.c
+index 0931803..e11eba2 100644
+--- a/miext/sync/misync.c
++++ b/miext/sync/misync.c
+@@ -131,16 +131,22 @@ miSyncDestroyFence(SyncFence * pFence)
+ void
+ miSyncTriggerFence(SyncFence * pFence)
+ {
+- SyncTriggerList *ptl, *pNext;
++ SyncTriggerList *ptl;
++ Bool triggered;
+
+ pFence->funcs.SetTriggered(pFence);
+
+ /* run through triggers to see if any fired */
+- for (ptl = pFence->sync.pTriglist; ptl; ptl = pNext) {
+- pNext = ptl->next;
+- if ((*ptl->pTrigger->CheckTrigger) (ptl->pTrigger, 0))
+- (*ptl->pTrigger->TriggerFired) (ptl->pTrigger);
+- }
++ do {
++ triggered = FALSE;
++ for (ptl = pFence->sync.pTriglist; ptl; ptl = ptl->next) {
++ if ((*ptl->pTrigger->CheckTrigger) (ptl->pTrigger, 0)) {
++ (*ptl->pTrigger->TriggerFired) (ptl->pTrigger);
++ triggered = TRUE;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (triggered);
+ }
+
+ SyncScreenFuncsPtr
+--
+2.43.0
+
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat
file://0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch \
file://CVE-2026-33999.patch \
file://CVE-2026-34000.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-34001.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c878d1930d87725d4a5bf498c24f4be8130d5b2646a9fd0f2994deff90116352"
Pick patch according to [1] [1] https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2026-April/003677.html [2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-34001 Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com> --- .../xserver-xorg/CVE-2026-34001.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2026-34001.patch