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Tue, 22 Sep 2026 02:12:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from MVIN00352.mvista.com ([2401:4900:1cc4:b6aa:4514:5733:3fea:a0]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a92af1059eb24-144f2a44cc8sm3552686c88.13.2026.09.22.02.12.48 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 22 Sep 2026 02:12:50 -0700 (PDT) From: Vijay Anusuri To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Vijay Anusuri Subject: [OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 2/3] python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-69248 Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 14:42:35 +0530 Message-ID: <20260922091236.766239-2-vanusuri@mvista.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20260922091236.766239-1-vanusuri@mvista.com> References: <20260922091236.766239-1-vanusuri@mvista.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from 45-33-107-173.ip.linodeusercontent.com [45.33.107.173] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2026 09:12:58 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/246393 Pick patch according to [2] [1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-69248 [2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-69248 Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri --- .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch | 299 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 300 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..659d1bf72a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +From 4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Woodruff +Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 20:44:05 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] x509: distinguish NC kinds when evaluating wildcard DNS SANs + (#14888) + +* x509: distinguish NC kinds when evaluating wildcard DNS SANs + +* Bump x509-limbo + +Note: SUSE patch CVE-2026-69248-distingush-nc-kinds-wildcard-sans.patch was adapted to our version where required. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from suse https://download.opensuse.org/distribution/leap-micro/6.1/product/repo/openSUSE-Leap-Micro-6.1-x86_64-Source/src/python-cryptography-42.0.4-slfo.1.1_6.1.src.rpm +Upstream commit https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2] +CVE: CVE-2026-69248 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri +--- + .../cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs | 37 +++- + .../src/types.rs | 165 ++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +index f49f618..a505349 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + fn evaluate_single_constraint( + &self, ++ kind: SubtreeKind, + constraint: &GeneralName<'chain>, + san: &GeneralName<'chain>, + budget: &mut Budget, +@@ -109,8 +110,18 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + match (constraint, san) { + (GeneralName::DNSName(pattern), GeneralName::DNSName(name)) => { ++ // NOTE: A DNS SAN can be a wildcard pattern (e.g. `*.foo.com`) ++ // rather than an ordinary DNS name. A wildcard represents a ++ // *set* of names, so the check depends on which subtree we're ++ // evaluating: a `permittedSubtrees` constraint must contain ++ // *every* name the wildcard can expand to, whereas an ++ // `excludedSubtrees` constraint matches if it overlaps the ++ // wildcard at all. We dispatch on `kind` accordingly. + match (DNSConstraint::new(pattern.0), DNSPattern::new(name.0)) { +- (Some(pattern), Some(name)) => Ok(Applied(pattern.matches(&name))), ++ (Some(pattern), Some(name)) => Ok(Applied(match kind { ++ SubtreeKind::Permitted => pattern.permits(&name), ++ SubtreeKind::Excluded => pattern.excludes(&name), ++ })), + (_, None) => Err(ValidationError::Other(format!( + "unsatisfiable DNS name constraint: malformed SAN {}", + name.0 +@@ -155,7 +166,12 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + let mut permit = true; + if let Some(permitted_subtrees) = &constraints.permitted_subtrees { + for p in permitted_subtrees.unwrap_read().clone() { +- let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint(&p.base, &san, budget)?; ++ let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint( ++ SubtreeKind::Permitted, ++ &p.base, ++ &san, ++ budget, ++ )?; + if status.is_applied() { + permit = status.is_match(); + if permit { +@@ -173,7 +189,12 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + if let Some(excluded_subtrees) = &constraints.excluded_subtrees { + for e in excluded_subtrees.unwrap_read().clone() { +- let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint(&e.base, &san, budget)?; ++ let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint( ++ SubtreeKind::Excluded, ++ &e.base, ++ &san, ++ budget, ++ )?; + if status.is_match() { + return Err(ValidationError::Other( + "excluded name constraint matched SAN".into(), +@@ -207,6 +228,16 @@ struct ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> { + store: &'a Store<'chain, B>, + } + ++/// Identifies which kind of name constraint subtree a SAN is being evaluated ++/// against. The two subtree kinds use different matching semantics for ++/// wildcard DNS SANs (containment vs. overlap); see [`DNSConstraint::permits`] ++/// and [`DNSConstraint::excludes`]. ++#[derive(Clone, Copy)] ++enum SubtreeKind { ++ Permitted, ++ Excluded, ++} ++ + // When applying a name constraint, we need to distinguish between a few different scenarios: + // * `Applied(true)`: The name constraint is the same type as the SAN and matches. + // * `Applied(false)`: The name constraint is the same type as the SAN and does not match. +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +index d82936e..c0b72e3 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +@@ -129,44 +129,69 @@ impl<'a> DNSConstraint<'a> { + DNSName::new(pattern).map(Self) + } + +- /// Returns true if this `DNSConstraint` matches the given `DNSPattern`. ++ /// Returns true if the given exact `DNSName` falls within this ++ /// constraint's subtree. + /// +- /// Constraint matching is defined by RFC 5280: any DNS name that can +- /// be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the left-hand +- /// side of the name satisfies the name constraint. ++ /// Per RFC 5280, a name satisfies the constraint if it can be constructed ++ /// by adding zero or more labels to the left-hand side of the constraint's ++ /// name (i.e. it is the constraint's name, or a subdomain of it). ++ fn contains(&self, name: &DNSName<'_>) -> bool { ++ // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, ++ // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead ++ // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. ++ // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip ++ // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need ++ // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as ++ // the constraint it's matching against. ++ name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() ++ && self ++ .0 ++ .rlabels() ++ .zip(name.rlabels()) ++ .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) ++ } ++ ++ /// Returns true if the given `DNSPattern` is permitted by this constraint, ++ /// for use with a `permittedSubtrees` name constraint. + /// +- /// On top of what RFC 5280 specifies, we define behavior for wildcard +- /// patterns (which are not covered by RFC 5280): a wildcard pattern +- /// matches a constraint if the pattern matches the constraint's inner name, +- /// _or_ if the pattern's inner name matches the constraint. +- /// This allows us to reject DNS names like `*.example.com` when +- /// the constraint is `example.com` or `bar.example.com`. +- pub fn matches(&self, name: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { +- match name { +- DNSPattern::Exact(name) => { +- // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, +- // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead +- // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. +- // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip +- // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need +- // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as +- // the constraint it's matching against. +- name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() +- && self +- .0 +- .rlabels() +- .zip(name.rlabels()) +- .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) +- } +- DNSPattern::Wildcard(inner) => { +- // NOTE: This check is not as simple as a single pattern match, +- // since we need two subtly distinct cases here: +- // 1. Constraint `bar.example.com` on `*.example.com` +- // 2. Constraint `example.com` on `*.example.com` +- // The first cases is handled by `DNSPattern::matches`, and the second is handled +- // by `DNSConstraint::matches`. +- name.matches(&self.0) || self.matches(&DNSPattern::Exact(inner.clone())) +- } ++ /// A pattern is permitted only if *every* name it can represent falls ++ /// within the constraint's subtree. An exact name is permitted by ordinary ++ /// subtree containment (per RFC 5280). ++ /// ++ /// Wildcard patterns are not covered by RFC 5280; we define their behavior ++ /// here. A wildcard pattern `*.X` is permitted only if its base name `X` ++ /// itself falls within the constraint's subtree. This is stricter than ++ /// mere overlap: `*.example.com` is *not* permitted by `foo.example.com`, ++ /// since it can also expand to a sibling such as `bar.example.com` that ++ /// lies outside the permitted subtree. ++ pub fn permits(&self, pattern: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { ++ match pattern { ++ DNSPattern::Exact(name) => self.contains(name), ++ DNSPattern::Wildcard(base) => self.contains(base), ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /// Returns true if the given `DNSPattern` is excluded by this constraint, ++ /// for use with an `excludedSubtrees` name constraint. ++ /// ++ /// A pattern is excluded if *any* name it can represent falls within the ++ /// constraint's subtree. An exact name is excluded by ordinary subtree ++ /// containment (per RFC 5280). ++ /// ++ /// Wildcard patterns are not covered by RFC 5280; we define their behavior ++ /// here. A wildcard pattern `*.X` is excluded if it overlaps the subtree ++ /// at all, which happens in two subtly distinct cases: ++ /// ++ /// 1. The constraint is more specific than the wildcard, e.g. constraint ++ /// `bar.example.com` and pattern `*.example.com` (which can expand to ++ /// `bar.example.com`). This is handled by `DNSPattern::matches`. ++ /// 2. The wildcard's base name falls within the subtree, e.g. constraint ++ /// `example.com` and pattern `*.example.com`. This is handled by ++ /// `DNSConstraint::contains`. ++ pub fn excludes(&self, pattern: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { ++ match pattern { ++ DNSPattern::Exact(name) => self.contains(name), ++ DNSPattern::Wildcard(base) => pattern.matches(&self.0) || self.contains(base), + } + } + } +@@ -462,37 +487,69 @@ mod tests { + } + + #[test] +- fn test_dnsconstraint_matches() { ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_exact() { + let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); + +- // Exact domain and arbitrary subdomains match. +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com").unwrap())); ++ // For exact patterns, `permits` and `excludes` behave identically: ++ // the pattern must fall within the constraint's subtree. ++ for permitted in [ ++ "example.com", ++ "foo.example.com", ++ "foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com", ++ ] { ++ let pattern = DNSPattern::new(permitted).unwrap(); ++ assert!(example_com.permits(&pattern)); ++ assert!(example_com.excludes(&pattern)); ++ } + + // Parent domains, distinct domains, and substring domains do not match. +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("badexample.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("wrong.com").unwrap())); ++ for rejected in ["com", "badexample.com", "wrong.com"] { ++ let pattern = DNSPattern::new(rejected).unwrap(); ++ assert!(!example_com.permits(&pattern)); ++ assert!(!example_com.excludes(&pattern)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ #[test] ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_permits_wildcard() { ++ let com = DNSConstraint::new("com").unwrap(); ++ let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); ++ let foo_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("foo.example.com").unwrap(); ++ let any_example_com = DNSPattern::new("*.example.com").unwrap(); ++ ++ // A wildcard `*.example.com` is permitted only by constraints whose ++ // subtree contains *every* name the wildcard can expand to, i.e. those ++ // that contain `example.com` itself. ++ assert!(com.permits(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(example_com.permits(&any_example_com)); ++ ++ // A constraint more specific than the wildcard's base does *not* ++ // permit it: the wildcard can expand to siblings outside the subtree ++ // (e.g. `*.example.com` can be `bar.example.com`, which lies outside ++ // `foo.example.com`). ++ assert!(!foo_example_com.permits(&any_example_com)); + } + + #[test] +- fn test_dnsconstraint_matches_wildcard() { ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_excludes_wildcard() { + let com = DNSConstraint::new("com").unwrap(); + let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); + let bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("bar.example.com").unwrap(); + let baz_bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("baz.bar.example.com").unwrap(); + let any_example_com = DNSPattern::new("*.example.com").unwrap(); + +- assert!(com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- assert!(bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- +- // A constraint on `baz.bar.example.com` doesn't match `*.example.com`, +- // since `baz.bar.example.com` matches zero or more sublabels of +- // `baz.bar.example.com` while `*.example.com` matches exactly one +- // sublabel of `example.com`. +- assert!(!baz_bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); ++ // A wildcard `*.example.com` is excluded by any constraint whose ++ // subtree it overlaps, including constraints more specific than the ++ // wildcard's base. ++ assert!(com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(bar_example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ ++ // A constraint on `baz.bar.example.com` doesn't overlap ++ // `*.example.com`, since `baz.bar.example.com` matches zero or more ++ // sublabels of `baz.bar.example.com` while `*.example.com` matches ++ // exactly one sublabel of `example.com`. ++ assert!(!baz_bar_example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); + } + + #[test] +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb index 01382219fa..8148ec0ba5 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe07eec95dfd477eb9530aef5bead34fec819b3aaf6c5bd6d20565da6 SRC_URI += "file://0001-pyproject.toml-remove-benchmark-disable-option.patch \ file://CVE-2026-26007.patch \ file://CVE-2026-34073.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-69248.patch \ file://check-memfree.py \ file://run-ptest \ "