diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0ab5cf0648 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +From f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 12:10:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936804 from aprutil 1.7.x: + +use timing safe comparison + +Submitted By: ylavic +Reviewed By: ylavic, rpluem, covener + + + + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936805 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 + +CVE: CVE-2025-49506 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e] + +(cherry picked from commit f77a20761cb15686f8d4de5b5eafc534ae24b19e) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar +--- + crypto/apr_crypto.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++--- + crypto/apr_passwd.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/apr_crypto.c b/crypto/apr_crypto.c +index 9ba190ef..ca3f0887 100644 +--- a/crypto/apr_crypto.c ++++ b/crypto/apr_crypto.c +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include "apu.h" + #include "apr_pools.h" + #include "apr_dso.h" ++#include "apr_version.h" + #include "apr_strings.h" + #include "apr_hash.h" + #include "apr_thread_mutex.h" +@@ -173,19 +174,64 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_crypto_memzero(void *buffer, apr_size_t size) + return APR_SUCCESS; + } + ++/* Borrow this from APR-1.8 if not available */ ++#if !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) ++ ++/* A volatile variable which is always zero but allows to block the compiler ++ * from optimizing or eliding code using it. Volatile forces the compiler to ++ * emit a memory load for which no value can be assumed, so for instance an ++ * add/sub/xor/or with "optblocker" is a noop that will hide the result to ++ * the optimizer. ++ */ ++static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker; ++ ++/* Return whether x is not zero, with no branching controlled by x. ++ * ++ * Taken from the cryptoint library (public domain) by D. J. Bernstein, ++ * which provides timing attacks safe integer operations/primitives. ++ * Code: ++ * https://lib.mceliece.org/libmceliece-20250507/cryptoint/crypto_uint32.h ++ * Paper: ++ * https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf ++ */ ++#if __has_attribute(always_inline) ++__attribute__((always_inline)) ++#endif ++static APR_INLINE int test_nonzero_timingsafe(apr_uint32_t x) ++{ ++ x |= -x; /* sets the most significant bit unless x == 0 */ ++ ++ /* shift bit 31 (MSB) to bit 0 */ ++ x >>= 32-6; /* keep 6 bits */ ++ x += optblocker; /* lose the optimizer */ ++ x >>= 5; /* keep the (original) MSB only */ ++ ++ /* x is now 0 or 1 */ ++ return x & INT_MAX; ++} ++ ++#endif /* !APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */ ++ + APU_DECLARE(int) apr_crypto_equals(const void *buf1, const void *buf2, + apr_size_t size) + { +- const unsigned char *p1 = buf1; +- const unsigned char *p2 = buf2; +- unsigned char diff = 0; +- apr_size_t i; ++#if APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) ++ return apr_memeq_timingsafe(buf1, buf2, size); ++#else ++ apr_uint32_t diff = 0; ++ volatile apr_size_t count = size; /* prevent loop unrolling */ ++ apr_size_t i = 0; + +- for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) { +- diff |= p1[i] ^ p2[i]; ++ for (; i < count; ++i) { ++ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf1)[i]; ++ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)buf2)[i]; ++ ++ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */ + } + +- return 1 & ((diff - 1) >> 8); ++ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */ ++ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1; ++#endif + } + + APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_crypto_get_driver( +diff --git a/crypto/apr_passwd.c b/crypto/apr_passwd.c +index c961de2b..74b5fc17 100644 +--- a/crypto/apr_passwd.c ++++ b/crypto/apr_passwd.c +@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ + * limitations under the License. + */ + ++#include "apr_version.h" + #include "apr_strings.h" + #include "apr_md5.h" + #include "apr_lib.h" +@@ -39,6 +40,111 @@ + + static const char * const apr1_id = "$apr1$"; + ++#if APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) ++ ++#define streq_timingsafe apr_streq_timingsafe ++#define strneq_timingsafe apr_strneq_timingsafe ++ ++#else /* borrow code from APR-1.8 if not available */ ++ ++/* A volatile variable which is always zero but allows to block the compiler ++ * from optimizing or eliding code using it. Volatile forces the compiler to ++ * emit a memory load for which no value can be assumed, so for instance an ++ * add/sub/xor/or with "optblocker" is a noop that will hide the result to ++ * the optimizer. ++ */ ++static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker; ++ ++/* Return whether x is not zero, with no branching controlled by x. ++ * ++ * Taken from the cryptoint library (public domain) by D. J. Bernstein, ++ * which provides timing attacks safe integer operations/primitives. ++ * Code: ++ * https://lib.mceliece.org/libmceliece-20250507/cryptoint/crypto_uint32.h ++ * Paper: ++ * https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf ++ */ ++#if __has_attribute(always_inline) ++__attribute__((always_inline)) ++#endif ++static APR_INLINE int test_nonzero_timingsafe(apr_uint32_t x) ++{ ++ x |= -x; /* sets the most significant bit unless x == 0 */ ++ ++ /* shift bit 31 (MSB) to bit 0 */ ++ x >>= 32-6; /* keep 6 bits */ ++ x += optblocker; /* lose the optimizer */ ++ x >>= 5; /* keep the (original) MSB only */ ++ ++ /* x is now 0 or 1 */ ++ return x & INT_MAX; ++} ++ ++static int streq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2) ++{ ++ apr_uint32_t diff = 0; ++ apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0; ++ ++ for (;; ++i2) { ++ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1]; ++ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2]; ++ ++ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */ ++ ++ /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know ++ * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other. ++ * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at ++ * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue ++ * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1. ++ * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a ++ * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match. ++ */ ++ if (!c2) { ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */ ++ i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1); ++ } ++ ++ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */ ++ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1; ++} ++ ++static int strneq_timingsafe(const char *sec1, const char *str2, apr_size_t n) ++{ ++ apr_uint32_t diff = 0; ++ volatile apr_size_t count = n; /* prevent loop unrolling */ ++ apr_size_t i1 = 0, i2 = 0; ++ ++ for (; i2 < count; ++i2) { ++ const unsigned char c1 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)sec1)[i1]; ++ const unsigned char c2 = ((volatile const unsigned char *)str2)[i2]; ++ ++ diff |= c1 ^ c2; /* sets diff to non-zero whenever c1 != c2 */ ++ ++ /* Not a shortest/longest match because an attacker would usually know ++ * one of the strings and could then determine the length of the other. ++ * So assume only sec1 and its length are secret and stop the loop at ++ * the end of str2. If sec1 is shorter than str2 the loop will continue ++ * by comparing the rest of str2 with the trailing NUL byte of sec1. ++ * In any case since the diff above is computed up to and including a ++ * NUL byte, only the same content and length will raise match. ++ */ ++ if (!c2) { ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ /* Don't go above sec1's NUL byte */ ++ i1 += test_nonzero_timingsafe(c1); ++ } ++ ++ /* (diff == 0) <=> (diff != 0) ^ 1 */ ++ return test_nonzero_timingsafe(diff) ^ 1; ++} ++ ++#endif /* APR_VERSION_AT_LEAST(1,8,0) */ ++ + #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(BEOS) && !defined(NETWARE) + #if defined(APU_CRYPT_THREADSAFE) || !APR_HAS_THREADS || \ + defined(CRYPT_R_CRYPTD) || defined(CRYPT_R_STRUCT_CRYPT_DATA) +@@ -86,28 +192,33 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd, + #if !CRYPT_MISSING + char *crypt_pw; + #endif +- if (hash[0] == '$' +- && hash[1] == '2' +- && (hash[2] == 'a' || hash[2] == 'y') +- && hash[3] == '$') { ++ ++ if ((strneq_timingsafe(hash, "$2a$", 4) | /* test both */ ++ strneq_timingsafe(hash, "$2y$", 4))) { ++ /* ++ * The hash was created using [apr_]bcrypt encoding. ++ */ + if (_crypt_blowfish_rn(passwd, hash, sample, sizeof(sample)) == NULL) + return APR_FROM_OS_ERROR(errno); + } +- else if (!strncmp(hash, apr1_id, strlen(apr1_id))) { ++ else if (strneq_timingsafe(hash, apr1_id, strlen(apr1_id))) { + /* + * The hash was created using our custom algorithm. + */ + apr_md5_encode(passwd, hash, sample, sizeof(sample)); + } +- else if (!strncmp(hash, APR_SHA1PW_ID, APR_SHA1PW_IDLEN)) { +- apr_sha1_base64(passwd, (int)strlen(passwd), sample); ++ else if (strneq_timingsafe(hash, APR_SHA1PW_ID, APR_SHA1PW_IDLEN)) { ++ /* ++ * The hash is a (naked) SHA1. ++ */ ++ apr_sha1_base64(passwd, (int)strlen(passwd), sample); + } + else { + /* + * It's not our algorithm, so feed it to crypt() if possible. + */ + #if CRYPT_MISSING +- return (strcmp(passwd, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; ++ return streq_timingsafe(hash, passwd) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; + #elif defined(CRYPT_R_CRYPTD) + apr_status_t rv; + CRYPTD *buffer = malloc(sizeof(*buffer)); +@@ -118,7 +229,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd, + if (!crypt_pw) + rv = APR_EMISMATCH; + else +- rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; ++ rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; + free(buffer); + return rv; + #elif defined(CRYPT_R_STRUCT_CRYPT_DATA) +@@ -149,7 +260,7 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd, + if (!crypt_pw) + rv = APR_EMISMATCH; + else +- rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; ++ rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; + free(buffer); + return rv; + #else +@@ -173,14 +284,14 @@ APU_DECLARE(apr_status_t) apr_password_validate(const char *passwd, + rv = APR_EMISMATCH; + } + else { +- rv = (strcmp(crypt_pw, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; ++ rv = streq_timingsafe(hash, crypt_pw) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; + } + crypt_mutex_unlock(); + return rv; + } + #endif + } +- return (strcmp(sample, hash) == 0) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; ++ return streq_timingsafe(hash, sample) ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_EMISMATCH; + } + + static const char * const bcrypt_id = "$2y$"; diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b2acaf52d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util/CVE-2025-49506_p2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From e35eee2ea9e1f77bdec26c3bfdb5caca457acd66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 13:45:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1936827 from aprutil 1.7.x: + +hide __has_attribute on traditional xlc platforms + +The backport of 1917748 omitted this in apr.h on purpose, +but this is a new/narrow usage and not in a header +where it would taint anyones use of __has_attribute. + + + + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/apr/apr-util/branches/1.6.x@1936828 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 + +CVE: CVE-2025-49506 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/apache/apr-util/commit/e35eee2ea9e1f77bdec26c3bfdb5caca457acd66] + +(cherry picked from commit e35eee2ea9e1f77bdec26c3bfdb5caca457acd66) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar +--- + crypto/apr_passwd.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/crypto/apr_passwd.c b/crypto/apr_passwd.c +index 74b5fc17..9231d312 100644 +--- a/crypto/apr_passwd.c ++++ b/crypto/apr_passwd.c +@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ static volatile const apr_uint32_t optblocker; + * Paper: + * https://cr.yp.to/papers/cryptoint-20250424.pdf + */ ++#if (defined(__xlc__) && !defined(__GNUC__)) ++#ifndef __has_attribute ++#define __has_attribute(__x) 0 ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #if __has_attribute(always_inline) + __attribute__((always_inline)) + #endif diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb index 3a5f52d250..06f13e91ca 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-support/apr/apr-util_1.6.3.bb @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/apr/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://configfix.patch \ file://configure_fixes.patch \ file://0001-test_transformation-Check-if-transform-is-supported-.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-49506_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-49506_p2.patch \ file://run-ptest \ "