diff --git a/documentation/ref-manual/boot-architecture.rst b/documentation/ref-manual/boot-architecture.rst
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+Boot Architecture and Firmware Components
+=========================================
+
+This document describes the firmware and boot architecture used by
+systems built with the Yocto Project across several processor
+architectures:
+
+* Arm (Arm32)
+* Arm64 (AArch64)
+* RISC-V
+* x86 / x86_64
+
+Understanding the firmware chain is important when configuring Yocto
+Project builds because multiple software components can fulfill the
+same role in the boot process. These components are often mutually
+exclusive and are typically selected through BitBake providers or
+machine configuration.
+
+
+Boot Process Overview
+---------------------
+
+Most systems boot through a sequence of stages that progressively
+initialize the hardware and load the operating system. Control typically
+passes from more privileged and trusted stages to less privileged ones.
+
+::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   Platform Firmware
+      ↓
+   System Firmware
+      ↓
+   OS Loader (optional)
+      ↓
+   Operating System
+
+
+Boot ROM
+--------
+
+Boot ROM is the first code executed when a processor starts. It is
+typically implemented by the CPU or SoC manufacturer and stored in
+on-chip read-only memory.
+
+Boot ROM performs minimal initialization and loads the next stage of
+firmware from boot media such as SPI flash, eMMC, or SD storage.
+
+Boot ROM code is generally **not modifiable by system developers**.
+
+
+Platform Firmware
+-----------------
+
+Platform firmware performs early platform initialization before the
+main boot firmware executes. Depending on the architecture and
+implementation, it may configure security boundaries, initialize memory
+and clocks, provide management-controller functions, or expose
+privileged runtime services used later by the operating system.
+
+Some parts of this layer may remain resident after boot. Platform
+firmware is usually platform-specific and typically has fewer
+interchangeable implementations than later boot stages.
+
+Examples include:
+
+* Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A)
+* Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M), where applicable
+* System Control Processor (SCP) firmware
+* OpenSBI, which implements the Supervisor Binary Interface (SBI)
+
+
+System Firmware
+---------------
+
+System firmware provides the main boot environment. It prepares the
+hardware needed to load the next stage, discovers bootable devices,
+and may provide a command shell or a UEFI environment. Many modern
+implementations can also boot the kernel directly from storage,
+making a separate OS loader optional.
+
+This layer is generally modifiable by system developers and often
+has alternative implementations.
+
+Typical implementations include:
+
+* U-Boot
+* EDK2
+* coreboot
+
+In Yocto Project builds this layer can be selected through a virtual
+provider using ``PREFERRED_PROVIDER``.
+
+The name ``virtual/boot-firmware`` reflects the role of this layer as
+the primary firmware environment responsible for locating bootable
+devices and initiating the operating system boot process.
+
+Example configuration::
+
+   PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/boot-firmware = "u-boot"
+
+
+OS Loader
+---------
+
+The OS loader is the final stage that typically resides on disk. It
+selects and loads a specific operating system kernel and optional
+initramfs into memory and passes the required configuration to start
+the system.
+
+This layer is modifiable by system developers and usually has multiple
+implementations.
+
+Examples include:
+
+* GRUB
+* Syslinux / EXTLINUX
+* systemd-boot
+
+In Yocto Project builds this layer can also be selected through a
+virtual provider.
+
+The name ``virtual/boot-manager`` reflects the role of this software in
+selecting and loading an operating system kernel from storage.
+
+Example configuration::
+
+   PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/boot-manager = "grub-efi"
+
+Some systems boot the kernel directly from system firmware (for example
+U-Boot or UEFI). In these cases an additional OS loader is not required.
+
+Example::
+
+   PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/boot-manager = "none"
+
+
+Boot Process by Architecture
+----------------------------
+
+
+Arm (Arm32)
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Many Arm32 systems boot directly into U-Boot using its SPL stage.
+
+::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   U-Boot SPL
+      ↓
+   U-Boot
+      ↓
+   Linux Kernel
+
+
+Arm64 (AArch64)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Arm64 platforms commonly include Trusted Firmware-A prior to the
+main boot firmware.
+
+::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   TF-A BL1 / BL2 / BL31
+      ↓
+   U-Boot or EDK2
+      ↓
+   OS Loader or Linux Kernel
+
+When a separate OS loader is used, it is typically GRUB or
+systemd-boot.
+
+
+RISC-V
+~~~~~~
+
+RISC-V systems typically include OpenSBI, which provides the
+Supervisor Binary Interface (SBI).
+
+::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   OpenSBI
+      ↓
+   U-Boot or EDK2
+      ↓
+   OS Loader or Linux Kernel
+
+When a separate OS loader is used, it is typically GRUB or
+systemd-boot.
+
+
+x86 / x86_64
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Typical x86 systems use platform firmware implementing BIOS
+compatibility or UEFI.
+
+::
+
+   CPU reset vector (firmware entry point)
+      ↓
+   Platform Firmware (BIOS / UEFI, for example coreboot- or EDK2-based firmware)
+      ↓
+   GRUB or systemd-boot
+      ↓
+   Linux Kernel
+
+
+Security Considerations
+-----------------------
+
+Secure Boot
+~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Secure Boot ensures that only software verified by a trusted key can
+execute during the boot process.
+
+Each stage verifies the integrity and authenticity of the next stage
+before transferring control. Verification is typically performed using
+digital signatures and public-key cryptography.
+
+The process begins with a hardware root of trust, often implemented in
+Boot ROM or secure firmware, which contains the keys used to verify
+subsequent boot stages.
+
+A simplified Secure Boot chain may look like this::
+
+   Boot ROM (Root of Trust)
+      ↓
+   Platform Firmware
+      ↓
+   System Firmware
+      ↓
+   OS Loader
+      ↓
+   Linux Kernel
+
+If verification fails at any stage, execution is typically halted or
+recovery mechanisms are triggered.
+
+Common Secure Boot mechanisms include:
+
+* Firmware signature verification
+* Signed bootloader images
+* Signed kernel images
+* UEFI Secure Boot
+* U-Boot FIT image verification
+
+In Yocto Project builds Secure Boot is commonly implemented using:
+
+* U-Boot verified boot (FIT image signatures)
+* UEFI Secure Boot with EDK2
+* Trusted Firmware-A verified boot
+
+
+Trusted Boot
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Trusted Boot focuses on *measuring* the boot process rather than
+preventing execution.
+
+Instead of blocking execution, Trusted Boot records cryptographic
+measurements (typically hashes) of boot components as they are loaded.
+These measurements are stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or
+other protected storage.
+
+A simplified measurement chain may look like this::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   Measure Platform Firmware
+      ↓
+   Measure Bootloader
+      ↓
+   Measure Kernel
+      ↓
+   Store measurements in TPM
+
+Measurements are extended into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
+in the TPM and can later be used to verify system integrity.
+
+Trusted Boot enables capabilities such as:
+
+* Remote attestation
+* Platform integrity verification
+* Measured boot logging
+* Runtime integrity checking
+
+Trusted Boot does **not necessarily prevent execution of untrusted
+software**, but provides a verifiable record of what software was
+loaded during boot.
+
+
+Secure Boot and Trusted Boot Together
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Many systems combine Secure Boot and Trusted Boot to provide both
+enforcement and measurement.
+
+For example::
+
+   Boot ROM
+      ↓
+   Verify Platform Firmware
+      ↓
+   Measure Platform Firmware
+      ↓
+   Verify Bootloader
+      ↓
+   Measure Bootloader
+      ↓
+   Verify Kernel
+      ↓
+   Measure Kernel
+
+This approach both prevents unauthorized code from running and
+provides an auditable record of the boot process.
+
+
+Yocto Project Integration
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The Yocto Project can be used to build systems that implement Secure
+Boot and Trusted Boot through several layers and components.
+
+Examples include:
+
+* Secure Boot support in U-Boot
+* UEFI Secure Boot with EDK2
+* Trusted Firmware-A verified boot support
+* TPM integration
+* Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
+* Extended Verification Module (EVM)
+
+These features can be enabled and configured using machine
+configurations, distribution features, and additional layers such as
+security-focused metadata layers.
+
+
+References
+----------
+
+* `Boot Loader Specification <https://systemd.io/BOOT_LOADER_SPECIFICATION/>`_
+* `Coreboot <https://doc.coreboot.org/>`_
+* `EDK2 <https://github.com/tianocore/edk2>`_
+* `GNU GRUB <https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/>`_
+* `IMA/EVM <https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/>`_
+* `Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) <https://ima-doc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ima-concepts.html>`_
+* `OpenSBI <https://github.com/riscv-software-src/opensbi>`_
+* `Syslinux Project <https://wiki.syslinux.org/wiki/index.php?title=The_Syslinux_Project>`_
+* `Trusted Firmware-A <https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/>`_
+* `Trusted Firmware-M <https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/>`_
+* `U-Boot <https://u-boot.readthedocs.io/>`_
+* `UEFI Secure Boot documentation <https://docs.system-transparency.org/st-1.1.0/docs/selected-topics/secureboot_concepts/>`_
diff --git a/documentation/ref-manual/index.rst b/documentation/ref-manual/index.rst
index aa1a63e0500b..2456f56c37ee 100644
--- a/documentation/ref-manual/index.rst
+++ b/documentation/ref-manual/index.rst
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Yocto Project Reference Manual
 
    system-requirements
    yocto-project-supported-features
+   boot-architecture
    terms
    release-process
    structure
