From patchwork Wed May 29 10:05:04 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jasper Orschulko X-Patchwork-Id: 44363 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE716C25B75 for ; Wed, 29 May 2024 10:05:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx.walter.deinstapel.de (mx.walter.deinstapel.de [62.176.232.99]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.10178.1716977139148138817 for ; Wed, 29 May 2024 03:05:40 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=fail reason="dkim: body hash did not verify" header.i=@fancydomain.eu header.s=mail header.b=d0YHAyJO; spf=pass (domain: fancydomain.eu, ip: 62.176.232.99, mailfrom: jasper@fancydomain.eu) From: jasper@fancydomain.eu DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=fancydomain.eu; s=mail; t=1716977135; bh=K/u57nBJQQH2XPU1HWdLDDotV5SY7+MuQ66gJAlqVCQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject; b=d0YHAyJO0vPvj+LKA8KrX70Tkcox2dEZVGL3LzjM/l9wZafreNS7qGx2MopAxbxRA CQ7TpMYncSAKc4OkH01I8G2FLs+ulVxXB9ND75l3RDbPiHCIqITnttfqeKhMJLb/1B EpmtKfzozdexWfPn0YyZQ9kZBQbuwYhTwNgLrRGj0cc6HgCksE537qxHExEEO+XtMj C57YRaKPxHutCWZAJ/FVRTlNbwYpnVKPapOhu+X5TzmzHBPDy3DT9I1YjCQEBU5D1R JQsxEiljHBbpd6xkMwy3juweKfbhF/EiPexsgD+lBEhrqCJRD2/XoDTi4e6G5xbfiX PUxVRMkX2lwiA== To: openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Jasper Orschulko Subject: [meta-webserver][kirkstone][PATCH] nginx: Remove obsolete patch Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 12:05:04 +0200 Message-ID: <20240529100504.8257-1-jasper@fancydomain.eu> Mime-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Wed, 29 May 2024 10:05:48 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/110612 From: Jasper Orschulko With the inclusion of commit 85102dd2dff41945997b983f7c2bfc954dd3bc47 the same patch was introduced again, thus this copy can be deleted (which accidently was never used, since I originally forgot to add it to the SRC_URI, whoops). Signed-off-by: Jasper Orschulko --- ...-per-iteration-stream-handling-limit.patch | 92 ------------------- 1 file changed, 92 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/0001-HTTP-2-per-iteration-stream-handling-limit.patch diff --git a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/0001-HTTP-2-per-iteration-stream-handling-limit.patch b/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/0001-HTTP-2-per-iteration-stream-handling-limit.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7dd1e721c..000000000 --- a/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/0001-HTTP-2-per-iteration-stream-handling-limit.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -From 2b9667f36551406169e3e2a6a774466ac70a83c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Maxim Dounin -Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 15:13:39 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] HTTP/2: per-iteration stream handling limit. - -To ensure that attempts to flood servers with many streams are detected -early, a limit of no more than 2 * max_concurrent_streams new streams per one -event loop iteration was introduced. This limit is applied even if -max_concurrent_streams is not yet reached - for example, if corresponding -streams are handled synchronously or reset. - -Further, refused streams are now limited to maximum of max_concurrent_streams -and 100, similarly to priority_limit initial value, providing some tolerance -to clients trying to open several streams at the connection start, yet -low tolerance to flooding attempts. - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/6ceef192e7af1c507826ac38a2d43f08bf265fb9] - -Reduces the impact of HTTP/2 Stream Reset flooding in the nginx product -(CVE-2023-44487). - -See: https://www.nginx.com/blog/http-2-rapid-reset-attack-impacting-f5-nginx-products/ - -This patch only reduces the impact and does not completely mitigate the CVE -in question, the latter being due to a design flaw in the HTTP/2 protocol -itself. For transparancy reasons I therefore opted to not mark the -CVE as resolved, so that integrators can decide for themselves, wheither to -enable HTTP/2 support or allow HTTP/1.1 connections only. - -Signed-off-by: Jasper Orschulko ---- - src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ - src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c -index 3611a2e50..291677aca 100644 ---- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c -+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.c -@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ ngx_http_v2_read_handler(ngx_event_t *rev) - ngx_log_debug0(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_HTTP, c->log, 0, "http2 read handler"); - - h2c->blocked = 1; -+ h2c->new_streams = 0; - - if (c->close) { - c->close = 0; -@@ -1320,6 +1321,14 @@ ngx_http_v2_state_headers(ngx_http_v2_connection_t *h2c, u_char *pos, - goto rst_stream; - } - -+ if (h2c->new_streams++ >= 2 * h2scf->concurrent_streams) { -+ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, h2c->connection->log, 0, -+ "client sent too many streams at once"); -+ -+ status = NGX_HTTP_V2_REFUSED_STREAM; -+ goto rst_stream; -+ } -+ - if (!h2c->settings_ack - && !(h2c->state.flags & NGX_HTTP_V2_END_STREAM_FLAG) - && h2scf->preread_size < NGX_HTTP_V2_DEFAULT_WINDOW) -@@ -1385,6 +1394,12 @@ ngx_http_v2_state_headers(ngx_http_v2_connection_t *h2c, u_char *pos, - - rst_stream: - -+ if (h2c->refused_streams++ > ngx_max(h2scf->concurrent_streams, 100)) { -+ ngx_log_error(NGX_LOG_INFO, h2c->connection->log, 0, -+ "client sent too many refused streams"); -+ return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c, NGX_HTTP_V2_NO_ERROR); -+ } -+ - if (ngx_http_v2_send_rst_stream(h2c, h2c->state.sid, status) != NGX_OK) { - return ngx_http_v2_connection_error(h2c, NGX_HTTP_V2_INTERNAL_ERROR); - } -diff --git a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h -index 349229711..6a7aaa62c 100644 ---- a/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h -+++ b/src/http/v2/ngx_http_v2.h -@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ struct ngx_http_v2_connection_s { - ngx_uint_t processing; - ngx_uint_t frames; - ngx_uint_t idle; -+ ngx_uint_t new_streams; -+ ngx_uint_t refused_streams; - ngx_uint_t priority_limit; - - ngx_uint_t pushing; --- -2.42.1 -