From patchwork Thu Jan 1 14:16:15 2026 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Peter Marko X-Patchwork-Id: 77907 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B094EED60F for ; Thu, 1 Jan 2026 14:16:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mta-64-228.siemens.flowmailer.net (mta-64-228.siemens.flowmailer.net [185.136.64.228]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.msgproc01-g2.104899.1767276981222067398 for ; Thu, 01 Jan 2026 06:16:21 -0800 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=peter.marko@siemens.com header.s=fm1 header.b=ZNFyCMMj; spf=pass (domain: rts-flowmailer.siemens.com, ip: 185.136.64.228, mailfrom: fm-256628-20260101141618168dafb3fb00020728-4l7le8@rts-flowmailer.siemens.com) Received: by mta-64-228.siemens.flowmailer.net with ESMTPSA id 20260101141618168dafb3fb00020728 for ; Thu, 01 Jan 2026 15:16:18 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; s=fm1; d=siemens.com; i=peter.marko@siemens.com; h=Date:From:Subject:To:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc; bh=RSdvUxTHGlsaR8bzYakSNRjiltGFFVQa0QQAUeKoJJM=; b=ZNFyCMMjgGcQ9x5l9y6suJMXHnWAcL2kuwcCDASfoKvoveOiVk8mJdXudHOz+P3+oCxsgy nXMtGtAJ5KpzPpyLwtnXJCeevrXP1LMWd4wYG4+66UOBbdPRCqLLzACYxvaIJY7YyGD6KlNe IDKY63yrxMZYCqdDSK7s2ztefllkfGDpUWy0rGlFwnQJcoM9AVbT4WvwGCess335SVB0Z3wf cnLq/5VEtnVqzhsk95P0+MvBOGyQJSQdi06Xqy6yQtFuno9VhQJ4kiTcjaUSHpW0KJ5PC//x 10O86I+dFDszaC5OZK+0wiBbw88Xqv+os+FnI9a4jZsGGG6dK+yg5myw==; From: Peter Marko To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Peter Marko Subject: [OE-core][kirkstone][PATCH] dropbear: patch CVE-2019-6111 Date: Thu, 1 Jan 2026 15:16:15 +0100 Message-Id: <20260101141615.113838-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Flowmailer-Platform: Siemens Feedback-ID: 519:519-256628:519-21489:flowmailer List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from 45-33-107-173.ip.linodeusercontent.com [45.33.107.173] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Thu, 01 Jan 2026 14:16:22 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/228823 From: Peter Marko Pick patch mentioning this CVE number. Signed-off-by: Peter Marko --- meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc | 1 + .../dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch | 157 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc index 94059df2582..cebb1e49c98 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear.inc @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/dropbear-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0001-Add-m_snprintf-that-won-t-return-negative.patch \ file://0001-Handle-arbitrary-length-paths-and-commands-in-multih.patch \ file://CVE-2025-47203.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-6111.patch \ " PAM_SRC_URI = "file://0005-dropbear-enable-pam.patch \ diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..84224a5f573 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/dropbear/dropbear/CVE-2019-6111.patch @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +From 48a17cff6aa104b8e806ddb2191f83f1024060f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Johnston +Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 22:59:19 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] scp CVE-2019-6111 fix + +Cherry-pick from OpenSSH portable + +391ffc4b9d31 ("upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during") + +upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during + +remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user. + +This checking provides some protection against a malicious server +sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted +files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules. + +For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check. + +reported by Harry Sintonen +fix approach suggested by markus@; +has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@ + +CVE: CVE-2019-6111 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/48a17cff6aa104b8e806ddb2191f83f1024060f1] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + scp.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 384f2cb..bf98986 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ + #include "includes.h" + /*RCSID("$OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.130 2006/01/31 10:35:43 djm Exp $");*/ + ++#include ++ + #include "atomicio.h" + #include "compat.h" + #include "scpmisc.h" +@@ -291,14 +293,14 @@ void verifydir(char *); + + uid_t userid; + int errs, remin, remout; +-int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; ++int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; + + #define CMDNEEDS 64 + char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ + + int response(void); + void rsource(char *, struct stat *); +-void sink(int, char *[]); ++void sink(int, char *[], const char *); + void source(int, char *[]); + void tolocal(int, char *[]); + void toremote(char *, int, char *[]); +@@ -325,8 +327,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); + +- fflag = tflag = 0; +- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1) ++ fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; ++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1) + switch (ch) { + /* User-visible flags. */ + case '1': +@@ -389,9 +391,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + setmode(0, O_BINARY); + #endif + break; ++ case 'T': ++ Tflag = 1; ++ break; + default: + usage(); +- } ++ } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + +@@ -409,7 +414,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + } + if (tflag) { + /* Receive data. */ +- sink(argc, argv); ++ sink(argc, argv, NULL); + exit(errs != 0); + } + if (argc < 2) +@@ -590,7 +595,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv) + continue; + } + xfree(bp); +- sink(1, argv + argc - 1); ++ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); + (void) close(remin); + remin = remout = -1; + } +@@ -823,7 +828,7 @@ bwlimit(int amount) + } + + void +-sink(int argc, char **argv) ++sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) + { + static BUF buffer; + struct stat stb; +@@ -837,6 +842,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + off_t size, statbytes; + int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; + char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048]; ++ char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL; + struct timeval tv[2]; + + #define atime tv[0] +@@ -858,6 +864,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + targisdir = 1; ++ if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { ++ /* ++ * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match ++ * the requested destination file glob. ++ */ ++ if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL) ++ fatal("strdup failed"); ++ if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *restrict_pattern++ = '\0'; ++ } ++ } + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + cp = buf; + if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) +@@ -940,6 +957,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); + exit(1); + } ++ if (restrict_pattern != NULL && ++ fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0) ++ SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); + if (targisdir) { + static char *namebuf = NULL; + static size_t cursize = 0; +@@ -978,7 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + goto bad; + } + vect[0] = xstrdup(np); +- sink(1, vect); ++ sink(1, vect, src); + if (setimes) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)