diff mbox series

[kirkstone,3/3] go: fix CVE-2023-29406

Message ID 20230802001813.3521965-3-sakib.sajal@windriver.com
State New, archived
Headers show
Series [kirkstone,1/3] go: fix CVE-2023-24536 | expand

Commit Message

Sakib Sajal Aug. 2, 2023, 12:18 a.m. UTC
Backport required patch to fix CVE-2023-29406.

Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc       |   1 +
 .../go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch           | 210 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 211 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch

Comments

Steve Sakoman Aug. 2, 2023, 5:39 p.m. UTC | #1
There is already a patch for this CVE in kirkstone:

https://git.yoctoproject.org/poky/commit/?h=kirkstone&id=4596433a54c12ee229e923ae39e3ec0d16d6f067

So I've dropped this patch from your series and adjusted the other two
to take into account the above commit.

Thanks!

Steve

On Tue, Aug 1, 2023 at 2:18 PM Sakib Sajal via lists.openembedded.org
<sakib.sajal=windriver.com@lists.openembedded.org> wrote:
>
> Backport required patch to fix CVE-2023-29406.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
> ---
>  meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc       |   1 +
>  .../go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch           | 210 ++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 211 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
> index d46eab01a0..b9d905a616 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
>      file://CVE-2023-24536_3.patch \
>      file://CVE-2023-24531_1.patch \
>      file://CVE-2023-24531_2.patch \
> +    file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \
>  "
>  SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..8a82d5c18c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
> +From 3077df09879fb1aad0ccfc009fee6fc5e5f532bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
> +Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 13:20:08 -0700
> +Subject: [PATCH] net/http: validate Host header before sending
> +
> +Verify that the Host header we send is valid.
> +Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops"
> +adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests.
> +
> +Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to
> +header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate
> +the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it.
> +CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2.
> +
> +Updates #60374
> +Fixes #61075
> +For CVE-2023-29406
> +
> +Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04
> +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996
> +Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
> +TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
> +Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
> +(cherry picked from commit 499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2)
> +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358
> +Run-TryBot: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
> +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2023-29406
> +Upstream-Status: Backport [5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b]
> +Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
> +---
> + src/net/http/http_test.go      | 29 ----------------------
> + src/net/http/request.go        | 45 ++++++++--------------------------
> + src/net/http/request_test.go   | 11 ++-------
> + src/net/http/transport_test.go | 18 ++++++++++++++
> + 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/net/http/http_test.go b/src/net/http/http_test.go
> +index 0d92fe5..f03272a 100644
> +--- a/src/net/http/http_test.go
> ++++ b/src/net/http/http_test.go
> +@@ -48,35 +48,6 @@ func TestForeachHeaderElement(t *testing.T) {
> +       }
> + }
> +
> +-func TestCleanHost(t *testing.T) {
> +-      tests := []struct {
> +-              in, want string
> +-      }{
> +-              {"www.google.com", "www.google.com"},
> +-              {"www.google.com foo", "www.google.com"},
> +-              {"www.google.com/foo", "www.google.com"},
> +-              {" first character is a space", ""},
> +-              {"[1::6]:8080", "[1::6]:8080"},
> +-
> +-              // Punycode:
> +-              {"гофер.рф/foo", "xn--c1ae0ajs.xn--p1ai"},
> +-              {"bücher.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
> +-              {"bücher.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
> +-              // Verify we convert to lowercase before punycode:
> +-              {"BÜCHER.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
> +-              {"BÜCHER.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
> +-              // Verify we normalize to NFC before punycode:
> +-              {"gophér.nfc", "xn--gophr-esa.nfc"},            // NFC input; no work needed
> +-              {"goph\u0065\u0301r.nfd", "xn--gophr-esa.nfd"}, // NFD input
> +-      }
> +-      for _, tt := range tests {
> +-              got := cleanHost(tt.in)
> +-              if tt.want != got {
> +-                      t.Errorf("cleanHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
> +-              }
> +-      }
> +-}
> +-
> + // Test that cmd/go doesn't link in the HTTP server.
> + //
> + // This catches accidental dependencies between the HTTP transport and
> +diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
> +index 09cb0c7..2f4e740 100644
> +--- a/src/net/http/request.go
> ++++ b/src/net/http/request.go
> +@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
> +       "io"
> +       "mime"
> +       "mime/multipart"
> +-      "net"
> +       "net/http/httptrace"
> +       "net/http/internal/ascii"
> +       "net/textproto"
> +@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ import (
> +       "strings"
> +       "sync"
> +
> ++      "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
> +       "golang.org/x/net/idna"
> + )
> +
> +@@ -568,12 +568,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
> +       // is not given, use the host from the request URL.
> +       //
> +       // Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.
> +-      host := cleanHost(r.Host)
> ++      host := r.Host
> +       if host == "" {
> +               if r.URL == nil {
> +                       return errMissingHost
> +               }
> +-              host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)
> ++              host = r.URL.Host
> ++      }
> ++      host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)
> ++      if err != nil {
> ++              return err
> ++      }
> ++      if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
> ++              return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
> +       }
> +
> +       // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
> +@@ -730,38 +737,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) {
> +       return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v)
> + }
> +
> +-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header.
> +-//
> +-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value
> +-// into Punycode form, if necessary.
> +-//
> +-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec:
> +-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]")
> +-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host)
> +-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host)
> +-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in
> +-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context
> +-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the
> +-// first offending character.
> +-func cleanHost(in string) string {
> +-      if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 {
> +-              in = in[:i]
> +-      }
> +-      host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in)
> +-      if err != nil { // input was just a host
> +-              a, err := idnaASCII(in)
> +-              if err != nil {
> +-                      return in // garbage in, garbage out
> +-              }
> +-              return a
> +-      }
> +-      a, err := idnaASCII(host)
> +-      if err != nil {
> +-              return in // garbage in, garbage out
> +-      }
> +-      return net.JoinHostPort(a, port)
> +-}
> +-
> + // removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host.
> + // E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080"
> + func removeZone(host string) string {
> +diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
> +index fac12b7..368e87a 100644
> +--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
> ++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
> +@@ -776,15 +776,8 @@ func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
> +       }
> +       req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
> +       req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
> +-      req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
> +-      want := []string{
> +-              "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
> +-              "Host: foo.com\r\n",
> +-              "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
> +-              "\r\n",
> +-      }
> +-      if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
> +-              t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n  Want = %q", got, want)
> ++      if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
> ++              t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
> +       }
> + }
> +
> +diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
> +index eeaa492..58f12af 100644
> +--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
> ++++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
> +@@ -6512,3 +6512,21 @@ func TestCancelRequestWhenSharingConnection(t *testing.T) {
> +       close(r2c)
> +       wg.Wait()
> + }
> ++
> ++func TestRequestSanitization(t *testing.T) {
> ++      setParallel(t)
> ++      defer afterTest(t)
> ++
> ++      ts := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(rw ResponseWriter, req *Request) {
> ++              if h, ok := req.Header["X-Evil"]; ok {
> ++                      t.Errorf("request has X-Evil header: %q", h)
> ++              }
> ++      })).ts
> ++      defer ts.Close()
> ++      req, _ := NewRequest("GET", ts.URL, nil)
> ++      req.Host = "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:evil"
> ++      resp, _ := ts.Client().Do(req)
> ++      if resp != nil {
> ++              resp.Body.Close()
> ++      }
> ++}
> +--
> +2.35.5
> +
> --
> 2.39.0
>
>
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
> View/Reply Online (#185367): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/185367
> Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/100496289/3620601
> Group Owner: openembedded-core+owner@lists.openembedded.org
> Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [steve@sakoman.com]
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
index d46eab01a0..b9d905a616 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@  SRC_URI += "\
     file://CVE-2023-24536_3.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-24531_1.patch \
     file://CVE-2023-24531_2.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a82d5c18c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.19/CVE-2023-29406.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@ 
+From 3077df09879fb1aad0ccfc009fee6fc5e5f532bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 13:20:08 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] net/http: validate Host header before sending
+
+Verify that the Host header we send is valid.
+Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops"
+adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests.
+
+Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to
+header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate
+the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it.
+CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2.
+
+Updates #60374
+Fixes #61075
+For CVE-2023-29406
+
+Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996
+Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
+Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2)
+Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358
+Run-TryBot: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-29406
+Upstream-Status: Backport [5fa6923b1ea891400153d04ddf1545e23b40041b]
+Signed-off-by: Sakib Sajal <sakib.sajal@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/net/http/http_test.go      | 29 ----------------------
+ src/net/http/request.go        | 45 ++++++++--------------------------
+ src/net/http/request_test.go   | 11 ++-------
+ src/net/http/transport_test.go | 18 ++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/net/http/http_test.go b/src/net/http/http_test.go
+index 0d92fe5..f03272a 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/http_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/http_test.go
+@@ -48,35 +48,6 @@ func TestForeachHeaderElement(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-func TestCleanHost(t *testing.T) {
+-	tests := []struct {
+-		in, want string
+-	}{
+-		{"www.google.com", "www.google.com"},
+-		{"www.google.com foo", "www.google.com"},
+-		{"www.google.com/foo", "www.google.com"},
+-		{" first character is a space", ""},
+-		{"[1::6]:8080", "[1::6]:8080"},
+-
+-		// Punycode:
+-		{"гофер.рф/foo", "xn--c1ae0ajs.xn--p1ai"},
+-		{"bücher.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
+-		{"bücher.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
+-		// Verify we convert to lowercase before punycode:
+-		{"BÜCHER.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"},
+-		{"BÜCHER.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"},
+-		// Verify we normalize to NFC before punycode:
+-		{"gophér.nfc", "xn--gophr-esa.nfc"},            // NFC input; no work needed
+-		{"goph\u0065\u0301r.nfd", "xn--gophr-esa.nfd"}, // NFD input
+-	}
+-	for _, tt := range tests {
+-		got := cleanHost(tt.in)
+-		if tt.want != got {
+-			t.Errorf("cleanHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want)
+-		}
+-	}
+-}
+-
+ // Test that cmd/go doesn't link in the HTTP server.
+ //
+ // This catches accidental dependencies between the HTTP transport and
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go
+index 09cb0c7..2f4e740 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request.go
+@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
+ 	"io"
+ 	"mime"
+ 	"mime/multipart"
+-	"net"
+ 	"net/http/httptrace"
+ 	"net/http/internal/ascii"
+ 	"net/textproto"
+@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ import (
+ 	"strings"
+ 	"sync"
+ 
++	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
+ 	"golang.org/x/net/idna"
+ )
+ 
+@@ -568,12 +568,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF
+ 	// is not given, use the host from the request URL.
+ 	//
+ 	// Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it.
+-	host := cleanHost(r.Host)
++	host := r.Host
+ 	if host == "" {
+ 		if r.URL == nil {
+ 			return errMissingHost
+ 		}
+-		host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host)
++		host = r.URL.Host
++	}
++	host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host)
++	if err != nil {
++		return err
++	}
++	if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) {
++		return errors.New("http: invalid Host header")
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	// According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other
+@@ -730,38 +737,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) {
+ 	return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v)
+ }
+ 
+-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header.
+-//
+-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value
+-// into Punycode form, if necessary.
+-//
+-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec:
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]")
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host)
+-//   https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host)
+-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in
+-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context
+-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the
+-// first offending character.
+-func cleanHost(in string) string {
+-	if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 {
+-		in = in[:i]
+-	}
+-	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in)
+-	if err != nil { // input was just a host
+-		a, err := idnaASCII(in)
+-		if err != nil {
+-			return in // garbage in, garbage out
+-		}
+-		return a
+-	}
+-	a, err := idnaASCII(host)
+-	if err != nil {
+-		return in // garbage in, garbage out
+-	}
+-	return net.JoinHostPort(a, port)
+-}
+-
+ // removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host.
+ // E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080"
+ func removeZone(host string) string {
+diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+index fac12b7..368e87a 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go
+@@ -776,15 +776,8 @@ func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) {
+ 	}
+ 	req.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+ 	req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces"
+-	req.Write(logWrites{t, &got})
+-	want := []string{
+-		"GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n",
+-		"Host: foo.com\r\n",
+-		"User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n",
+-		"\r\n",
+-	}
+-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+-		t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n  Want = %q", got, want)
++	if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil {
++		t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error")
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
+index eeaa492..58f12af 100644
+--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go
++++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go
+@@ -6512,3 +6512,21 @@ func TestCancelRequestWhenSharingConnection(t *testing.T) {
+ 	close(r2c)
+ 	wg.Wait()
+ }
++
++func TestRequestSanitization(t *testing.T) {
++	setParallel(t)
++	defer afterTest(t)
++
++	ts := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(rw ResponseWriter, req *Request) {
++		if h, ok := req.Header["X-Evil"]; ok {
++			t.Errorf("request has X-Evil header: %q", h)
++		}
++	})).ts
++	defer ts.Close()
++	req, _ := NewRequest("GET", ts.URL, nil)
++	req.Host = "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:evil"
++	resp, _ := ts.Client().Do(req)
++	if resp != nil {
++		resp.Body.Close()
++	}
++}
+-- 
+2.35.5
+