From patchwork Sat Nov 1 21:04:36 2025 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Peter Marko X-Patchwork-Id: 73434 X-Patchwork-Delegate: steve@sakoman.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0472FCCFA00 for ; Sat, 1 Nov 2025 21:04:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mta-64-227.siemens.flowmailer.net (mta-64-227.siemens.flowmailer.net [185.136.64.227]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.msgproc02-g2.14266.1762031083524636740 for ; Sat, 01 Nov 2025 14:04:43 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=peter.marko@siemens.com header.s=fm1 header.b=gvvvOOND; spf=pass (domain: rts-flowmailer.siemens.com, ip: 185.136.64.227, mailfrom: fm-256628-20251101210441d80ef6f0a30002076c-5ban_5@rts-flowmailer.siemens.com) Received: by mta-64-227.siemens.flowmailer.net with ESMTPSA id 20251101210441d80ef6f0a30002076c for ; Sat, 01 Nov 2025 22:04:41 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; s=fm1; d=siemens.com; i=peter.marko@siemens.com; h=Date:From:Subject:To:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc; bh=wYeSopZO7mF6KqGZqO8/GdbHR1YM0ValIrAG+/VixEc=; b=gvvvOONDmJpGxefatia9yyARy+2yEpl2C9vSqLVUnI0UvIxBu0yf/CEHXZRPy5Qaz6hY76 6jhe+ENFA0sZf1XyUFcKSsW/msY2YnxXt4QGgfbqWxzBZwNzwUEYUBkN/Z7uhhhh7uaVtNuq nDcqOlTR+SoqHc4rQk7FAGEw735aPBgnBl6vWS7fy6sRepOiUzxFVd6kt58LlC7DOqUTOxCC wzw9C1iH5SVcI4FdK8IOva1tcshLxiAykf5LxywCMSdlIM0AvGo0SyEBcCsYySXKy9uQ7BDO Lvm0BoVjKRmnRNAwH/B2uUnESqeXx+mYrLIQmLD+9lLIyxLNFkNblOxw==; From: Peter Marko To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Peter Marko Subject: [OE-core][kirkstone][PATCH] wpa-supplicant: patch CVE-2025-24912 Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 22:04:36 +0100 Message-Id: <20251101210436.1359606-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Flowmailer-Platform: Siemens Feedback-ID: 519:519-256628:519-21489:flowmailer List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from 45-33-107-173.ip.linodeusercontent.com [45.33.107.173] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Sat, 01 Nov 2025 21:04:46 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/225565 From: Peter Marko Pick patches as listed in NVD CVE report. Note that Debian lists one of the patches as introducing the vulnerability. This is against what the original report [1] says. Also the commit messages provide hints that the first patch fixes this issue and second is fixing problem with the first patch. [1] https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN19358384/ Signed-off-by: Peter Marko --- .../wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch | 79 +++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch | 70 ++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8976047f68 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response + +The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply +that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such, +such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for +the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN) +is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before +validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the +state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the +response. + +Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on +responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a +theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting +RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS +server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and +with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by +flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS +request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly +protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in +processing RADIUS responses. + +Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having +fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the +registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and +processing of the response has succeeded. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +CVE: CVE-2025-24912 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c +index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644 +--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c ++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c +@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100); + rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip; + +- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ +- if (prev_req) +- prev_req->next = req->next; +- else +- radius->msgs = req->next; +- radius->num_msgs--; +- + for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) { + RadiusRxResult res; + res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret, +@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + radius_msg_free(msg); + /* fall through */ + case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED: ++ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ ++ if (prev_req) ++ prev_req->next = req->next; ++ else ++ radius->msgs = req->next; ++ radius->num_msgs--; ++ + radius_client_msg_free(req); + return; + case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR: +@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier, + invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" : + ""); +- radius_client_msg_free(req); + + fail: + radius_msg_free(msg); diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f3cecd6d5f --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2025-24912-02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping + +A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS +request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message +handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of +the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req +pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such, +some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result +in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a +memory leak. + +Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request +is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a +new entry. + +Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response") +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen + +CVE: CVE-2025-24912 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++--- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c +index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644 +--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c ++++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c +@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + struct radius_hdr *hdr; + struct radius_rx_handler *handlers; + size_t num_handlers, i; +- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req; ++ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r; + struct os_reltime now; + struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf; + int invalid_authenticator = 0; +@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + break; + } + +- prev_req = NULL; + req = radius->msgs; + while (req) { + /* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using +@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + hdr->identifier) + break; + +- prev_req = req; + req = req->next; + } + +@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx) + /* fall through */ + case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED: + /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */ ++ prev_req = NULL; ++ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) { ++ if (r == req) ++ break; ++ prev_req = r; ++ } + if (prev_req) + prev_req->next = req->next; + else diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb index fbbbebc450..50ac901cba 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \ file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \ file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"