From patchwork Thu Sep 19 02:54:07 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Javier Tia X-Patchwork-Id: 49256 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88024CDD56F for ; Thu, 19 Sep 2024 02:54:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-vk1-f179.google.com (mail-vk1-f179.google.com [209.85.221.179]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web11.10886.1726714457936075416 for ; Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:54:18 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@linaro.org header.s=google header.b=VEfW/aWv; spf=pass (domain: linaro.org, ip: 209.85.221.179, mailfrom: javier.tia@linaro.org) Received: by mail-vk1-f179.google.com with SMTP id 71dfb90a1353d-5010861905bso743621e0c.1 for ; Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:54:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; t=1726714457; x=1727319257; darn=lists.yoctoproject.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=rfYQN1FZLOsg1p4vez/5z0QvYTzYNu/ke6pkUpC9YUY=; b=VEfW/aWvpehf3bU9x9cJB00t/63c3+GHnfIA9KPNerrnG26FefY9SEFlL3Vlq0Z82q ix9ZVi7o98fle7xp4xYu+npimdZ520OoHZ5MFtKhZkpg0Hws4D1iTzxSmfPgXcw/HW8k l4F+BSS+GFaDqXog1OLP+WWI27cVxffo3s/k3nQU2wFWt7gXd+CCi3GwSoteJayotsSS 1dCIB9ZaUZj1loJZDyFi/JOjEy4VClpi8UeRfFE9t6+qdkiuU/iH8pRsTEI9ojfn+EUg orjj34HCycx8Hd+4CZAhnQhgkjkUiQ2YIYWEV3z0hd7D35EEfHqkYgH8XcaPghbC6K/r 2DLg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1726714457; x=1727319257; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=rfYQN1FZLOsg1p4vez/5z0QvYTzYNu/ke6pkUpC9YUY=; b=QWvNaNzfKLQl1Hu7SpXCfdlbajSDhYFubUlbdMeiLF10gTYzcaDewp6LBpmDdMm36q 2y1UQ8Y9blFHScc8SZYlFVro7yA89u9hmeBOZYzJu0RwPP94tiCOcCGCvuXx2qPuwRu5 A31KrwxwV2pbeIGEBeLo72bbnNG9n9EBUkAHnzMMYzjNirv/J5YrkCiGcMohO8JufXhF lVEEDgmPJtnydDaXbMYyNrWw3CSeJUIaZ9Qg38x0bWkcOshcNQLmsEa775TP/LC3CqPu yHfp680hx6vn61YHsENqaPNUaYH5HUGsQYRTAKHtTDxezO1Qg6Rpil2MG+lzt3brEed7 VwOQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxYpC01ovAliQKFE3ckM8BCskHHiRK+g3NdzK8WKOTz565yK7ct CWFAwLj16Q0s4lylXdMb7d/ZVwiVQzkX7vlZQRd8lzWIfP9sydBRSng7ae/LAbkTPygktGgagMY P X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IFOGyGNF5f8y+H5aZx05PpD16vrQr3/T18DqUn70bp/svg6upIj1jwIvbcX4zb/tISqgwJ3vw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6122:4124:b0:4f6:b302:5c50 with SMTP id 71dfb90a1353d-503c9a2e8bdmr1204128e0c.0.1726714456639; Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:54:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jetm-rog-x670e-gene.lan ([170.246.157.153]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 71dfb90a1353d-5035ba92e49sm1238181e0c.31.2024.09.18.19.54.15 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 18 Sep 2024 19:54:15 -0700 (PDT) From: Javier Tia To: meta-arm@lists.yoctoproject.org Cc: Mikko Rapeli , Ross Burton , Jon Mason , Javier Tia Subject: [PATCH v6 2/2] qemuarm64-secureboot: Enable UEFI Secure Boot Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 20:54:07 -0600 Message-ID: <20240919025407.64543-3-javier.tia@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.1 In-Reply-To: <20240919025407.64543-1-javier.tia@linaro.org> References: <20240919025407.64543-1-javier.tia@linaro.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: X-Webhook-Received: from li982-79.members.linode.com [45.33.32.79] by aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org with HTTPS for ; Thu, 19 Sep 2024 02:54:18 -0000 X-Groupsio-URL: https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/meta-arm/message/6085 Encapsulate all UEFI Secure Boot required settings in one Kas configuration file. Introduce SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR variable where UEFI keys will be generated to sign UEFI binaries.  Introduce uefi-secureboot machine feature, which is being used to conditionally set the proper UEFI settings in recipes. Replace Grub bootloader with systemd-boot, which it makes easier to enable Secure Boot. Advantages using systemd as Init Manager: - Extending secure boot to userspace is a lot easier with systemd than with sysvinit where custom scripts will need to be written for all use cases. - systemd supports dm-verity and TPM devices for encryption usecases out of the box. Enabling them is a lot easier than writing custom scripts for sysvinit. - systemd also supports EUFI signing the UKI binaries which merge kernel, command line and initrd which helps in bringing secure boot towards rootfs. - systemd offers a modular structure with unit files that are more predictable and easier to manage than the complex and varied scripts used by SysVinit. This modularity allows for better control and customization of the boot process, which is beneficial in Secure Boot environments. - Add CI settings to build and test UEFI Secure Boot. Add one test to verify Secure Boot using OE Testing infraestructure: $ kas build ci/qemuarm64-secureboot.yml:ci/uefi-secureboot.yml:ci/testimage.yml ... RESULTS - uefi_secureboot.UEFI_SB_TestSuite.test_uefi_secureboot: PASSED (0.62s) ... SUMMARY: core-image-base () - Ran 73 tests in 28.281s core-image-base - OK - All required tests passed (successes=19, skipped=54, failures=0, errors=0) Signed-off-by: Javier Tia --- .gitlab-ci.yml | 1 + ci/uefi-secureboot.yml | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ .../lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/uefi_secureboot.py | 29 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ci/uefi-secureboot.yml create mode 100644 meta-arm/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/uefi_secureboot.py diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml index e8627731..1ea167c6 100644 --- a/.gitlab-ci.yml +++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml @@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ qemuarm64-secureboot: TOOLCHAINS: [gcc, clang] TCLIBC: [glibc, musl] TS: [none, qemuarm64-secureboot-ts] + UEFISB: [none, uefi-secureboot] TESTING: testimage - KERNEL: linux-yocto-dev TESTING: testimage diff --git a/ci/uefi-secureboot.yml b/ci/uefi-secureboot.yml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f3d03ec1 --- /dev/null +++ b/ci/uefi-secureboot.yml @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/siemens/kas/master/kas/schema-kas.json + +# UEFI Secure Boot: A mechanism to ensure that only trusted software is executed +# during the boot process. + +header: + version: 14 + includes: + - ci/meta-openembedded.yml + - ci/meta-secure-core.yml + +local_conf_header: + uefi_secureboot: | + SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR = "${TOPDIR}/sbkeys" + BB_ENV_PASSTHROUGH_ADDITIONS = "SBSIGN_KEYS_DIR" + + # Detected by passing kernel parameter + QB_KERNEL_ROOT = "" + + # kernel is in the image, should not be loaded separately + QB_DEFAULT_KERNEL = "none" + + WKS_FILE = "efi-disk-no-swap.wks.in" + KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "Image" + + MACHINE_FEATURES:append = " efi uefi-secureboot" + + EFI_PROVIDER = "systemd-boot" + + # Use systemd as the init system + INIT_MANAGER = "systemd" + DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " systemd" + DISTRO_FEATURES_NATIVE:append = " systemd" + + IMAGE_INSTALL:append = " systemd systemd-boot util-linux coreutils efivar" + + TEST_SUITES:append = " uefi_secureboot" \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta-arm/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/uefi_secureboot.py b/meta-arm/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/uefi_secureboot.py new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9e47ea8d --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-arm/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/uefi_secureboot.py @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT +# + +from oeqa.runtime.case import OERuntimeTestCase +from oeqa.core.decorator.oetimeout import OETimeout + + +class UEFI_SB_TestSuite(OERuntimeTestCase): + """ + Validate Secure Boot is Enabled + """ + + @OETimeout(1300) + def test_uefi_secureboot(self): + # Validate Secure Boot is enabled by checking + # 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c-SecureBoot. + # The GUID '8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c' is a well-known + # identifier for the Secure Boot UEFI variable. By checking the value of + # this variable, specifically + # '8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c-SecureBoot', we can determine + # whether Secure Boot is enabled or not. This variable is set by the + # UEFI firmware to indicate the current Secure Boot state. If the + # variable is set to a value of '0x1' (or '1'), it indicates that Secure + # Boot is enabled. If the variable is set to a value of '0x0' (or '0'), + # it indicates that Secure Boot is disabled. + cmd = "efivar -d -n 8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c-SecureBoot" + status, output = self.target.run(cmd, timeout=120) + self.assertEqual(output, "1", msg="\n".join([cmd, output]))