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([147.161.217.9]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d2e1a72fcca58-8c872e4d7basm294518b3a.21.2026.11.19.10.37.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:37:41 -0800 (PST) From: ankur.tyagi85@gmail.com To: openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Ankur Tyagi Subject: [blacksail][PATCH 42/64] tinyproxy: patch CVE-2026-125371 Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 07:33:10 +1300 Message-ID: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from 45-33-107-173.ip.linodeusercontent.com [45.33.107.173] by lin-tor-korg-lkml-alma10-1 with HTTPS for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 18:37:47 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/132732 From: Ankur Tyagi Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-125371 Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi --- .../tinyproxy/tinyproxy/CVE-2026-125371.patch | 70 +++++++++++++++++++ .../tinyproxy/tinyproxy_1.11.3.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy/CVE-2026-125371.patch diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy/CVE-2026-125371.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy/CVE-2026-125371.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7a86af207c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy/CVE-2026-125371.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 8c8463fb1a0bf7db82d3dfc6f363d5b339e96cd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: rofl0r +Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 06:42:05 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] acl: use hostspec parser to disallow suffix hostname matches + +the existing ad-hoc parsing in acl.c allowed an attacker to +use e.g. an "untrusted.net" domain name to access a reachable +tinyproxy instance if it had an allow list entry for "trusted.net". + +exploiting it would require that the attacker has prior knowledge +of the instance's configuration or is damn good at guessing and +well-budgeted to register lots of potentially matching domains. + +fix by re-using the existing hardened hostspec parser. + +closes #627 + +(cherry picked from commit 3991ac8f98c6a9f05b3265018b812dbf2ca92c28) +CVE: CVE-2026-125371 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tinyproxy/tinyproxy/commit/3991ac8f98c6a9f05b3265018b812dbf2ca92c28] +Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi +--- + src/acl.c | 25 +++++++++---------------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/acl.c b/src/acl.c +index 2d141ba..db526db 100644 +--- a/src/acl.c ++++ b/src/acl.c +@@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ acl_string_processing (struct acl_s *acl, const char *ip_address, + { + int match; + struct addrinfo hints, *res, *ressave; +- size_t test_length, match_length; + char ipbuf[512]; + + assert (acl && acl->h.type == HST_STRING); +@@ -153,23 +152,17 @@ STRING_TEST: + return -1; + } + +- test_length = strlen (string_addr); +- match_length = strlen (acl->h.address.string); +- + /* +- * If the string length is shorter than AC string, return a -1 so +- * that the "driver" will skip onto the next control in the list. ++ * compare the reverse-resolved client hostname against the ACL ++ * entry, using the shared hostspec matcher so that hostname ++ * entries are matched at label boundaries: plain entries match ++ * the whole hostname exactly, and leading-dot entries match the ++ * apex host plus every subdomain below it. This prevents ++ * suffix-collision bypasses, e.g. "Allow trusted.net" must not ++ * admit "untrusted.net" (GH issue #627). + */ +- if (test_length < match_length) +- return -1; +- +- if (strcasecmp +- (string_addr + (test_length - match_length), +- acl->h.address.string) == 0) { +- if (acl->access == ACL_DENY) +- return 0; +- else +- return 1; ++ if (hostspec_match (string_addr, &acl->h) != 0) { ++ return acl->access != ACL_DENY; + } + + /* Indicate that no tests succeeded, so skip to next control. */ diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy_1.11.3.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy_1.11.3.bb index 46d3a4d7c6..86e7e906b1 100644 --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy_1.11.3.bb +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/tinyproxy/tinyproxy_1.11.3.bb @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz file://CVE-2026-54387.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55202.patch \ file://CVE-2026-54388.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-125371.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9bcf46db1a2375ff3e3d27a41982f1efec4706cce8899ff9f33323a8218f7592"