From patchwork Sat Feb 21 01:05:36 2026 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Livin Sunny X-Patchwork-Id: 81525 X-Patchwork-Delegate: yoann.congal@smile.fr Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 086EBC5DF68 for ; Sat, 21 Feb 2026 01:09:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-ot1-f65.google.com (mail-ot1-f65.google.com [209.85.210.65]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.msgproc02-g2.11974.1771636168462925697 for ; Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:09:28 -0800 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b=VtBB2pHo; spf=pass (domain: gmail.com, ip: 209.85.210.65, mailfrom: livinsunny519@gmail.com) Received: by mail-ot1-f65.google.com with SMTP id 46e09a7af769-7d4c307db9aso1338119a34.3 for ; Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:09:28 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1771636167; x=1772240967; darn=lists.openembedded.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=uniOxKKiULdgLzosKiww5K+6hlIYLTZBVy49P6NHlpg=; b=VtBB2pHosiME5uV78AETkft3Iug5p1/YfsLL0LwLGrzj9PxPboZlIlZPZ06A7wsnTQ 2hKoEMHiM9uRmDV7Tt1SJFyCWoC3fpyHTUb7Vz5XEGEkCSI4F3aonO9AP9+92Ehj3Zgz J0hZanTjjLaTZd0aWD5WLoYO2lxtfHOnlr2vua/wGDFq25GRU4ssV25afJ00uqDOnOtw GB97/sMqOr/3aUlptpoof9xeS2mSodq6sbW9ggEDCsF71NkXDNRN/Z8iK7O1bSj61Luv U+Yh3JFJYGRuC4OF7IdnK1wf4B70v9fwodNKV0AW+CE+6ZmsHqRUBUzAJ0f5f9QS7jBI JTHg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1771636167; x=1772240967; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=uniOxKKiULdgLzosKiww5K+6hlIYLTZBVy49P6NHlpg=; b=Ck/q+0mK4WmUKgcEV58FzAxuEuL20BqYOzck9zOETCKcA2ZO8jO6XczTm0FaczHnn1 N8im27QEOVJbk+i2bf0ozO1OBhzNZho1bRHNT3fvO2jkna7BFH3rdhNbDeao5/a4htNz 8ViiZHOCNxwpw4AGvRx09k7P5ZzKgsvi9xFyYZcQKWS8yA5tyHa8mRiOk7PAGk8yL1Li yFZOKBMad0C7Xo2Nquu+tRN5TOO9GCy9sKJz7/InZXYRzBf0NDMWXedfCV7YdpTxhHEI KQSH76IzxNS3zATNkdEOovxBmTtpfwvLyVgWmMJhBn9gcMvGO9pdhKzwASQXZsOCj9Ab dQhA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyI8uxWXN6lc+5yYKZ0FA5gRI4ZrtSwefiVfq2VE4jT7/Jmk/OV Fav2t+H5OYyW59OD8R03+8HIajuHxwNjILrSPXbhTy2NWSrcMZKMXVkhEemRb1YZ X-Gm-Gg: AZuq6aJ90dRC81RhDVWAM4ezZgKZVF9mDbxVbYwmxxW5S7R5s4mnOUTTouwYjN5Tcha qWT/3fSbmxs/tXqDbaQvM0nio34Noi5doLyWyuyIAP5iMoGBcgnmiDtIP3vAnRe+taH62+MfS7b 3q/eW52961TMJewjcmR1o2kl0pTO2lCVmyMMqi0g6SWi9QG8ldft3AnPrkT/kFpcf1FAgLSJwLy mPRs0r6hhiCAdVPvECXzUoGH/6Sxbz4E/Atp3JDA6j3EuLRB88hQCSfgNYR8cbdITNmQYiNM5Iw vFrcRKwzKPMqfu08bR0WfgiNn8C/ESYNEeKHkfLH4ADRcZBU+BkEEW9c28y720mBZFm1WltarwY VCmTkqIsWseG9/daK5v4tlNo/WYyz7t73+zjYvkY4q0v2fFkPOH34rYjY0HuIl9mKBb0dbYlmkl VdkJ5zw0BHMvDWOj5Xk8vnpdAyQxHV6UOfmS68bdGm04RQGw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:651b:b0:7d1:94d0:e8f1 with SMTP id 46e09a7af769-7d52bedcb8fmr1078877a34.15.1771636167405; Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:09:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from OLA-4NW0K93.ad.garmin.com ([185.153.204.24]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 46e09a7af769-7d52ce63069sm1159609a34.0.2026.02.20.17.09.26 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:09:26 -0800 (PST) From: Livin Sunny To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: JPEWhacker@gmail.com, Peter.Marko@siemens.com, Livin Sunny Subject: [OE-core][scarthgap][PATCH v2] busybox: Fixes CVE-2025-60876 Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2026 19:05:36 -0600 Message-ID: <20260221010838.3369126-1-livinsunny519@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from 45-33-107-173.ip.linodeusercontent.com [45.33.107.173] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Sat, 21 Feb 2026 01:09:32 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/231555 This patch addresses CVE-2025-60876[1], which allows malicious URLs to inject HTTP headers. It has been accepted by Debian[2] and is tracked here [4]. The upstream fix has been submitted [3] and is pending merge. [1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60876 [2] https://bugs.debian.org/1120795 [3] https://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2025-November/091840.html [4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-60876 Signed-off-by: Livin Sunny --- Changes in v2: - Updated the commit message to include details from debian. - Updated the upstream status to submitted. --- ...control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.36.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/wget-disallow-control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch -- 2.53.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/wget-disallow-control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/wget-disallow-control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aafd0ec60b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/wget-disallow-control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From: Radoslav Kolev +Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 11:21:18 +0200 +Subject: wget: don't allow control characters or spaces in the URL +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1120795 + +Fixes CVE-2025-60876 malicious URL can be used to inject +HTTP headers in the request. + +Signed-off-by: Radoslav Kolev +Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Deloget + +Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2025-November/091840.html] + +CVE: CVE-2025-60876 + +Signed-off-by: Livin Sunny +--- + networking/wget.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/networking/wget.c b/networking/wget.c +index ec3767793..fa555427b 100644 +--- a/networking/wget.c ++++ b/networking/wget.c +@@ -536,6 +536,15 @@ static void parse_url(const char *src_url, struct host_info *h) + { + char *url, *p, *sp; + ++ /* Fix for CVE-2025-60876 - don't allow control characters or spaces in the URL */ ++ /* otherwise a malicious URL can be used to inject HTTP headers in the request */ ++ const unsigned char *u = (void *) src_url; ++ while (*u) { ++ if (*u <= ' ') ++ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("Unencoded control character found in the URL!"); ++ u++; ++ } ++ + free(h->allocated); + h->allocated = url = xstrdup(src_url); + +-- +2.47.3 diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.36.1.bb b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.36.1.bb index d3f259d45b..b7a8ad2ed5 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.36.1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.36.1.bb @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \ file://CVE-2023-39810.patch \ file://CVE-2025-46394-01.patch \ file://CVE-2025-46394-02.patch \ + file://wget-disallow-control-chars-in-URLs-CVE-2025-60876.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg " # TODO http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2023-January/090078.html