new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nate Prewitt <nate.prewitt@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:57:56 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork
+
+Prior to version 2.33.0, the `requests.utils.extract_zipped_paths()` utility function
+uses a predictable filename when extracting files from zip archives into the system
+temporary directory. If the target file already exists, it is reused without validation.
+A local attacker with write access to the temp directory could pre-create a malicious
+file that would be loaded in place of the legitimate one. Standard usage of the Requests
+library is not affected by this vulnerability. Only applications that call
+`extract_zipped_paths()` directly are impacted. Starting in version 2.33.0, the library
+extracts files to a non-deterministic location. If developers are unable to upgrade,
+they can set `TMPDIR` in their environment to a directory with restricted write access.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-25645
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/66d21cb07bd6255b1280291c4fafb71803cdb3b7]
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+---
+ src/requests/utils.py | 13 +++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/requests/utils.py b/src/requests/utils.py
+index d8803e6e91..54959bb8ab 100644
+--- a/src/requests/utils.py
++++ b/src/requests/utils.py
+@@ -282,12 +282,13 @@ def extract_zipped_paths(path):
+ return path
+
+ # we have a valid zip archive and a valid member of that archive
+- tmp = tempfile.gettempdir()
+- extracted_path = os.path.join(tmp, member.split("/")[-1])
+- if not os.path.exists(extracted_path):
+- # use read + write to avoid the creating nested folders, we only want the file, avoids mkdir racing condition
+- with atomic_open(extracted_path) as file_handler:
+- file_handler.write(zip_file.read(member))
++ suffix = os.path.splitext(member.split("/")[-1])[-1]
++ fd, extracted_path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=suffix)
++ try:
++ os.write(fd, zip_file.read(member))
++ finally:
++ os.close(fd)
++
+ return extracted_path
+
+
@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://requests.readthedocs.io"
LICENSE = "Apache-2.0"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=34400b68072d710fecd0a2940a0d1658"
-SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
- file://environment.d-python3-requests.sh \
-"
+inherit pypi python_setuptools_build_meta
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "dbba0bac56e100853db0ea71b82b4dfd5fe2bf6d3754a8893c3af500cec7d7cf"
-inherit pypi python_setuptools_build_meta
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-25645.patch"
+SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " file://environment.d-python3-requests.sh"
do_install:append:class-nativesdk() {
mkdir -p ${D}${SDKPATHNATIVE}/environment-setup.d
When unpacking zip files requests uses predictable paths. Backport a fix to use randomly generated pathnames to mitigate injection attacks. Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> --- .../python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-requests_2.32.5.bb | 7 ++- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-requests/CVE-2026-25645.patch