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[kirkstone] u-boot: fix CVE-2024-42040

Message ID 20251029032929.3667642-1-hongxu.jia@windriver.com
State New
Headers show
Series [kirkstone] u-boot: fix CVE-2024-42040 | expand

Commit Message

Hongxu Jia Oct. 29, 2025, 3:29 a.m. UTC 
Backport a patch [1] from upstrem to fix CVE-2024-42040 [2]

[1] https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/81e5708cc2c865df606e49aed5415adb2a662171
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42040

Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
---
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch         | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc     |  4 +-
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch
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Patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d250e51b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2024-42040.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ 
+From 1406fc918977bba4dac0af5e22e63a5553aa6aff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
+Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 17:43:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] net: bootp: Prevent buffer overflow to avoid leaking the RAM
+ content
+
+CVE-2024-42040 describes a possible buffer overflow when calling
+bootp_process_vendor() in bootp_handler() since the total length
+of the packet is passed to bootp_process_vendor() without being
+reduced to len-(offsetof(struct bootp_hdr,bp_vend)+4).
+
+The packet length is also checked against its minimum size to avoid
+reading data from struct bootp_hdr outside of the packet length.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul HENRYS <paul.henrys_ext@softathome.com>
+Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-42040
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/81e5708cc2c865df606e49aed5415adb2a662171]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
+---
+ net/bootp.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/bootp.c b/net/bootp.c
+index 68002909634..843180d296c 100644
+--- a/net/bootp.c
++++ b/net/bootp.c
+@@ -362,6 +362,14 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
+ 	debug("got BOOTP packet (src=%d, dst=%d, len=%d want_len=%zu)\n",
+ 	      src, dest, len, sizeof(struct bootp_hdr));
+ 
++	/* Check the minimum size of a BOOTP packet is respected.
++	 * A BOOTP packet is between 300 bytes and 576 bytes big
++	 */
++	if (len < offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 64) {
++		printf("Error: got an invalid BOOTP packet (len=%u)\n", len);
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	bp = (struct bootp_hdr *)pkt;
+ 
+ 	/* Filter out pkts we don't want */
+@@ -379,7 +387,8 @@ static void bootp_handler(uchar *pkt, unsigned dest, struct in_addr sip,
+ 
+ 	/* Retrieve extended information (we must parse the vendor area) */
+ 	if (net_read_u32((u32 *)&bp->bp_vend[0]) == htonl(BOOTP_VENDOR_MAGIC))
+-		bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len);
++		bootp_process_vendor((uchar *)&bp->bp_vend[4], len -
++				     (offsetof(struct bootp_hdr, bp_vend) + 4));
+ 
+ 	net_set_timeout_handler(0, (thand_f *)0);
+ 	bootstage_mark_name(BOOTSTAGE_ID_BOOTP_STOP, "bootp_stop");
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc
index d366f10398..7a63420642 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@  PE = "1"
 # repo during parse
 SRCREV = "d637294e264adfeb29f390dfc393106fd4d41b17"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
+SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+           file://CVE-2024-42040.patch \
+"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build"