diff mbox series

[v2] dev--manual: add security team processes

Message ID 20231020143928.1700522-1-rybczynska@gmail.com
State New
Headers show
Series [v2] dev--manual: add security team processes | expand

Commit Message

Marta Rybczynska Oct. 20, 2023, 2:39 p.m. UTC
Add the initial version of the section on vulnerability reports,
operations of the Security Team with a
transcription of https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Security_private_reporting

Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>
---
 documentation/dev-manual/index.rst            |   1 +
 .../dev-manual/security-subjects.rst          | 197 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 198 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst

Comments

Michael Opdenacker Oct. 20, 2023, 5:57 p.m. UTC | #1
Hi Marta

Thanks for this new version!
See my comments below...

On 20.10.23 at 16:39, Marta Rybczynska wrote:
> Add the initial version of the section on vulnerability reports,
> operations of the Security Team with a
> transcription of https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Security_private_reporting
>
> Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>
> ---
>   documentation/dev-manual/index.rst            |   1 +
>   .../dev-manual/security-subjects.rst          | 197 ++++++++++++++++++
>   2 files changed, 198 insertions(+)
>   create mode 100644 documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
>
> diff --git a/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst b/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
> index 3106b90a4..9ccf60f70 100644
> --- a/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
> +++ b/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual
>      runtime-testing
>      debugging
>      licenses
> +   security-subjects
>      vulnerabilities
>      sbom
>      error-reporting-tool
> diff --git a/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst b/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..feec5f337
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
> +
> +Dealing with Vulnerability Reports
> +**********************************
> +
> +The Yocto Project and OpenEmbedded are open-source, community-based projects
> +used in numerous products. They assemble multiple other open-source projects,
> +and need to handle security issues and practices both internal (in the code
> +maintained by both projects), and external (maintained by otehr projects and

s/otehr/other/

> +organizations).
> +
> +This manual assembles security-related information concerning the whole
> +ecosystem. It includes information on reporting a potential security issue,
> +the operation of the YP Security team and how to contribute in the
> +related code. It is written to be useful for both security researchers and
> +YP developers.
> +
> +How to report a potential security vulnerability?
> +=================================================
> +
> +If you would like to report a public issue (for example, one with a released
> +CVE number), please report it using the
> +:yocto_bugs:`Security Bugzilla </enter_bug.cgi?product=Security>`.
> +
> +If you are dealing with a not-yet released or urgent issue, please send a
> +message to security AT yoctoproject DOT org, including as many details as
> +possible: the layer or software module affected, the recipe and its version,
> +and any example code, if available. This mailing list is monitored by the
> +Yocto Project Security team.
> +
> +For each layer, you might also look for specific instructions (if any) for
> +reporting potential security issues in the specific ``SECURITY.md`` file at the
> +root of the repository. Instructions on how and where submit a patch are
> +usually available in ``README.md``. If this is your first patch to the
> +Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded, you might want to have a look into the
> +Contributor's Manual section
> +":ref:`contributor-guide/submit-changes:preparing changes for submission`".
> +
> +Branches maintained with security fixes
> +========================================
> +
> +See the :yocto_wiki:`Stable release and LTS </Stable_Release_and_LTS>`
> +wiki page for detailed info regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
> +branches.

Do you think we could point to 
https://docs.yoctoproject.org/ref-manual/release-process.html instead. 
Does it have enough information?

> +
> +The :yocto_wiki:`Releases page </Releases>` contains a list
> +of all releases of the Yocto Project. Versions in grey are no longer actively
> +maintained with security patches, but well-tested patches may still be accepted
> +for them for significant issues.
> +
> +Security-reated discussions at the Yocto Project
> +================================================
> +
> +We have set up two security-related mailing lists:
> +
> +  -  Public List yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org


What about "Public List:" instead ?

> +
> +    This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
> +    open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
> +    initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
> +    please see the yocto-security mailing list info page.

I would use ":yocto_lists:`yocto-security mailing list info page 
</g/yocto-security>`" here.

> +
> +  - Private List security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org

Same here as earlier, "Private List:"?

> +
> +    This is a private mailing list for reporting non-published potential
> +    vulnerabilities. The list is monitored by the Yocto Project Security team.
> +
> +
> +What you should do if you find a security vulnerability
> +-------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +If you find a security flaw; a crash, an information leakage, or anything that
> +can have a security impact if exploited in any Open Source software built or
> +used by the Yocto Project, please report this to the Yocto Project Security
> +Team. If you prefer to contact the upstream project directly, please send a
> +copy to the security team at the Yocto Project as well. If you believe this is
> +highly sensitive information, please report the vulnerability in a secure way,
> +i.e. encrypt the email and send it to the private list. This ensures that
> +the exploit is not leaked and exploited before a response/fix has been generated.
> +
> +
> +What Yocto Security Team does when it receives a security vulnerability
> +-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> +
> +The YP Security Team team performs a quick analysis and would usually report
> +the flaw to the upstream project. Normally the upstream project analyzes the
> +problem. If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they
> +develop and release a fix following their own security policy. They may want
> +to include the original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some
> +coordination for handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just
> +understanding the problem or what caused it.
> +
> +The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
> +Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to
> +discuss coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are normally non-public.
> +
> +When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
> +for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned and
> +the CVE record published.
> +
> +If an upstream project does not respond quickly
> +-----------------------------------------------
> +
> +If an upstream project does not fix the problem in a reasonable time,
> +the Yocto's Security Team will contact other interested parties (usually
> +other distributions) in the community and together try to solve the
> +vulnerability as quickly as possible.
> +
> +The Yocto Project Security team adheres to the 90 days disclosure policy
> +by default. An increase of the embargo time is possible when necessary.
> +
> +Security team
> +=============
> +
> +The Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded security team coordinates the work on security
> +subjects in the project. All general discussion takes place publicly. The
> +Security Team only uses confidential communication tools to deal with private
> +vulnerability reports before they are released.
> +
> +Security team appointment
> +-------------------------
> +
> +The Yocto Project Security Team consists of at least three members. When new
> +members are needed, the YP TSC asks for nominations by public channels including

s/YP TSC/Yocto Project Technical Steering Committee (YP TSC)/

(replacing the first instance is enough)

> +a nomination deadline. Self-nominations are possible. When the limit time is
> +reached, the YP TSC posts the list of candidates for the comments of project
> +participants and developers. Comments may be sent publicly or privately to the
> +YP and OE TSCs. The candidates are approved by both YP TSC and OE TSC and the

s/OE TSC/OpenEmbedded (OE) TSC/

> +final list of the team members is announced publicly. The aim is to have people
> +representing technical leadership, security knowledge and infrastructure present
> +with enough people to provide backup/coverage but keep the notification list
> +small enough to minimise information risk and maintain trust.
> +
> +YP Security Team members may resign at any time.
> +
> +Security Team Operations
> +------------------------
> +
> +The work of the Security Team might require high confidentiality. Team members
> +are individuals selected by merit and do not represent the companies they work
> +for. They do not share information about confidential issues outside of the team
> +and do not hint about ongoing embargoes.
> +
> +Team members can bring in domain experts as needed. Those people should be
> +added to individual issues only and adhere to the same standards as the YP
> +Security Team.
> +
> +The YP security team organizes its meetings and communication as needed.
> +
> +When the YP Security team receives a report about a potential security
> +vulnerability, they quickly analyze and notify the reporter of the result.
> +They might also request more information.
> +
> +If the issue is confirmed and affects the code maintained by the YP, they
> +confidentially notify maintainers of that code and work with them to prepare
> +a fix.
> +
> +If the issue is confirmed and affects an upstream project, the YP security team
> +notifies the project. Usually, the upstream project analyzes the problem again.
> +If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they develop and
> +release a fix following their security policy. They may want to include the
> +original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some coordination for
> +handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just understanding the problem
> +or what caused it.
> +
> +The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
> +Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to discuss
> +coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are generally non-public. The YP
> +Security Team participates in the discussion as needed. They might also
> +include the YP maintainer of the affected package.
> +
> +When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
> +for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned
> +and the CVE record published.

Oops, you already have the exact same paragraph in one of the earlier 
sections above.
You also have "They may want to include the original reporter in the 
loop"  twice in your patch. I guess the two paragraphs need a bit of rework.

> +
> +When the fix is publicly available, the YP security team member or the
> +package maintainer sends patches against the YP code base, following usual
> +procedures, including public code review.
> +
> +Current Security Team members
> +-----------------------------
> +
> +For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
> +keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
> +information in the subject line.
> +
> +  -  Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
> +
> +  -  Michael Halstead <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
> +     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
> +     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
> +
> +  -  Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
> +
> +  -  Marta Rybczynska <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
> +
> +  -  Steve Sakoman <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__

Maybe add a ":" character right after each name?
That's all I have. Thanks for the quality of this document!

Cheers
Michael.
Marta Rybczynska Oct. 23, 2023, 6:38 p.m. UTC | #2
Helo Michael,
Thanks for comments, all are addressed in v3.

On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 7:57 PM Michael Opdenacker
<michael.opdenacker@bootlin.com> wrote:
>
> > +
> > +Branches maintained with security fixes
> > +========================================
> > +
> > +See the :yocto_wiki:`Stable release and LTS </Stable_Release_and_LTS>`
> > +wiki page for detailed info regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
> > +branches.
>
> Do you think we could point to
> https://docs.yoctoproject.org/ref-manual/release-process.html instead.
> Does it have enough information?
>

Yes, it is good. Changed the reference.

> > +
> > +  -  Public List yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
>
>
> What about "Public List:" instead ?
>

Yes.

> > +When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
> > +for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned
> > +and the CVE record published.
>
> Oops, you already have the exact same paragraph in one of the earlier
> sections above.
> You also have "They may want to include the original reporter in the
> loop"  twice in your patch. I guess the two paragraphs need a bit of rework.
>

I moved content around so that this information is given only once now.

> > +Current Security Team members
> > +-----------------------------
> > +
> > +For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
> > +keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
> > +information in the subject line.
> > +
> > +  -  Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
> > +
> > +  -  Michael Halstead <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
> > +     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
> > +     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
> > +
> > +  -  Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
> > +
> > +  -  Marta Rybczynska <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
> > +
> > +  -  Steve Sakoman <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
>
> Maybe add a ":" character right after each name?
> That's all I have. Thanks for the quality of this document!

Not sure about it. I was wondering, however, about showing key
fingerprint directly.
That would mean, however, that LTS documentation will require changes
in that regard
(key expiration is typically 1 or 2 years). What do you think?

Regards,
Marta
Michael Opdenacker Oct. 25, 2023, 10:19 a.m. UTC | #3
Hi Marta,

Thanks for the updates in the V3. Replying to your last question...

On 23.10.23 at 20:38, Marta Rybczynska wrote:
> +Current Security Team members
>>> +-----------------------------
>>> +
>>> +For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
>>> +keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
>>> +information in the subject line.
>>> +
>>> +  -  Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
>>> +
>>> +  -  Michael Halstead <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
>>> +     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
>>> +     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
>>> +
>>> +  -  Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
>>> +
>>> +  -  Marta Rybczynska <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
>>> +
>>> +  -  Steve Sakoman <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
>> Maybe add a ":" character right after each name?
>> That's all I have. Thanks for the quality of this document!
> Not sure about it. I was wondering, however, about showing key
> fingerprint directly.
> That would mean, however, that LTS documentation will require changes
> in that regard
> (key expiration is typically 1 or 2 years). What do you think?

I've go no strong opinion here, but its probably safer to have the key 
fingerprints, right? Or maybe the a link with the fingerprint as text 
and the URL as target? This way, you have a confirmation of the key in 
the docs, and in case it gets out of date, there's a link to find an update.

Thanks in advance for the V4 update taking Quentin and Robert's comments 
into account.

Cheers
Michael.
Marta Rybczynska Oct. 25, 2023, 1:32 p.m. UTC | #4
On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 12:20 PM Michael Opdenacker
<michael.opdenacker@bootlin.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Marta,
>
> Thanks for the updates in the V3. Replying to your last question...
>
> On 23.10.23 at 20:38, Marta Rybczynska wrote:
> > +Current Security Team members
> >>> +-----------------------------
> >>> +
> >>> +For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
> >>> +keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
> >>> +information in the subject line.
> >>> +
> >>> +  -  Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
> >>> +
> >>> +  -  Michael Halstead <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
> >>> +     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
> >>> +     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
> >>> +
> >>> +  -  Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
> >>> +
> >>> +  -  Marta Rybczynska <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
> >>> +
> >>> +  -  Steve Sakoman <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__
> >> Maybe add a ":" character right after each name?
> >> That's all I have. Thanks for the quality of this document!
> > Not sure about it. I was wondering, however, about showing key
> > fingerprint directly.
> > That would mean, however, that LTS documentation will require changes
> > in that regard
> > (key expiration is typically 1 or 2 years). What do you think?
>
> I've go no strong opinion here, but its probably safer to have the key
> fingerprints, right? Or maybe the a link with the fingerprint as text
> and the URL as target? This way, you have a confirmation of the key in
> the docs, and in case it gets out of date, there's a link to find an update.
>
> Thanks in advance for the V4 update taking Quentin and Robert's comments
> into account.
>
I've decided against adding fingerprints verbatim. And the V4 is out.
I'm happy to see that
there are so many people reviewing docs!

Kind regards,
Marta
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst b/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
index 3106b90a4..9ccf60f70 100644
--- a/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
+++ b/documentation/dev-manual/index.rst
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@  Yocto Project Development Tasks Manual
    runtime-testing
    debugging
    licenses
+   security-subjects
    vulnerabilities
    sbom
    error-reporting-tool
diff --git a/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst b/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..feec5f337
--- /dev/null
+++ b/documentation/dev-manual/security-subjects.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ 
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-SA-2.0-UK
+
+Dealing with Vulnerability Reports
+**********************************
+
+The Yocto Project and OpenEmbedded are open-source, community-based projects
+used in numerous products. They assemble multiple other open-source projects,
+and need to handle security issues and practices both internal (in the code
+maintained by both projects), and external (maintained by otehr projects and
+organizations).
+
+This manual assembles security-related information concerning the whole
+ecosystem. It includes information on reporting a potential security issue,
+the operation of the YP Security team and how to contribute in the
+related code. It is written to be useful for both security researchers and
+YP developers.
+
+How to report a potential security vulnerability?
+=================================================
+
+If you would like to report a public issue (for example, one with a released
+CVE number), please report it using the
+:yocto_bugs:`Security Bugzilla </enter_bug.cgi?product=Security>`.
+
+If you are dealing with a not-yet released or urgent issue, please send a
+message to security AT yoctoproject DOT org, including as many details as
+possible: the layer or software module affected, the recipe and its version,
+and any example code, if available. This mailing list is monitored by the
+Yocto Project Security team.
+
+For each layer, you might also look for specific instructions (if any) for
+reporting potential security issues in the specific ``SECURITY.md`` file at the
+root of the repository. Instructions on how and where submit a patch are
+usually available in ``README.md``. If this is your first patch to the
+Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded, you might want to have a look into the
+Contributor's Manual section
+":ref:`contributor-guide/submit-changes:preparing changes for submission`".
+
+Branches maintained with security fixes
+========================================
+
+See the :yocto_wiki:`Stable release and LTS </Stable_Release_and_LTS>`
+wiki page for detailed info regarding the policies and maintenance of stable
+branches.
+
+The :yocto_wiki:`Releases page </Releases>` contains a list
+of all releases of the Yocto Project. Versions in grey are no longer actively
+maintained with security patches, but well-tested patches may still be accepted
+for them for significant issues.
+
+Security-reated discussions at the Yocto Project
+================================================
+
+We have set up two security-related mailing lists:
+
+  -  Public List yocto [dash] security [at] yoctoproject[dot] org
+
+    This is a public mailing list for anyone to subscribe to. This list is an
+    open list to discuss public security issues/patches and security-related
+    initiatives. For more information, including subscription information,
+    please see the yocto-security mailing list info page.
+
+  - Private List security [at] yoctoproject [dot] org
+
+    This is a private mailing list for reporting non-published potential
+    vulnerabilities. The list is monitored by the Yocto Project Security team.
+
+
+What you should do if you find a security vulnerability
+-------------------------------------------------------
+
+If you find a security flaw; a crash, an information leakage, or anything that
+can have a security impact if exploited in any Open Source software built or
+used by the Yocto Project, please report this to the Yocto Project Security
+Team. If you prefer to contact the upstream project directly, please send a
+copy to the security team at the Yocto Project as well. If you believe this is
+highly sensitive information, please report the vulnerability in a secure way,
+i.e. encrypt the email and send it to the private list. This ensures that
+the exploit is not leaked and exploited before a response/fix has been generated.
+
+
+What Yocto Security Team does when it receives a security vulnerability
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The YP Security Team team performs a quick analysis and would usually report
+the flaw to the upstream project. Normally the upstream project analyzes the
+problem. If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they
+develop and release a fix following their own security policy. They may want
+to include the original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some
+coordination for handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just
+understanding the problem or what caused it.
+
+The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
+Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to
+discuss coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are normally non-public.
+
+When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
+for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned and
+the CVE record published.
+
+If an upstream project does not respond quickly
+-----------------------------------------------
+
+If an upstream project does not fix the problem in a reasonable time,
+the Yocto's Security Team will contact other interested parties (usually
+other distributions) in the community and together try to solve the
+vulnerability as quickly as possible.
+
+The Yocto Project Security team adheres to the 90 days disclosure policy
+by default. An increase of the embargo time is possible when necessary.
+
+Security team
+=============
+
+The Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded security team coordinates the work on security
+subjects in the project. All general discussion takes place publicly. The
+Security Team only uses confidential communication tools to deal with private
+vulnerability reports before they are released.
+
+Security team appointment
+-------------------------
+
+The Yocto Project Security Team consists of at least three members. When new
+members are needed, the YP TSC asks for nominations by public channels including
+a nomination deadline. Self-nominations are possible. When the limit time is
+reached, the YP TSC posts the list of candidates for the comments of project
+participants and developers. Comments may be sent publicly or privately to the
+YP and OE TSCs. The candidates are approved by both YP TSC and OE TSC and the
+final list of the team members is announced publicly. The aim is to have people
+representing technical leadership, security knowledge and infrastructure present
+with enough people to provide backup/coverage but keep the notification list
+small enough to minimise information risk and maintain trust.
+
+YP Security Team members may resign at any time.
+
+Security Team Operations
+------------------------
+
+The work of the Security Team might require high confidentiality. Team members
+are individuals selected by merit and do not represent the companies they work
+for. They do not share information about confidential issues outside of the team
+and do not hint about ongoing embargoes.
+
+Team members can bring in domain experts as needed. Those people should be
+added to individual issues only and adhere to the same standards as the YP
+Security Team.
+
+The YP security team organizes its meetings and communication as needed.
+
+When the YP Security team receives a report about a potential security
+vulnerability, they quickly analyze and notify the reporter of the result.
+They might also request more information.
+
+If the issue is confirmed and affects the code maintained by the YP, they
+confidentially notify maintainers of that code and work with them to prepare
+a fix.
+
+If the issue is confirmed and affects an upstream project, the YP security team
+notifies the project. Usually, the upstream project analyzes the problem again.
+If they deem it a real security problem in their software, they develop and
+release a fix following their security policy. They may want to include the
+original reporter in the loop. There is also sometimes some coordination for
+handling patches, backporting patches etc, or just understanding the problem
+or what caused it.
+
+The security policy of the upstream project might include a notification to
+Linux distributions or other important downstream projects in advance to discuss
+coordinated disclosure. These mailing lists are generally non-public. The YP
+Security Team participates in the discussion as needed. They might also
+include the YP maintainer of the affected package.
+
+When the upstream project releases a version with the fix, they are responsible
+for contacting `Mitre <https://www.cve.org/>`__ to get a CVE number assigned
+and the CVE record published.
+
+When the fix is publicly available, the YP security team member or the
+package maintainer sends patches against the YP code base, following usual
+procedures, including public code review.
+
+Current Security Team members
+-----------------------------
+
+For secure communications, please send your messages encrypted using the GPG
+keys. Remember, message headers are not encrypted so do not include sensitive
+information in the subject line.
+
+  -  Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=ross%40burtonini.com>`__
+
+  -  Michael Halstead <mhalstead [at] linuxfoundation [dot] org>
+     `Public key <https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x3373170601861969>`__
+     or `Public key <https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xd1f2407285e571ed12a407a73373170601861969>`__
+
+  -  Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=richard.purdie%40linuxfoundation.org>`__
+
+  -  Marta Rybczynska <marta DOT rybczynska [at] syslinbit [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=marta.rybczynska@syslinbit.com>`__
+
+  -  Steve Sakoman <steve [at] sakoman [dot] com> `Public key <https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=steve%40sakoman.com>`__