diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/02-CVE-2026-31912.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/02-CVE-2026-31912.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1173a4f9d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap/02-CVE-2026-31912.patch @@ -0,0 +1,520 @@ +From d3f358d3cffbe1ecb94d5284b3e81f052a0adcb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Denis Ovsienko +Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 13:33:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2026-31912: Mind the program bounds in pcap_offline_filter(). + +The current revision of pcapint_filter_with_aux_data() does not know the +number of instructions in the filter program, it assumes the program +counter always remains within the bounds of the provided filter program +and always reaches a return instruction. This holds for programs that +have been generated or validated by libpcap. + +However, this does not necessarily hold for programs that come from an +external source via pcap_offline_filter() or [deprecated] bpf_filter() +and have not been explicitly validated. If the interpreter executes +such a program and advances the program counter beyond the last +instruction, it will be interpreting memory space after the filter +program as BPF instructions, which in the current implementation will +eventually cause either abort() (another commit addresses that) or +SIGSEGV. + +To fix the latter problem, in pcapint_filter_with_aux_data() add a +parameter for the number of instructions in the program and reject the +packet as soon as (or just before) the program counter goes out of +bounds. Update all incoming code paths to specify the length; also in +pcap_offline_filter(3PCAP) make it clear the function now requires the +'bf_len' member to be set correctly and uses it. + +(backported from commit d1209988c74dd9330659898d3b676ee6bbe1c551) + +(cherry picked from commit d3f358d3cffbe1ecb94d5284b3e81f052a0adcb9) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/d3f358d3cffbe1ecb94d5284b3e81f052a0adcb9] +CVE: CVE-2026-31912 +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam +--- +diff --git a/bpf_filter.c b/bpf_filter.c +index fa82d1d0..dec336ea 100644 +--- a/bpf_filter.c ++++ b/bpf_filter.c +@@ -72,6 +72,24 @@ enum { + BPF_S_ANC_VLAN_TAG_PRESENT, + }; + ++/* ++ * Kernel BPF implementations tend to define BPF_MAXINSNS to 512 or 4096, the ++ * userland interpreter in libpcap is meant to support much longer filter ++ * programs. In the latter case it is important that BPF_MAXINSNS does not ++ * interfere with the safety checks in the validator and the interpreter: ++ * (BPF_MAXINSNS + UINT8_MAX) * sizeof(struct bpf_insn) < UINT32_MAX ++ * It makes the most sense to be able to interpret as many instructions as ++ * pcap_compile() can produce, without optimization, for a valid filter ++ * expression before it consumes as much memory as the current definitions of ++ * NCHUNKS and CHUNKSIZE() allow. For some expressions this can be almost ++ * 1.53 million instructions on a 64-bit machine and twice as many on a 32-bit ++ * machine. ++ */ ++#ifdef BPF_MAXINSNS ++#undef BPF_MAXINSNS ++#endif ++#define BPF_MAXINSNS 3060000U ++ + /* + * Execute the filter program starting at pc on the packet p + * wirelen is the length of the original packet +@@ -86,12 +104,14 @@ enum { + */ + #if defined(SKF_AD_VLAN_TAG_PRESENT) + u_int +-pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_char *p, +- u_int wirelen, u_int buflen, const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *aux_data) ++pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_int proglen, ++ const u_char *p, const u_int wirelen, const u_int buflen, ++ const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *aux_data) + #else + u_int +-pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_char *p, +- u_int wirelen, u_int buflen, const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *aux_data _U_) ++pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_int proglen, ++ const u_char *p, const u_int wirelen, const u_int buflen, ++ const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *aux_data _U_) + #endif + { + register uint32_t A, X; +@@ -101,13 +121,36 @@ pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_char *p, + if (pc == 0) + /* + * No filter means accept all. ++ * In this case the value of 'proglen' is irrelevant. + */ + return (u_int)-1; ++ if (proglen < 1 || proglen > BPF_MAXINSNS) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* ++ * Require the current instruction pointer not to overflow for both the ++ * filter program (where the pointer will be dereferenced) and an ++ * immediately following margin (where it will be not). So long as the ++ * margin is large enough to represent the destination of any single ++ * conditional [forward] jump from within the filter program, a single ++ * guard prevents all filter program over-read attempts that result ++ * from the program running out of instructions before a BPF_RET or a ++ * conditional jump directing the interpreter beyond the program end. ++ * Unconditional jumps mean a larger problem space, which the BPF_JA ++ * case below addresses separately. ++ */ ++ const struct bpf_insn *pcend = pc + proglen; ++ if (pcend + UINT8_MAX < pc) ++ return 0; ++ + A = 0; + X = 0; ++ const struct bpf_insn *pc0 = pc; + --pc; + for (;;) { + ++pc; ++ if (pc >= pcend) ++ return 0; + switch (pc->code) { + + default: +@@ -243,6 +286,40 @@ DIAG_ON_DEFAULT_ONLY_SWITCH + continue; + + case BPF_JMP|BPF_JA: ++ /* ++ * The pointer (pc) decrements and increments in units ++ * of sizeof(struct bpf_insn) == 8 bytes. The number ++ * of units is in the [INT32_MIN, INT32_MAX] interval, ++ * hence the result can point before the beginning or ++ * beyond the end of the filter program and can under- ++ * or overflow; also on 32-bit architectures it can ++ * under- or overflow more than once and can test ++ * negative for underflow, overflow and out-of-range ++ * conditions after under- or overflowing at least ++ * once. ++ * ++ * However, it has been verified above that the program ++ * length is sufficiently small and the pointer does ++ * not wrap within the bounds of the filter program, so ++ * there is a one-to-one correspondence between BPF ++ * program counter values [0, proglen) and all valid ++ * values of the pointer. In other words, after this ++ * unconditional jump the pointer arithmetic result ++ * will be valid iff BPF program counter value will be ++ * valid. For the latter problem the solution is ++ * almost the same as in the validator. ++ * ++ * The main difference is that here the current value ++ * of BPF program counter is not a 32-bit unsigned ++ * variable, but a ptrdiff_t expression, which is ++ * 64-bit signed on 64-bit architectures and 32-bit ++ * signed on 32-bit architectures. However, the cast ++ * to 32-bit unsigned is safe in both cases because: ++ * pc0 <= pc < pc0 + proglen, therefore: ++ * 0 <= pc - pc0 < proglen <= BPF_MAXINSNS < INT32_MAX ++ */ ++ if ((bpf_u_int32)(pc - pc0) + 1 + pc->k >= proglen) ++ return 0; + /* + * XXX - we currently implement "ip6 protochain" + * with backward jumps, so sign-extend pc->k. +@@ -396,10 +473,10 @@ DIAG_ON_DEFAULT_ONLY_SWITCH + } + + u_int +-pcap_filter(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_char *p, u_int wirelen, +- u_int buflen) ++pcap_filter(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_int proglen, const u_char *p, ++ u_int wirelen, u_int buflen) + { +- return pcap_filter_with_aux_data(pc, p, wirelen, buflen, NULL); ++ return pcap_filter_with_aux_data(pc, proglen, p, wirelen, buflen, NULL); + } + + /* +@@ -419,7 +496,7 @@ pcap_validate_filter(const struct bpf_insn *f, int len) + u_int i, from; + const struct bpf_insn *p; + +- if (len < 1) ++ if (len < 1 || (u_int)len > BPF_MAXINSNS || f + len < f) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; ++i) { +@@ -485,33 +562,45 @@ pcap_validate_filter(const struct bpf_insn *f, int len) + case BPF_JMP: + /* + * Check that jumps are within the code block, +- * and that unconditional branches don't go +- * backwards as a result of an overflow. ++ * regardless of the direction. libpcap uses ++ * backward jumps to implement the "protochain" ++ * primitive. All offsets that mean a backward ++ * jump in libpcap (whether in-range or not) in ++ * kernel BPF implementations mean out-of-range ++ * or overflow forward jumps -- kernel ++ * implementations must reject that. ++ * + * Unconditional branches have a 32-bit offset, + * so they could overflow; we check to make + * sure they don't. Conditional branches have + * an 8-bit offset, and the from address is <= +- * BPF_MAXINSNS, and we assume that BPF_MAXINSNS ++ * BPF_MAXINSNS, and we know that BPF_MAXINSNS + * is sufficiently small that adding 255 to it + * won't overflow. + * + * We know that len is <= BPF_MAXINSNS, and we +- * assume that BPF_MAXINSNS is < the maximum size ++ * know that BPF_MAXINSNS is < the maximum value + * of a u_int, so that i + 1 doesn't overflow. +- * +- * For userland, we don't know that the from +- * or len are <= BPF_MAXINSNS, but we know that +- * from <= len, and, except on a 64-bit system, +- * it's unlikely that len, if it truly reflects +- * the size of the program we've been handed, +- * will be anywhere near the maximum size of +- * a u_int. We also don't check for backward +- * branches, as we currently support them in +- * userland for the protochain operation. + */ + from = i + 1; + switch (BPF_OP(p->code)) { + case BPF_JA: ++ /* ++ * So long as both 'from' and bpf_insn.k are ++ * 32-bit unsigned, this check rejects any jump ++ * offset that points outside of the valid BPF ++ * address space of the filter program no ++ * matter whether signed interpretation of the ++ * offset is positive or negative. ++ * ++ * Note that this condition is necessary, but ++ * not sufficient to get correct results from ++ * respective pointer arithmetic in the process ++ * address space. Other necessary conditions ++ * are that BPF_MAXINSNS is correctly defined ++ * and enforced, and that the pointer does not ++ * overflow. ++ */ + if (from + p->k >= (u_int)len) + return 0; + break; +@@ -539,12 +628,14 @@ pcap_validate_filter(const struct bpf_insn *f, int len) + + /* + * Exported because older versions of libpcap exported them. ++ * This function is deprecated and unsafe, use pcap_offline_filter() instead. + */ + u_int + bpf_filter(const struct bpf_insn *pc, const u_char *p, u_int wirelen, + u_int buflen) + { +- return pcap_filter(pc, p, wirelen, buflen); ++ // The actual length of the filter program is not known. ++ return pcap_filter(pc, BPF_MAXINSNS, p, wirelen, buflen); + } + + int +diff --git a/dlpisubs.c b/dlpisubs.c +index 6815b0ec..790acf28 100644 +--- a/dlpisubs.c ++++ b/dlpisubs.c +@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ pcap_process_pkts(pcap_t *p, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user, + bufp += caplen; + #endif + ++pd->stat.ps_recv; +- if (pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, pk, origlen, caplen)) { ++ if (pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ pk, origlen, caplen)) { + #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BUFMOD_H + pkthdr.ts.tv_sec = sbp->sbh_timestamp.tv_sec; + pkthdr.ts.tv_usec = sbp->sbh_timestamp.tv_usec; +diff --git a/pcap-bpf.c b/pcap-bpf.c +index 2898e598..04b5620d 100644 +--- a/pcap-bpf.c ++++ b/pcap-bpf.c +@@ -1255,7 +1255,8 @@ pcap_read_bpf(pcap_t *p, int cnt, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user) + #endif + */ + if (pb->filtering_in_kernel || +- pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, datap, bhp->bh_datalen, caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ datap, bhp->bh_datalen, caplen)) { + struct pcap_pkthdr pkthdr; + #ifdef BIOCSTSTAMP + struct bintime bt; +diff --git a/pcap-bt-linux.c b/pcap-bt-linux.c +index c7bfef1d..dcf3b575 100644 +--- a/pcap-bt-linux.c ++++ b/pcap-bt-linux.c +@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ bt_read_linux(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets _U_, pcap_handler callback, u_char + pkth.caplen+=sizeof(pcap_bluetooth_h4_header); + pkth.len = pkth.caplen; + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + callback(user, &pkth, pktd); + return 1; + } +diff --git a/pcap-bt-monitor-linux.c b/pcap-bt-monitor-linux.c +index 206e65b5..3f9d5b49 100644 +--- a/pcap-bt-monitor-linux.c ++++ b/pcap-bt-monitor-linux.c +@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ bt_monitor_read(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets _U_, pcap_handler callback, u_ch + bthdr->opcode = htons(hdr.opcode); + + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + callback(user, &pkth, pktd); + return 1; + } +diff --git a/pcap-dag.c b/pcap-dag.c +index f261ead0..c3fe1dbd 100644 +--- a/pcap-dag.c ++++ b/pcap-dag.c +@@ -668,8 +668,9 @@ dag_read(pcap_t *p, int cnt, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user) + caplen = p->snapshot; + + /* Run the packet filter if there is one. */ +- if ((p->fcode.bf_insns == NULL) || pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, dp, packet_len, caplen)) { +- ++ if (p->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || ++ pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ dp, packet_len, caplen)) { + /* convert between timestamp formats */ + register unsigned long long ts; + +diff --git a/pcap-dbus.c b/pcap-dbus.c +index 506f150f..760bb9ba 100644 +--- a/pcap-dbus.c ++++ b/pcap-dbus.c +@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ dbus_read(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets _U_, pcap_handler callback, u_char *us + + gettimeofday(&pkth.ts, NULL); + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, (u_char *)raw_msg, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ (u_char *)raw_msg, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + handlep->packets_read++; + callback(user, &pkth, (u_char *)raw_msg); + count++; +diff --git a/pcap-dpdk.c b/pcap-dpdk.c +index 025a6748..cc31d2f2 100644 +--- a/pcap-dpdk.c ++++ b/pcap-dpdk.c +@@ -407,7 +407,9 @@ static int pcap_dpdk_dispatch(pcap_t *p, int max_cnt, pcap_handler cb, u_char *c + + } + if (bp){ +- if (p->fcode.bf_insns==NULL || pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, bp, pcap_header.len, pcap_header.caplen)){ ++ if (p->fcode.bf_insns==NULL || ++ pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ bp, pcap_header.len, pcap_header.caplen)){ + cb(cb_arg, &pcap_header, bp); + }else{ + pd->bpf_drop++; +diff --git a/pcap-int.h b/pcap-int.h +index 894e74af..11ca3c56 100644 +--- a/pcap-int.h ++++ b/pcap-int.h +@@ -619,13 +619,15 @@ struct pcap_bpf_aux_data { + * Filtering routine that takes the auxiliary data as an additional + * argument. + */ +-u_int pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *, +- const u_char *, u_int, u_int, const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *); ++u_int pcap_filter_with_aux_data(const struct bpf_insn *, const u_int, ++ const u_char *, const u_int, const u_int, ++ const struct pcap_bpf_aux_data *); + + /* + * Filtering routine that doesn't. + */ +-u_int pcap_filter(const struct bpf_insn *, const u_char *, u_int, u_int); ++u_int pcap_filter(const struct bpf_insn *, const u_int, const u_char *, ++ u_int, u_int); + + /* + * Routine to validate a BPF program. +diff --git a/pcap-linux.c b/pcap-linux.c +index 13bd8529..b2b2ca70 100644 +--- a/pcap-linux.c ++++ b/pcap-linux.c +@@ -3993,6 +3993,7 @@ static int pcap_handle_packet_mmap( + aux_data.vlan_tag = tp_vlan_tci & 0x0fff; + + if (pcap_filter_with_aux_data(handle->fcode.bf_insns, ++ handle->fcode.bf_len, + bp, + tp_len, + snaplen, +diff --git a/pcap-netfilter-linux.c b/pcap-netfilter-linux.c +index 2eb0fc8c..5b5f5c18 100644 +--- a/pcap-netfilter-linux.c ++++ b/pcap-netfilter-linux.c +@@ -259,8 +259,8 @@ netfilter_read_linux(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets, pcap_handler callback, u_c + + gettimeofday(&pkth.ts, NULL); + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, payload, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) +- { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ payload, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + handlep->packets_read++; + callback(user, &pkth, payload); + count++; +diff --git a/pcap-netmap.c b/pcap-netmap.c +index 27d36e5b..bcfd6e93 100644 +--- a/pcap-netmap.c ++++ b/pcap-netmap.c +@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ pcap_netmap_filter(u_char *arg, struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *buf) + const struct bpf_insn *pc = p->fcode.bf_insns; + + ++pn->rx_pkts; +- if (pc == NULL || pcap_filter(pc, buf, h->len, h->caplen)) ++ if (pc == NULL || ++ pcap_filter(pc, p->fcode.bf_len, buf, h->len, h->caplen)) + pn->cb(pn->cb_arg, h, buf); + } + +diff --git a/pcap-npf.c b/pcap-npf.c +index 99b5981e..a4364353 100644 +--- a/pcap-npf.c ++++ b/pcap-npf.c +@@ -682,7 +682,8 @@ pcap_read_npf(pcap_t *p, int cnt, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user) + */ + if (pw->filtering_in_kernel || + p->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, datap, bhp->bh_datalen, caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ datap, bhp->bh_datalen, caplen)) { + #ifdef ENABLE_REMOTE + switch (p->rmt_samp.method) { + +diff --git a/pcap-rdmasniff.c b/pcap-rdmasniff.c +index d63ca898..c8763b33 100644 +--- a/pcap-rdmasniff.c ++++ b/pcap-rdmasniff.c +@@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ rdmasniff_read(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets, pcap_handler callback, u_char *u + pktd = (u_char *) handle->buffer + wc.wr_id * RDMASNIFF_RECEIVE_SIZE; + + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ pktd, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + callback(user, &pkth, pktd); + ++priv->packets_recv; + ++count; +diff --git a/pcap-snf.c b/pcap-snf.c +index fe9cc9c8..16ce9c8e 100644 +--- a/pcap-snf.c ++++ b/pcap-snf.c +@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ snf_read(pcap_t *p, int cnt, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user) + caplen = p->snapshot; + + if ((p->fcode.bf_insns == NULL) || +- pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, req.pkt_addr, req.length, caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(p->fcode.bf_insns, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ req.pkt_addr, req.length, caplen)) { + hdr.ts = snf_timestamp_to_timeval(req.timestamp, p->opt.tstamp_precision); + hdr.caplen = caplen; + hdr.len = req.length; +diff --git a/pcap-usb-linux.c b/pcap-usb-linux.c +index 726e4a8a..44b2bf30 100644 +--- a/pcap-usb-linux.c ++++ b/pcap-usb-linux.c +@@ -735,8 +735,8 @@ usb_read_linux_bin(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets _U_, pcap_handler callback, u + pkth.ts.tv_usec = info.hdr->ts_usec; + + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->buffer, +- pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ handle->buffer, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + handlep->packets_read++; + callback(user, &pkth, handle->buffer); + return 1; +@@ -904,8 +904,8 @@ usb_read_linux_mmap(pcap_t *handle, int max_packets, pcap_handler callback, u_ch + pkth.ts.tv_usec = hdr->ts_usec; + + if (handle->fcode.bf_insns == NULL || +- pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, (u_char*) hdr, +- pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(handle->fcode.bf_insns, handle->fcode.bf_len, ++ (u_char*) hdr, pkth.len, pkth.caplen)) { + handlep->packets_read++; + callback(user, &pkth, (u_char*) hdr); + packets++; +diff --git a/pcap.c b/pcap.c +index ef1bbb71..9ee83f98 100644 +--- a/pcap.c ++++ b/pcap.c +@@ -4179,7 +4179,7 @@ pcap_offline_filter(const struct bpf_program *fp, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, + const struct bpf_insn *fcode = fp->bf_insns; + + if (fcode != NULL) +- return (pcap_filter(fcode, pkt, h->len, h->caplen)); ++ return (pcap_filter(fcode, fp->bf_len, pkt, h->len, h->caplen)); + else + return (0); + } +diff --git a/savefile.c b/savefile.c +index db8a3aa0..e9708b23 100644 +--- a/savefile.c ++++ b/savefile.c +@@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ pcap_offline_read(pcap_t *p, int cnt, pcap_handler callback, u_char *user) + * and, if it passes, process it. + */ + if ((fcode = p->fcode.bf_insns) == NULL || +- pcap_filter(fcode, data, h.len, h.caplen)) { ++ pcap_filter(fcode, p->fcode.bf_len, ++ data, h.len, h.caplen)) { + (*callback)(user, &h, data); + n++; /* count the packet */ + if (n >= cnt) diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.4.bb index 692fdf606c..323cca3d98 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.4.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/libpcap/libpcap_1.10.4.bb @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.tcpdump.org/release/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-11961-02.patch \ file://CVE-2025-11964.patch \ file://01-CVE-2026-0799.patch \ + file://02-CVE-2026-31912.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ed19a0383fad72e3ad435fd239d7cd80d64916b87269550159d20e47160ebe5f"