new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response
+
+The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply
+that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such,
+such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for
+the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN)
+is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before
+validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the
+state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the
+response.
+
+Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on
+responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a
+theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting
+RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS
+server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and
+with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by
+flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS
+request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly
+protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in
+processing RADIUS responses.
+
+Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having
+fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the
+registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and
+processing of the response has succeeded.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-24912
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644
+--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100);
+ rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip;
+
+- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
+- if (prev_req)
+- prev_req->next = req->next;
+- else
+- radius->msgs = req->next;
+- radius->num_msgs--;
+-
+ for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
+ RadiusRxResult res;
+ res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret,
+@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ radius_msg_free(msg);
+ /* fall through */
+ case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
++ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
++ if (prev_req)
++ prev_req->next = req->next;
++ else
++ radius->msgs = req->next;
++ radius->num_msgs--;
++
+ radius_client_msg_free(req);
+ return;
+ case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR:
+@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier,
+ invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" :
+ "");
+- radius_client_msg_free(req);
+
+ fail:
+ radius_msg_free(msg);
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping
+
+A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS
+request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message
+handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of
+the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req
+pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such,
+some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result
+in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a
+memory leak.
+
+Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request
+is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a
+new entry.
+
+Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response")
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-24912
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644
+--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
+@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ struct radius_hdr *hdr;
+ struct radius_rx_handler *handlers;
+ size_t num_handlers, i;
+- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req;
++ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r;
+ struct os_reltime now;
+ struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf;
+ int invalid_authenticator = 0;
+@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ break;
+ }
+
+- prev_req = NULL;
+ req = radius->msgs;
+ while (req) {
+ /* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using
+@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ hdr->identifier)
+ break;
+
+- prev_req = req;
+ req = req->next;
+ }
+
+@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+ /* fall through */
+ case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
+ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
++ prev_req = NULL;
++ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) {
++ if (r == req)
++ break;
++ prev_req = r;
++ }
+ if (prev_req)
+ prev_req->next = req->next;
+ else
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \
file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \
+ file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \
+ file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"