diff mbox series

[3/3] xwayland: fix CVE-2025-62229 CVE-2025-62230 CVE-2025-62231

Message ID 20251103114511.1271396-3-ross.burton@arm.com
State New
Headers show
Series [1/3] xserver-xorg: remove redundant patch | expand

Commit Message

Ross Burton Nov. 3, 2025, 11:45 a.m. UTC 
From https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2025-October/003635.html:

1) CVE-2025-62229: Use-after-free in XPresentNotify structures creation

    Using the X11 Present extension, when processing and adding the
    notifications after presenting a pixmap, if an error occurs, a dangling
    pointer may be left in the error code path of the function causing a
    use-after-free when eventually destroying the notification structures
    later.

    Introduced in: Xorg 1.15
    Fixed in: xorg-server-21.1.19 and xwayland-24.1.9
    Fix: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/5a4286b1
    Found by: Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative.

2) CVE-2025-62230: Use-after-free in Xkb client resource removal

    When removing the Xkb resources for a client, the function
    XkbRemoveResourceClient() will free the XkbInterest data associated
    with the device, but not the resource associated with it.

    As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function
    triggers a use-after-free.

    Introduced in: X11R6
    Fixed in: xorg-server-21.1.19 and xwayland-24.1.9
    Fix: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/99790a2c
         https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/10c94238
    Found by: Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative.

3) CVE-2025-62231: Value overflow in Xkb extension XkbSetCompatMap()

    The XkbCompatMap structure stores some of its values using an unsigned
    short, but fails to check whether the sum of the input data might
    overflow the maximum unsigned short value.

    Introduced in: X11R6
    Fixed in: xorg-server-21.1.19 and xwayland-24.1.9
    Fix: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/475d9f49
    Found by: Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
---
 ...after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch | 91 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...ke-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch | 63 +++++++++++++
 ...KB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch | 92 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch | 53 +++++++++++
 .../xwayland/xwayland_24.1.8.bb               |  7 +-
 5 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c2f6ad1e021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ 
+From a2d7bd5fefecfc4315247902b7f03e8bf9866908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 09:46:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] present: Fix use-after-free in present_create_notifies()
+
+Using the Present extension, if an error occurs while processing and
+adding the notifications after presenting a pixmap, the function
+present_create_notifies() will clean up and remove the notifications
+it added.
+
+However, there are two different code paths that can lead to an error
+creating the notify, one being before the notify is being added to the
+list, and another one after the notify is added.
+
+When the error occurs before it's been added, it removes the elements up
+to the last added element, instead of the actual number of elements
+which were added.
+
+As a result, in case of error, as with an invalid window for example, it
+leaves a dangling pointer to the last element, leading to a use after
+free case later:
+
+ |  Invalid write of size 8
+ |     at 0x5361D5: present_clear_window_notifies (present_notify.c:42)
+ |     by 0x534A56: present_destroy_window (present_screen.c:107)
+ |     by 0x41E441: xwl_destroy_window (xwayland-window.c:1959)
+ |     by 0x4F9EC9: compDestroyWindow (compwindow.c:622)
+ |     by 0x51EAC4: damageDestroyWindow (damage.c:1592)
+ |     by 0x4FDC29: DbeDestroyWindow (dbe.c:1291)
+ |     by 0x4EAC55: FreeWindowResources (window.c:1023)
+ |     by 0x4EAF59: DeleteWindow (window.c:1091)
+ |     by 0x4DE59A: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
+ |     by 0x4DEFB2: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
+ |     by 0x4A9AFB: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3567)
+ |     by 0x5DCC78: ClientReady (connection.c:603)
+ |   Address 0x16126200 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 2,048 free'd
+ |     at 0x4841E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
+ |     by 0x5363DD: present_destroy_notifies (present_notify.c:111)
+ |     by 0x53638D: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:100)
+ |     by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
+ |     by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
+ |     by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
+ |     by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
+ |     by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
+ |     by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
+ |   Block was alloc'd at
+ |     at 0x48463F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
+ |     by 0x5362A1: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:81)
+ |     by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164)
+ |     by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189)
+ |     by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337)
+ |     by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561)
+ |     by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284)
+ |     by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34)
+
+To fix the issue, count and remove the actual number of notify elements
+added in case of error.
+
+CVE-2025-62229, ZDI-CAN-27238
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0)
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-62229
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+---
+ present/present_notify.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/present/present_notify.c b/present/present_notify.c
+index 445954998..00b3b68bd 100644
+--- a/present/present_notify.c
++++ b/present/present_notify.c
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ present_create_notifies(ClientPtr client, int num_notifies, xPresentNotify *x_no
+         if (status != Success)
+             goto bail;
+ 
+-        added = i;
++        added++;
+     }
+     return Success;
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..61369d789ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ 
+From 539bca9e0d05ce995a936c4bdf90bc716510d2a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:55:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file.
+
+In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources
+from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead.
+
+This is related to:
+
+CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 99790a2c9205a52fbbec01f21a92c9b7f4ed1d8f)
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-62230
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+---
+ include/xkbsrv.h | 2 ++
+ xkb/xkb.c        | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/xkbsrv.h b/include/xkbsrv.h
+index bd747856b..d801cd4b8 100644
+--- a/include/xkbsrv.h
++++ b/include/xkbsrv.h
+@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ #include "inputstr.h"
+ #include "events.h"
+ 
++extern RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
++
+ typedef struct _XkbInterest {
+     DeviceIntPtr dev;
+     ClientPtr client;
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index ac154e200..6c102af0a 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ int XkbKeyboardErrorCode;
+ CARD32 xkbDebugFlags = 0;
+ static CARD32 xkbDebugCtrls = 0;
+ 
+-static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
++RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT = 0;
+ 
+ /***====================================================================***/
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..76e50cfad92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ 
+From a7e9938b621e16677c6330306a45baba0495ea31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:58:57 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing XkbInterest
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated
+with the device, but not the resource associated with it.
+
+As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function
+gets called and accesses already freed memory:
+
+ | Invalid read of size 8
+ |   at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047)
+ |   by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094)
+ |   by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
+ |   by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
+ |   by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550)
+ |   by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601)
+ |   by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657)
+ |   by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206)
+ |   by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491)
+ |   by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
+ |   by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
+ | Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd
+ |   at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
+ |   by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067)
+ |   by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193)
+ |   by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244)
+ |   by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348)
+ |   by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504)
+ |   by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
+ |   by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
+ |   by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
+ |   by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
+ | Block was alloc'd at
+ |   at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
+ |   by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262)
+ |   by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846)
+ |   by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153)
+ |   by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493)
+ |   by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
+ |   by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
+ |   by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
+ |   by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
+
+To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the
+device XkbInterest data.
+
+CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 10c94238bdad17c11707e0bdaaa3a9cd54c504be)
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-62230
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+---
+ xkb/xkbEvents.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkbEvents.c b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
+index f8f65d4a7..7c669c93e 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkbEvents.c
++++ b/xkb/xkbEvents.c
+@@ -1055,6 +1055,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
+             autoCtrls = interest->autoCtrls;
+             autoValues = interest->autoCtrlValues;
+             client = interest->client;
++            FreeResource(interest->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
+             free(interest);
+             found = TRUE;
+         }
+@@ -1066,6 +1067,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id)
+                 autoCtrls = victim->autoCtrls;
+                 autoValues = victim->autoCtrlValues;
+                 client = victim->client;
++                FreeResource(victim->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT);
+                 free(victim);
+                 found = TRUE;
+             }
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..27c8f6c8099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ 
+From 70dfb0fb993655b0989d54e3bffc4e62c5629392 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
+using an unsigned short.
+
+However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
+input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
+"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
+unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.
+
+To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
+unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.
+
+CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49acd0e55bc0b089ed77f732ad18585470)
+
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-62231
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 6c102af0a..a77fe7ff0 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -2990,6 +2990,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
+         XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
+         unsigned int skipped = 0;
+ 
++        if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX)
++            return BadValue;
+         if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
+             compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
+             compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland_24.1.8.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland_24.1.8.bb
index a621af1a7f0..af4bb734996 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland_24.1.8.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland_24.1.8.bb
@@ -9,7 +9,12 @@  HOMEPAGE = "https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/XwaylandStandalone"
 LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5df87950af51ac2c5822094553ea1880"
 
-SRC_URI = "https://www.x.org/archive/individual/xserver/xwayland-${PV}.tar.xz"
+SRC_URI = "https://www.x.org/archive/individual/xserver/xwayland-${PV}.tar.xz \
+           file://0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch \
+           file://0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch \
+           file://0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch \
+           file://0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch \
+           "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c8908d57c8ed9ceb8293c16ba7ad5af522efaf1ba7e51f9e4cf3c0774d199907"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "xwayland-(?P<pver>\d+(\.(?!90\d)\d+)+)\.tar"