new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+CVE: CVE-2022-3551
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+
+GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
+fail somewhere.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index 4692895db..b79a269e3 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5935,18 +5935,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
+ xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
+ status = Success;
+ str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
+- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */
+- return BadMatch;
++ {
++ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */
++ if (keymap) {
++ free(keymap);
++ return BadMatch;
++ }
++ }
+ names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+ names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+ names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+ names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+ names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
+- if (status != Success)
++ if (status == Success) {
++ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
++ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
++ status = BadLength;
++ }
++
++ if (status != Success) {
++ free(names.keycodes);
++ free(names.types);
++ free(names.compat);
++ free(names.symbols);
++ free(names.geometry);
+ return status;
+- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
+- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
+- return BadLength;
++ }
+
+ CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+ CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
+--
+2.34.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+CVE: CVE-2022-3550
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
+
+GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
+request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
+field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
+swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+ xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
+index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
+--- a/xkb/xkb.c
++++ b/xkb/xkb.c
+@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
+ CARD16 len;
+
+ wire = *wire_inout;
++
++ if (client->req_len <
++ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
++ return BadValue;
++
+ len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
+ if (client->swapped) {
+ swaps(&len);
+--
+2.34.1
+
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ require xserver-xorg.inc
SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.patch \
file://0001-Avoid-duplicate-definitions-of-IOPortBase.patch \
+ file://0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch \
+ file://0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5cc4be8ee47edb58d4a90e603a59d56b40291ad38371b0bd2471fc3cbee1c587"
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in X.org Server. Affected by this vulnerability is the function _GetCountedString of the file xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to buffer overflow. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211051. A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in X.org Server. Affected by this issue is the function ProcXkbGetKbdByName of the file xkb/xkb.c. The manipulation leads to memory leak. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211052. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3550 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3551 Upstream patches: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Signed-off-by: Soumya <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> --- ...possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ ...ntedString-against-request-length-at.patch | 38 +++++++++++ .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch