From patchwork Sat Apr 13 22:02:16 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Marko, Peter" X-Patchwork-Id: 42304 X-Patchwork-Delegate: steve@sakoman.com Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19308C4345F for ; Sat, 13 Apr 2024 22:27:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mta-64-225.siemens.flowmailer.net (mta-64-225.siemens.flowmailer.net [185.136.64.225]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.21841.1713047210781766819 for ; Sat, 13 Apr 2024 15:26:52 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=peter.marko@siemens.com header.s=fm1 header.b=Ea2daEXk; spf=pass (domain: rts-flowmailer.siemens.com, ip: 185.136.64.225, mailfrom: fm-256628-202404132226479ecfeb32a354dcbeb4-ccvnec@rts-flowmailer.siemens.com) Received: by mta-64-225.siemens.flowmailer.net with ESMTPSA id 202404132226479ecfeb32a354dcbeb4 for ; Sun, 14 Apr 2024 00:26:48 +0200 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; s=fm1; d=siemens.com; i=peter.marko@siemens.com; h=Date:From:Subject:To:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc; bh=ZVn+az3eg9S8gDWyMHzhIq0tDoP4z7GTIvYnJ3Cm2+4=; b=Ea2daEXkEcpTshsUxWcxj+3+1T6O8Bdf1cHWIt285lMqkLLben31VEll5JQ8HqYDFIZCZg xm/HplBUsKiIu+H3R4Ci5duw/9ntqbPQrHaRg74Kt9QENlbpNbROlQcmidGCNtaHYqIrX54K Ss11RxdF9nHknIMUVWbWyq3norbpM=; From: Peter Marko To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Cc: Peter Marko Subject: [OE-core][kirkstone][PATCH] openssl: patch CVE-2024-2511 Date: Sun, 14 Apr 2024 00:02:16 +0200 Message-Id: <20240413220216.1520282-1-peter.marko@siemens.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Flowmailer-Platform: Siemens Feedback-ID: 519:519-256628:519-21489:flowmailer List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Sat, 13 Apr 2024 22:27:01 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/198202 From: Peter Marko Patch: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d News: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/daee101e39073d4b65a68faeb2f2de5ad7b05c36 Signed-off-by: Peter Marko --- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-2511.patch | 122 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 123 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-2511.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-2511.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-2511.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8aea686205 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-2511.patch @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 15:43:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix unconstrained session cache growth in TLSv1.3 + +In TLSv1.3 we create a new session object for each ticket that we send. +We do this by duplicating the original session. If SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is in +use then the new session will be added to the session cache. However, if +early data is not in use (and therefore anti-replay protection is being +used), then multiple threads could be resuming from the same session +simultaneously. If this happens and a problem occurs on one of the threads, +then the original session object could be marked as not_resumable. When we +duplicate the session object this not_resumable status gets copied into the +new session object. The new session object is then added to the session +cache even though it is not_resumable. + +Subsequently, another bug means that the session_id_length is set to 0 for +sessions that are marked as not_resumable - even though that session is +still in the cache. Once this happens the session can never be removed from +the cache. When that object gets to be the session cache tail object the +cache never shrinks again and grows indefinitely. + +CVE-2024-2511 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24044) + +(cherry picked from commit 7e4d731b1c07201ad9374c1cd9ac5263bdf35bce) + +CVE: CVE-2024-2511 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b52867a9f618bb955bed2a3ce3db4d4f97ed8e5d] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko +--- + ssl/ssl_lib.c | 5 +++-- + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ + ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 5 ++--- + 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +index 2c8479eb5fc69..eed649c6fdee9 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -3736,9 +3736,10 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) + + /* + * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it +- * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) ++ * would be rather hard to do anyway :-). Also if the session has already ++ * been marked as not_resumable we should not cache it for later reuse. + */ +- if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) ++ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0 || s->session->not_resumable) + return; + + /* +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +index d836b33ed0e81..75adbd9e52b40 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -152,16 +152,11 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) + return ss; + } + +-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) +-{ +- return ssl_session_dup(src, 1); +-} +- + /* + * Create a new SSL_SESSION and duplicate the contents of |src| into it. If + * ticket == 0 then no ticket information is duplicated, otherwise it is. + */ +-SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++static SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup_intern(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + { + SSL_SESSION *dest; + +@@ -285,6 +280,27 @@ SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) + return NULL; + } + ++SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src) ++{ ++ return ssl_session_dup_intern(src, 1); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Used internally when duplicating a session which might be already shared. ++ * We will have resumed the original session. Subsequently we might have marked ++ * it as non-resumable (e.g. in another thread) - but this copy should be ok to ++ * resume from. ++ */ ++SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(const SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket) ++{ ++ SSL_SESSION *sess = ssl_session_dup_intern(src, ticket); ++ ++ if (sess != NULL) ++ sess->not_resumable = 0; ++ ++ return sess; ++} ++ + const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len) + { + if (len) +diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +index a9e67f9d32a77..6c942e6bcec29 100644 +--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +@@ -2338,9 +2338,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) + * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed + * to send back. + */ +- if (s->session->not_resumable || +- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) +- && !s->hit)) ++ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) ++ && !s->hit) + s->session->session_id_length = 0; + + if (usetls13) { diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb index 5e43fdc2de..3b253ddde0 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.13.bb @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ file://afalg.patch \ file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-2511.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \